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Articles
On the Origins of Originalism
Jamal Greene*
For all its proponents' claims of its necessity as a means of constraining
judges, originalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United States. Recom-
mended responses to judicial activism in other countries more typically take the
form of minimalism or textualism. This Article considers why. Ifocus particular
attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada and Australia,
nations that, like the United States, have well-established traditions of judicial
enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the United States a
common law adjudicative norm, but whose political and legal cultures less
readily assimilate judicial restraint to constitutional historicism. I offer six
hypotheses as to the influences that sensitize our own culture to such historicism:
the canonizing influence of time; the revolutionary character of American
sovereignty; the rights revolution of the Warren and Burger Courts; the
politicization of the judicial-nomination process in the United States;
accommodation of an assimilative, as against a pluralist, ethos; and a relatively
evangelical religious culture. These six hypotheses suggest, among other things,
that originalist argument in the United States is a form of ethical argument and
that the domestic debate over originalism should be understood in ethical terms.
I. Introduction ......................................................................................... 2
II. O ur O riginalism .................................................................................. 8
III. The Lives of Others: The Cases of Canada and Australia ................ 18
A. Canada's Charter Evolution ......................................................... 20
1. Judicial Review Under the BNA Act ........................................ 20
2. A Tree Grows in Canada: Judicial Review Under the Charter .... 28
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful conversation, generous
feedback, and thoughtful suggestions, I wish to thank Vincent Blasi, Samuel Bray, Laurence Claus,
Charles Fried, Suzanne Goldberg, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Kent Greenawalt, Ruth Greenwood, Philip
Hamburger, Paul Horwitz, Grant Huscroft, Vicki Jackson, Gillian Metzger, Bradley Miller, Henry
Monaghan, Elora Mukherjee, Richard Primus, Peter Schuck, Neil Siegel, Peter Strauss, Wade
Wright, and participants at the New York City Junior Faculty Colloquium and workshops at
Columbia Law School, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, and the SMU Dedman
School of Law.
2 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:1
3. Critics of Canadian Activism ................................................... 37
B. Australia's Faint-Hearted Originalism .......................................... 40
1. The Commonwealth ofAustralia Constitution Act 1900 ....... 41
2. Legalism at the Bar of the High Court ...................................... 43
3. The Mason Court Revolution ................................................... 50
4. The Gleeson Counterrevolution ................................................. 57
IV . Six H ypotheses ................................................................................. 62
A . Fixating on the Fram ers ............................................................... 63
B. Revolution vs. Evolution ............................................................. 66
C . Rights and the Right ..................................................................... 69
D. The Politics of Judicial Nominations ............................................ 72
E. Pluralism and N om os .................................................................... 74
F. Constitutional Faith ....................................................................... 78
V. Originalism as Ethical Argument ..................................................... 82
V I. C onclusion ........................................................................................ 88
I. Introduction
For the last quarter-century, originalism has been the idiom of judicial
restraint in the United States. Originalism's proponents defend it as uniquely
appropriate to judging in a constitutional democracy because, unlike its
competitors, originalism offers articulable and transparent criteria for
discerning the meaning of ambiguous constitutional texts. Without the dis-
cipline originalism enforces, judges are free to decide cases according to
metrics that are either impermissible-their naked policy preferences, say-
or too opaque to impose the public accountability the judicial role demands.
Despite sustained criticism that has discredited originalists within
certain comers of the legal academy, the originalism movement is a success
by numerous measures.' As others have remarked, the Court's recent deci-
sion in District of Columbia v. Heller2 was less interesting for its result,
which was widely anticipated, than for the fact that Justice Stevens's lengthy
dissent spent so much space parsing the views of eighteenth-century
Americans on the meaning of the Second Amendment's text.3 As Part II of
1. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009).
2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (establishing an individual constitutional right to keep a loaded
handgun in one's home).
3. See id. at 2822-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (substantiating his claim that the Second
Amendment was originally adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to
maintain a well-regulated militia but not to curtail the legislature's power to regulate private civilian
uses of firearms); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REv. 246, 256-57 (2008) (faulting both judges as historians but noting that both the
majority and Stevens's dissent were "impressively detailed" in their compilations of historical
evidence); Heller on a First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008, 17:03 EST) ("Stevens might not be a
very accomplished originalist, or you might think he was wrong in this instance, but the mere fact
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this Article details, originalism is a recurring topic of discussion in newspa-
per editorials, on blogs, on talk radio, and at confirmation hearings, and
consistently large numbers of Americans report in surveys that they believe
Supreme Court Justices should interpret the Constitution solely based on the
original intentions of its authors.
4
In light of the claims to singular democratic legitimacy made on
originalism's behalf, and given the evident sympathy of many Americans
toward those claims, it is curious that originalism is so little celebrated
outside the United States. The notion that the meaning of a political
constitution is, in any practical sense, fixed at some point in the past and
authoritative in present cases is pooh-poohed by most leading jurists in
Canada, South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of Europe, and the
text-bound "original meaning" version of originalism that has been ascendant
in recent years in the United States is on the wane in Australia.
The global rejection of American-style originalism would be
understandable if constitutional judges in other democratic countries either
were ignorant of originalism's claims to judicial restraint or were dis-
couraged from such restraint altogether, but neither is true. The charge of
judicial activism is neither unique to nor uniquely stigmatic within American
constitutional discourse,5 and for all the hostility many originalists show
toward importing foreign jurisprudence into American constitutional
interpretation, the domestic originalism movement has not been reticent in
seeking to export itself abroad.6  That so many American judges, theorists,
and ordinary citizens take originalism so seriously seems all the more curious
in light of the advanced age of the U.S. Constitution. Few constitutional
that he and the three who joined him paid such obeisance to originalism on a matter of
constitutional first impression confirms again its ascendance as a methodol[o]gy."); Some
Preliminary Reflections on Heller, Posting of Sandy Levinson to Balkinization, http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2008/06/some-preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html (June 26, 2008, 17:47 EST)
(remarking on the 110 pages that Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens spent debating the purported
original meaning of the Second Amendment); More on Heller, Posting of Mark Tushnet to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/more-on-heller.html (June 27, 2008, 9:57 EST)
(criticizing both the majority and the dissent for marshalling history in support of a single original
meaning); cf Greene, supra note 1, at 686-88 (distinguishing the originalism of Justice Stevens's
opinion from that of Justice Scalia's).
4. Greene, supra note 1, at 695-96.
5. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE? 3-6 (2001) (discussing concerns voiced by Canadians regarding alleged
activism by the Supreme Court of Canada); Luise Barnstedt, Judicial Activism in the Practice of the
German Federal Constitutional Court: Is the GFCC an Activist Court?, 13 JURIDICA INT'L 38, 41-
42 (2007) (describing the German Federal Constitutional Court's judicial self-restraint); Michael
Kirby, "Judicial Activism?" A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 1, 8-10
(cataloging attacks on the purported activism of the Australian High Court).
6. See infra note 102 and accompanying text; cf Greg Craven, Original Intent and the
Australian Constitution-Coming Soon to a Court Near You?, 1 PUB. L. REV. 166, 166 (1990)
(Austl.) ("No one with a serious interest in constitutional law and theory could fail to be aware of
the debate that has raged in the United States over the question of 'original intent' (or
'intentionalism') as a theory for the interpretation of that country's Constitution.").
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framers or ratifiers are less connected to contemporary realities than our own,
and yet few peoples more earnestly or enthusiastically engage originalist
constitutional premises than we do. It may be the genius of the U.S.
Constitution that its text so graciously adapts to changing circumstances,7 but
it is a genius that many originalists conspicuously refuse to recognize.
Our relative embrace of originalism is not easily explained as a
corollary to either the age of our Constitution, which at first blush seems to
cut the other way, or its commitment to writing, which is no longer unique.
Nor do we find obvious answers in our politics. Rights revolutions of the
sort to which the originalist movement is responsive have proceeded more
quickly and more dramatically elsewhere, and yet opposition movements in
those societies have not turned to historical meaning as a source of constitu-
tional restoration. 8 Foreign legal cultures tend rather to express objections to
judicially engineered constitutional change in terms of either minimalism or
legalism, recalling the erstwhile American alternatives of prudentialism 9 and
"neutral principles."'
This all raises a strong inference that originalism is not culturally
neutral-that is, whether originalism "takes" appears to depend less on it
than on us. Recognizing that affinity for originalism is culturally contingent
could have two salutary effects. First, it could go some way toward debunk-
ing the claim still advanced by many of originalism's defenders that
originalist interpretation inheres in judicially enforced written
constitutionalism. Second, it could go even further toward determining the
best use of the considerable energy now devoted either to originalism's
defeat or to its appropriation for progressive ends.
Turning the inference into a conclusion is challenging, however. We
have no access to a parallel-universe United States in which most relevant
variables, save persuasive normative arguments for originalism, are held con-
stant. Nonetheless, we do have, in Canada and Australia, two foreign legal
regimes that are in many key respects comparable to our own." Like the
7. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) ("This provision is made in
a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs.").
8. Cf Jack M. Balkin, Originalism and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427,
506 (2007) (arguing that, in the United States, social movements use aspirational appeals tied to the
Constitution in ways that "adopt the rhetorical tropes of restoration and redemption that are
characteristic of our history").
9. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962)
(discussing the merits of judicial resort to "the passive virtues," such as denial of certiorari and the
political question doctrine, in deciding how and whether to adjudicate difficult cases).
10. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1959) (arguing that judicial review should be grounded in "reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved").
11. Here I employ a "most similar cases" approach to comparative constitutional law. See Ran
Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.
125, 133-34 (2005) (describing the origins and methodology of this approach, which entails
[Vol. 88:1
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United States, Canada and Australia are stable, liberal, federal democracies
with independent judiciaries, well-established traditions of judicial review,
and written constitutions of long standing relative to most of the world's.
Moreover, all three countries have common law legal regimes derived from
British practice and so seem more likely than civil law countries to approach
constitutional interpretation using the evolutionary and judge-empowering
methods generally disfavored by originalists. 2 Any explanations for diver-
gence between American attitudes toward constitutional historicism and
those of Canadians and Australians cannot readily count on the "writtenness"
of the U.S. Constitution, its enforcement by independent and unaccountable
judges, or the necessity of checking a judiciary accustomed to the creativity
that common law adjudication affords.
As Part III demonstrates, in neither Canada nor Australia is the language
of judicial restraint historicist. In Canada, the metaphor of a "living tree"
dominates constitutional judicial practice and scholarship; objections to
"activist" decisions are more typically framed as errors of application than
errors of method. As in much of Europe, Canadian constitutional interpreta-
tion is unapologetically, and for the most part uncontroversially, teleological.
The same cannot be said of Australia, whose constitutional jurisprudence is
self-consciously "originalist" to a degree unknown in the United States and
unimaginable in Canada. Significantly, however, Australia's judges,
lawyers, and theorists are less likely than their American counterparts to
marry constitutional historicism to judicial restraint. Rather, Australian
originalism has for many years been aggressively textualist. In many cases,
that entails serious attention to the original understanding of constitutional
provisions. History is not, however, understood as competing with stare
decisis. Rather, in the nature of a common law judge, the typical Australian
textualist views the evolving body of precedents as authoritative rather than
aberrational. Australian jurists are also generally comfortable incorporating
contemporary norms, even those given definitive voice only in foreign juris-
dictions or international legal instruments, into interpretation of open-ended
textual provisions. Few would doubt, moreover, that the secular trend in
Australian constitutionalism is toward greater attention to constitutional pur-
pose and away from the public-meaning originalism promoted by Justice
Scalia and by most academic originalists in the United States. In short,
comparing cases that have similar characteristics but that vary on key independent and dependent
variables).
12. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 39-40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that an anti-
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is "preeminently a common-law way of making
law"); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States and Europe:
Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 633, 655 (2004) ("[T]he countermajoritarian
difficulty in the United States stems less from the judicial vindication of antimajoritarian rights than
from the danger that judges, nurtured on the broad and open-ended common law approach, will
trample on majoritarian laws much more than is constitutionally necessary.").
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although some version of originalist judicial practice is not peculiar to the
United States, the historicist appeals that support American originalism have
a potency here that is found in few foreign constitutional courts, not least the
two most like our own.
It is not possible, of course, to establish conclusively what produces this
result. An uncountable number of factors, some invisible to casual
inspection, determine the sorts of interpretive moves that prove persuasive
and become conventional within a legal culture; one must admit a certain risk
in reaching conclusions based on considered but ultimately anecdotal obser-
vation of political histories. It is equally obvious, however, that such
observation strongly recommends a set of hypotheses that usefully informs
the American debate over originalism.
Part IV considers six such hypotheses. First is the effect that the
passage of time has on our tendency to lionize historical figures and cohorts.
Even if we cannot expect Madison to understand our world, his imprimatur is
worth more than that of the "rascals" who currently populate our politics.
Moreover, the fact that in principle we have yet to scrap our Constitution
inevitably breeds a certain confidence in the correctness of its original
assumptions.
Second, and in aid of the first, our Constitution is perceived as
revolutionary rather than evolutionary. The United States announced its
sovereignty quickly, painfully, and without sympathy to its former coloniz-
ers. A political identity so formed is not easily refashioned in light of
evolving contemporary circumstances, at least not overtly. The sovereign
"moments" of Canada and Australia were glacial by comparison; although
both countries had functional constitutions by the start of the twentieth
century, 13 Canada's could not be amended domestically until 1982,14 and
both countries were to varying degrees formally bound by the British Crown
well into the 1980s.
15
Third, American originalism is an instrument through which a domestic,
sociopolitical movement seeks to validate its political commitments and to
influence our courts. If that movement is a backlash against the rights affin-
ity of the Warren and Burger Courts, 16 there is little reason to expect a
counterpart to emerge organically from different political conditions in other
13. See infra sections III(A)(1), (B)(I).
14. See Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.) (enacting the procedures for domestically amending the Canadian constitution).
15. PETER BOYCE, THE QUEEN'S OTHER REALMS: THE CROWN AND ITS LEGACY IN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND 3-4 (2008).
16. See Greene, supra note 1, at 674-82 (discussing the history of originalism and describing
reactive originalism as born of "an obsession with the perceived pathologies of living
constitutionalism"); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 455, 464 (1986) (warning of "a drift back toward the
radical egalitarianism and expansive civil libertarianism of the Warren Court").
[Vol. 88:1
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countries. Australia's constitution lacks a bill of rights,17 thereby tempering
(though not eliminating) the High Court's ability to frustrate legislative ma-
jorities to protect individual rights. Canada does of course have the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,' 8 and its Supreme Court aggressively polices it,19
but the Court might have done so too recently to generate an effectively
mobilized backlash. The availability of parliamentary override of certain
Canadian Supreme Court decisions may also tend to deflect potential
criticism away from the Court and towards the legislature.
Fourth, and in aid of the third, the American public participates in the
selection of Supreme Court Justices to a degree unheard of in most of the
world. Confirmation hearings are the principal site at which the sociopoliti-
cal movement behind originalism has invited the public into a conversation
about constitutional methodology. No remotely comparable mechanism
exists in Canada or in Australia, wherein the reigning government selects
high court judges20 and convention dictates that the selection be informed by
some combination of expertise and ordinary political patronage rather than
by ideological considerations.2'
Fifth, the American ethos of cultural and political assimilation inflates a
narrative of fidelity to a unitary interpretation of the Constitution and deflates
narratives of interpretive contest. The notion that interpretation should be
open-ended, not because the Constitution is vague but because the
Constitution is indeterminate, gains far more traction in Canadian legal
discourse than in that of Australia or the United States. I suggest that this
results in part from Canada's existential commitment to multiculturalism.
Finally, something must be said of religion. Constitutionalism is often
called our civil religion,22 and the originalism movement that so glorifies the
Constitution's original understanding is conspicuously commingled with an
evangelical movement that tends to disfavor departures from the original
meaning of God's word. The United States is the world's most religious
developed democracy, 23 and a substantial number of Americans are at best
ambivalent toward the use of reason and creativity in exegesis of sacred
17. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
18. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.
19. See infra section III(A)(2).
20. See infra notes 506-07 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431, 467 (2005) ("America has what amounts to a civil religion of
constitutionalism."); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution " in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP.
CT. REV. 123, 136 ("Constitutionalism, like religion, represents an attempt to render an otherwise
chaotic order coherent, to supply a set of beliefs capable of channeling our conduct."); Christopher
Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 85 (2000) ("Over
time, the Constitution... became the fundamental 'sacred scripture' of American politics, the
outstanding document of American civil religion.").
23. PHIL ZUCKERMAN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOD: WHAT THE LEAST RELIGIOUS NATIONS CAN
TELL US ABOUT RELIGION 173 (2008).
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texts; 24 yet that is precisely the toolkit of the judge tasked with applying
constitutional principles dynamically rather than ministerially.
These six proposed hypotheses vary in strength and persuasiveness.
Readers will have their favorites as I have mine. The list is not, moreover,
meant to be exhaustive. (In fine nonoriginalist fashion, it answers not to the
canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.) It is sufficiently exemplary,
however, to demonstrate that originalism is not culturally indifferent. The
appeal of originalism domestically lies neither in its integrity as a theory of
25 2interpretation nor, wholly, in its success as a political practice. 6  Rather,
originalism is a product of time, of place, and of ethos. Part V offers, then,
that in the language of Philip Bobbitt's well-known typology,27 historical
argument is itself a form of ethical argument. Taken seriously, that
realization is potentially self-defeating for originalists, and for nonoriginalists
it recommends foregoing the debater's points so common in legal academic
literature in favor of an aggressive emphasis on a contrary, more sympathetic
ethos.
II. Our Originalism
It is frequently said that all constitutional interpretation is originalist.
28
That is not so much a statement about constitutional theory as about consti-
tutional fidelity. Interpretation of a text entails deciphering one of two
meanings: that intended by the text's author or that understood by the text's
original audience. 29  To assign some other meaning to a text-some
contemporary meaning wholly unmoored from the original, for example-is
to disclaim fidelity to it. If, by fortuity, the word "Senator" comes in a later
24. See infra notes 560-64 and accompanying text.
25. I develop this theme in other work. See Greene, supra note 1, at 696 ("The success of
originalism results not from its penetrable logic but from its consistency with a political morality
defended most ardently by originalism's opponents.").
26. See id. at 708 ("[O]riginalism's success is ... disaggregated from its theoretical bona fides
and a premium is placed on those features that appeal, even if superficially, to popular
understandings of the judicial role.").
27. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-
119 (1982) (positing six modalities of constitutional argument).
28. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 280 (1988) (expressing
discomfort with the use of originalist and nonoriginalist labels because "[t]here is a sense in which
we are all originalists"); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 1599, 1603 (1989) ("There is no meaningful distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist
theories of constitutional interpretation."); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis-
and the Crisis of History-in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REv. 459, 472 (1997) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)) (referencing the common
claim that all constitutional lawyers are originalists, at least to some extent, because there is a shared
recognition that "the original meaning of the Constitution has at least some relevance to its present
meaning").
29. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW, supra note 12, at 129, 144 (explaining the distinction between an inquiry into the text's
expected public meaning and the authors' intended meaning, and acknowledging that while his
preference is for the former, the two frequently provide evidence in support of each other).
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age to mean "sandwich," each state is not thereby entitled to two free
lunches. Unless, that is, we are not interested in constitutional fidelity.
30
When it comes to the customary nomenclature of American
constitutional theory, we are not all originalists. To call oneself an originalist
is not simply to proclaim fidelity to the Constitution but to privilege the
original understanding of the document as against organic alterations to that
understanding brought about through social change and judicial innovation.
It is, moreover, to consider the original understanding dispositive or at least
presumptively correct in matters of first impression. Most constitutional
lawyers consider original understanding relevant but not dispositive:
precedent, unwritten implications from constitutional structure,
contemporary public understanding, and political consequences are also
relevant.31 Originalists generally are either, by degrees, less sanguine about
these alternative sources of constitutional meaning or believe them irrelevant
to constitutional meaning but, for prudential reasons, appropriate in limited
ways to the crafting of judicial decision rules.32
My use of the term "original understanding" is deliberate. As I use it, it
can refer either to the original intent of the framers or ratifiers as to the
meaning and scope of a constitutional provision, or to the original semantic
meaning of the text of the provision. There has been a gradual but dramatic
shift in preference among academic originalists in favor of original meaning
rather than original intent.33 Here is not the place to examine the interesting
30. That is not to say that fidelity requires a principle embodied within a text to be applied
consistently across generations. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007) (distinguishing between the expected application of constitutional texts,
which is not binding law, and those texts' original meaning, which is, and arguing that fidelity to the
text does not mean fidelity to original expected application); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 115, 119-20
(distinguishing between "semantic" originalism, which insists that constitutional texts be interpreted
in light of the drafters' intent, and "expectation" originalism, which advocates that texts be
interpreted in light of the consequences anticipated by the drafters).
31. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (explaining that nearly all judges, lawyers, and
commentators accept textual, historical, structural or purposive, precedent-based, and moral or
social policy-based arguments as legitimate).
32. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 157-58 (1990) (arguing that the Constitution's text counsels some ambivalence about
precedent but nevertheless conceding that some precedents have become so embedded in our
society that they should not be changed); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2009) ("Most self-described originalists ... would temper originalism with some
deference to social changes other than judicial precedent."); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) ("[A]lmost evely originalist would adulterate
[originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis.").
33. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999)
("[O]riginalism has itself changed-from original intention to original meaning. No longer do
originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers."); Keith E. Whittington,
The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 609 (2004) (explaining that the focus of new
originalism has been on "the public meaning of the text" rather than on "the concrete intentions of
individual drafters").
2009]
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arguments in favor of one or the other, except to note that one's intent as to
the scope of a provision and one's reasonable expectation as to its application
are theoretically distinct both from each other and from the original meaning
of the provision's text, but in practice they may be difficult to disentangle.
Justice Scalia, for example, is notionally committed to the authority of origi-
nal meaning but nonetheless cannot accept that the original meaning of
"cruel and unusual" may in later years come to apply to capital punishment.34
Persuasive evidence as to original expected application, such as the refer-
ences to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, seems in practice to
drive Scalia's assessment of original meaning.35 It is indeed difficult to
recall a case in which any self-proclaimed originalist judge has perceived
daylight between original meaning, original expected application, and
original intent, notwithstanding the fierce academic debate over these
36distinctions.
The academic discourse around originalism also increasingly
distinguishes between constitutional interpretation, which is a hermeneutic
exercise common to literature and law alike, and constitutional construction,
which is a political and adjudicative exercise designed to fill the interstices of
constitutional text.37 Interpretive originalists and constructive originalists are
conceptually separate populations, but this, again, is a distinction fastidiously
maintained in academic literature but generally unexpressed in judicial
38
opinions or public discourse.
It is perhaps obvious, but too little recognized, that discussion of
originalism is not confined to the academy.39 Originalism is a term that,
34. See Scalia, supra note 32, at 861-62 (arguing that even if the Constitution's "cruel and
unusual" language suggests an evolutionary intent, such intent finds no support in historical
evidence).
35. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 46 (expressing frustration that, despite explicit contemplation
of the death penalty in the Constitution, some still maintain that the practice is unconstitutional).
36. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30.
37. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 99 (2004) (distinguishing interpretation, which determines the meaning of words, from
construction, which "fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of these words when applied
to particular circumstances"); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-11 (1999) (characterizing
constitutional interpretation as "essentially legalistic" and constitutional construction as "essentially
political").
38. See Berman, supra note 32, at 38 n.100 (providing various examples of scholarly
explorations of the relationship between constitutional interpretation and construction, but noting
that "courts rarely expressly distinguish the two in the course of their opinions"); Todd E. Pettys,
The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1011 (2009) (suggesting that
popular conceptions of originalism have not kept pace with this development in constitutional
scholarship).
39. See Greene, supra note 1, at 60-61 (tracing the increased prominence of originalism in the
American popular and political discourse, particularly following the Reagan Administration);
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554 (2006) ("Since the 1980s, originalism has primarily served as an
ideology that inspires political mobilization and engagement.").
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today anyway, has content within a public discourse that extends well
beyond the law reviews. Rush Limbaugh puts the matter succinctly:
The only antidote to ... judicial activism is the conservative
judicial philosophy known as Originalism. As Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas explained in a February 2001 speech... : "The
Constitution means what the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention
and the state ratifying conventions understood it to mean; not what we
judges think it should mean." Hallelujah.
Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your
political and social beliefs. It means not citing foreign law to support
your preferences. It means not imposing your personal policy whims
on society via judicial fiat. And where the Constitution is silent, it
40
means not inventing a penumbra to support your own opinion.
A significant segment of the population associates originalism with the
values Limbaugh specifies.4' It is simple, it is suspicious of grants of
discretion to legal elites, it is hostile to transnational sources of law, and,
significantly, it is the "only antidote" to judicial activism.
Polling data suggests that a substantial number of Americans find
originalism at least superficially compelling. A series of polls conducted
annually by Quinnipiac University from 2003 to 2008 consistently found that
roughly 4 in 10 Americans agreed that "[i]n making decisions, the Supreme
Court should only consider the original intentions of the authors of the
Constitution" as opposed to "consider[ing] changing times and current
realities in applying the principles of the Constitution. '' 42 These polls per-
haps suggest that much of the American public finds the distinction between
original intent and original meaning less interesting than do legal academics.
Indeed, even though the debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in
Heller is best construed as a contest between the legal authority of original
meaning versus original purpose, 43 much of the public response to the deci-
sion assimilated both opinions to a single interpretive modality: original
intent. 4 In the great debates of American constitutional theory, this error is a
40. Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism?, THE LIMBAUGH LETTER,
Dec. 2005, at 12, 12, available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.
guest.html.
41. In 2005 Reagan Justice Department alum and radio talk-show host Mark Levin published a
book in which originalism featured prominently. MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA 12-22 (2005) (espousing the virtues of originalism
over the dangers of "judicial tyranny"). The book spent nine weeks on the New York Times Best
Sellers list. Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at G26.
42. Press Release, Quinnipiac Polling Inst., American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, but They Don't Want Government to Ban It (July 17,
2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x 1284.xml?ReleaseID= 1194.
43. Greene, supra note 1, at 685 n. 163.
44. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer's response was typical of many:
I think what is really interesting is that the dissent by John Paul Stevens, the most
distinguished of the liberals on the other side, . . . was almost entirely based on
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technical one only. As Scalia has written, "[T]he Great Divide with regard to
constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and objective
meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether derived from
Framers' intent or not) and current meaning.145
Heller demonstrates the elevated space originalism occupies within
American legal and political culture. The decision overruled the opinions of
dozens if not hundreds of federal court judges, 46 read a sixty-nine-year-old
Supreme Court precedent into oblivion,47 and called into serious question the
gun-control regulations of several of the nation's largest and most crime-
ridden metropolitan areas, including of course the one in which the Court
itself sits. 48 The Court did so over the stated objections of four Justices, the
nation's capital, and the cities of Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Los
Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Sacramento, San
Francisco, Seattle, and Trenton. 49 Against that opposition the Court relied
almost entirely on a single proposition: that the original meaning of "the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"5° is not limited to
the militia-related purpose that concededly animated the right's
codification.51
originalism, i.e., it was about what was intended by the founders at the time of the
writing of this amendment.... So I thought it was an interesting agreement on that, on
the philosophical premise.
Special Report with Brit Hume: 'Special Report' Panel Discusses Barack Obama 's Slippery Stance
on the Supreme Court's Gun Ruling and North Korea (FOX News television broadcast June 26,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,372706,00.html). For
additional examples in this vein, see Greene, supra note 1, at 687 & nn.181-82.
45. Scalia, supra note 12, at 38.
46. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2823 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we
endorsed there .... ").
47. See id. at 2813-16 (majority opinion) (describing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), as a limited case about only one particular type of weapon).
48. Id. at 2817-22.
49. See id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have
focused on the scope of individual gun rights rather than the existence of such rights); id. at 2847
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the District's law should fall within the scope of regulation
left open to legislatures by the Second Amendment); Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (No. 07-290) (contending that the District's law banning the possession of especially
dangerous types of weapons is not prohibited by the Second Amendment and does not disturb the
purpose of the Second Amendment); Brief of Amici Curiae Major American Cities et al. in Support
of Petitioners at 2-4, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290) (pleading for the law to be upheld to
protect cities' ability to fight gun violence); Brief of the City of Chicago & the Board of Education
of the City of Chicago as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No.
07-290) (agreeing with the District but arguing in the alternative that the Second Amendment
should not be incorporated against the states).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
51. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
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Virtually every constitutional court engages in pluralistic
interpretation, 52 but in very few would an opinion like Heller be possible.
First, it is not every court that feels sufficiently legitimated to order local
governments to refrain from disarming their citizens. Second, those courts
that do enjoy that level of legitimacy are infrequently originalist. 53 Third,
whether generally originalist or not, in no other country of which I am aware
is it conceivable that the court would mount such a direct political challenge
solely on the basis of historical arguments that conflict with longstanding
precedents and political practice. It was fewer than two decades ago, after
all, that former Chief Justice Warren Burger (no pinko, he) called the very
argument used successfully in Heller "one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I
repeat the word 'fraud,' on the American public by special interest groups
that I have ever seen in my lifetime." 54  Two years earlier Robert Bork-
Robert Bork!-had said that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the right
of states to form militia, not for individuals to bear arms," and that all state
gun-control laws were "probably constitutional. 55  Yet in the immediate
aftermath of Heller both John McCain, strongly, and Barack Obama, tepidly,
endorsed the Court's decision.56
Originalism is the instrument and the beneficiary of a deliberate
decision by former Attorney General Edwin Meese and others to structure
the Reagan Justice Department's critique of the Warren and Burger Courts in
jurisprudential terms. Abetted by organizations like the Federalist Society
and think tanks like the Center for Judicial Studies, Meese began a campaign
during Reagan's second term to promote publicly the view that originalism is
the only way to control activist judges.57 The rhetorical core of the campaign
52. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 321, 325 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006) (discussing several countries that
employ myriad interpretive modalities to analyze their constitutions); cf Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutions as "Living Trees "? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 921, 926 (2006) (referring to the "ubiquity of interpretive change and of multi-
sourced methods of interpretation" in countries with strong traditions of judicial protection of
constitutional rights).
53. See Jackson, supra note 52, at 925-26 (declaring that courts that exercise judicial review
and adjudicate within rights-protecting constitutional regimes typically are more open to modifying
prior interpretations of the constitution to fit modem circumstances).
54. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991).
55. Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at
B5. For a general discussion of the legal community's skepticism in the 1980s towards a robust,
judicially enforced Second Amendment right, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 222-25 (2008).
56. See Mike Doming, Obama Hedges on Gun Ruling: Republicans Accuse Candidate of
"Flip-Flop," CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/
obama/chi-guns-obama-mccainjun27-archive,0,7844065. story (reporting McCain's characterization
of Heller as a "landmark victory" and Obama's more cautious approval).
57. See Greene, supra note 1, at 680-81 (discussing Meese's characterization of originalism as
the only reliable method to induce judicial restraint); Siegel, supra note 55, at 220-22 (chronicling
the Reagan administration's systematic program to institute constitutional conservatism
nationwide).
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was a well-publicized series of speeches by Meese in 1985 and 1986. In a
July 1985 speech to the American Bar Association, for example, Meese
stated, "It has been and will continue to be the policy of this administration to
press for a jurisprudence of original intention."58  The Administration, he
said, would "resurrect the original meaning" of constitutional provisions as
"the only reliable guide for judgment." 59 When Bork was nominated to the
Court in the summer of 1987, the American people had already been primed
to debate the interpretive methodology Bork notoriously promoted.
Some form of originalism is not new to American judicial culture. It is
not unusual to find strong statements of the need to give constitutional text
the meaning intended by its framers in nineteenth-century Supreme Court
opinions, ranging from Chief Justice Marshall's dissent in Ogden v.
Saunders,60 to Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,61 to
Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.62 Ex
parte Bain,63 a habeas case concerning the ability of a federal prosecutor to
amend an indictment, 64 is typical of nineteenth-century rhetoric. Justice
Miller wrote: "It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the
language of the Constitution here relied on, as indeed in all other instances
where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as nearly as
possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument.
65
The Progressive Era saw the first serious scholarly and judicial
challenges to the assumption that constitutional interpretation should be tied
to original understanding. Justice Holmes's pragmatism and Justice
Brandeis's prudentialism led both to be suspicious of doctrinaire interpretive
modalities that limited the Constitution's capacity to adapt to modern
58. Meese, supra note 16, at 465.
59. Id. at 465-66.
60. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ("To say that the intention
of the [Constitution] must prevail; that this intention must be collected from its words; that its words
are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the
instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor
extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers; -is to repeat what
has been already said more at large, and is all that can be necessary.").
61. 60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857) ("If any of [the Constitution's] provisions are deemed unjust, there
is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only
the same in words, but the same in meaning. .. and intent with which it spoke when it came from
the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.").
62. 157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895) (framing the Court's inquiry into the constitutionality of the
income tax as an examination of "what, at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, were
recognized as direct taxes" and what "those who framed and adopted it [understood its] terms to
designate and include").
63. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
64. Id. at 2-6.
65. Id. at 12.
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problems. Thus, in Missouri v. Holland,66 Justice Holmes urged that the
Constitution must grow along with the nation it is meant to govern:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago.
67
Justice Brandeis brandished his nonoriginalist credentials most
pointedly in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,68 in which he argued
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the wiretapping of telephone
conversations. 69  He wrote, "[G]eneral limitations on the powers of
Government ... do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting
modern conditions by regulations which a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive,, 70 and
likewise, "[c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing
world.",7 1 The Court's progressives "won" in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
72
when Justice Roberts embraced progressive interpretation over Justice
Sutherland's originalist dissent,7 3 and in the forty-five years between
Sutherland's retirement in 1941 and Justice Scalia's appointment in 1986,
Hugo Black was the Court's only self-avowed originalist.
74
66. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
67. Id. at 433.
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 472 (internal citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
73. Compare id. at 390, 399-400 (upholding, thanks to Justice Roberts's deciding vote, a state
law that established a minimum wage for women and thereby overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), based in part on "the economic conditions which have supervened,
and in light of which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the State must be
considered"), with id. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("[T]he meaning of the Constitution does
not change with the ebb and flow of economic events.").
74. See JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 36 (2005) (explaining that Supreme Court decision making under the
Warren and early Burger Courts was characterized by a "revolt against formalism" and that "the text
and original meaning of the Constitution receded into the jurisprudential background"). Black
defined his own interpretive approach in originalist terms that sharply contrasted with most of his
contemporaries:
I strongly believe that the public welfare demands that constitutional cases must be
decided according to the terms of our Constitution itself and not according to the
judges' views of fairness, reasonableness, or justice .... I have no fear of
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Meese and his allies' frequent resort to metaphors of restoration-his
use of the word "resurrect" was no accident-was facilitated by the Warren
and Burger Courts' refusal to ground a series of prominent individual-rights
decisions in originalist terms. Griswold v. Connecticut,
75 Mapp v. Ohio,76
Miranda v. Arizona,77 Reynolds v. Sims,78 and Roe v. Wade79 are among the
usual suspects, and we could add Brown v. Board of Education8" to the list
were that case not preternaturally immune from judicial critique. Bork and
Scalia alike have suggested that the Warren Court's abandonment of origi-
nalism is a historical anomaly and that it is the duty of the Court's
conservatives to right the ship. 81 But in important ways, Our Originalism-
the methodological child of the Meese movement-is not our fathers'. As
Meese, Limbaugh, and Scalia frequently explain, they understand originalism
to be a tool of judicial restraint; its alternative is an unattractive world in
which "nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the
Nation. 82 Justice Sutherland's originalism emphatically did not emphasize
judicial restraint, which Sutherland said "belongs in the domain of will and
not of judgment., 83
It is ironic, then, that another distinguishing characteristic of the latest
originalism movement is its hostility to precedent. Justice Thomas has sug-
gested a willingness to overrule constitutional precedents that are contrary to
the original understanding, 84 and Justice Scalia, who has called himself a
constitutional amendments properly adopted, but I do fear the rewriting of the
Constitution by judges under the guise of interpretation.
HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 14 (1968). In considering recent originalist
Justices, we might also include William Rehnquist, who memorably bashed living constitutionalism
in these pages. See William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693,
696-97 (1976) ("A mere change in public opinion since the adoption of the Constitution,
unaccompanied by a constitutional amendment, should not change the meaning of the
Constitution."). As Chief Justice, however, Rehnquist was not a vocal or consistent defender of
originalism, particularly in his later years. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and
Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1047 (2006) ("Chief Justice
Rehnquist, although an occasional adherent to originalism, is more fairly characterized as a
pragmatist who took into account a variety of arguments in resolving a case.").
75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81. See BORK, supra note 32, at 143 ("What was once the dominant view of constitutional
law-that a judge is to apply the Constitution according to the principles intended by those who
ratified the document-is now very much out of favor among the theorists of the field."); Scalia,
supra note 32, at 852-54 (describing what he calls a recent and unprecedented trend of
constitutional scholars openly rejecting originalism).
82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Greene, supra
note 1, at 680 (indicating that Meese argued originalism is essential to judicial restraint); Limbaugh,
supra note 40, at 12 (claiming originalism to be the "only antidote" to judicial activism).
83. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
84. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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"faint-hearted originalist, ',85 has indicated that his occasional deference to
longstanding precedent that he disagrees with is "not part of [his] originalist
philosophy[, but] a pragmatic exception to it." 86 Heller was blithely dismis-
sive of the Court's Second Amendment decision in United States v. Miller,
87
and Justice Scalia has advocated abandoning prior precedent in favor of
original understanding in Eighth Amendment,88 campaign finance, 89 and
abortion cases, 90 among others.91 By contrast, there was no significant
tension articulated between originalism and stare decisis before Justice
Black's tenure on the Court.
92
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the originalism of today is the
product of a political mobilization. It is not merely the idiosyncratic prefer-
ence of a single Justice, as in the case of Black; it is a movement that
preceded the nominations of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and was deli-
berately designed to produce their jurisprudential approaches. 93  It is
discussed on talk radio and in bestselling books; in blogs and in newspaper
columns; in presidential campaigns and at water coolers. Originalism has not
"triumphed," as some suggested in the wake of Heller.94 But it has proven
85. Scalia, supra note 32, at 864.
86. Scalia, supra note 29, at 140.
87. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Although it makes some attempt to salvage Miller as a case driven
entirely by the type of weapon involved, the majority opinion in Heller disparages Miller's
precedential weight because of its brevity, the fact that the government was essentially unopposed
on appeal, and the absence of discussion on the history of the Second Amendment. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814-15 (2008). In short, according to Scalia, "the case did
not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment." Id. at 2814.
88. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 964-65 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (rejecting the holding
of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality
guarantee).
89. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248, 257 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing, contrary to Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that campaign-contribution limits violate the First
Amendment).
90. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983, 993, 999 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Roe v. Wade should be overruled).
91. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (overruling Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), to hold that the admission of testimonial hearsay without an
opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant violates the Sixth Amendment).
92. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 32 (1994) (arguing that both Justice Black and Justice Scalia
"have largely rejected precedent as a legitimate source of constitutional decision making").
93. Id. at 56-57 (contrasting Black's version of originalism, which was "clearly influenced by
his personal and professional experiences" and "not shaped in the abstract," with Scalia's, which
was derived "from a conservative movement that developed in the 1960s and grew in the 1970s in
opposition to what it perceived as rampant judicial activism in the twentieth century").
94. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling of the Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (2009) (noting the post-Heller celebration by conservatives
nationwide); Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2008, at A13 (celebrating Scalia's opinion in Heller as "the finest example of what is now
called 'original public meaning' jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court"); Posting of
Dale Carpenter to The Volokh Conspiracy, supra note 3 (concluding, from Justice Stevens's
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persuasive in a nontrivial number of cases,95 it lies squarely at the center of
academic conversation in constitutional theory, and it is an important part of
the national dialogue, such as there is one, about the proper role of the
judiciary within a democracy. Or our democracy, at least.
III. The Lives of Others: The Cases of Canada and Australia
Outside the United States, American originalism is as well-known as it
is marginalized. The reasons for the latter, which I take up in Part IV, are
complicated. The former is more easily explained in light of the cross-
pollination of constitutional theory through scholarly exchange, transnational
judicial conferences, and cross-reference in judicial practice-what Sujit
Choudhry has called the "migration" of constitutional ideas.96 Since the start
of 2007 more than 100 academic articles with originalism in the title have
been published in legal periodicals, and a vast array of resources greet the
foreign judge or constitutional theorist interested in comparative study.97
The law-journal database maintained by Washington & Lee School of Law
includes more than 200 international and comparative law journals, more
than 100 of which are located outside the United States, 98 and LexisNexis
currently serves customers in more than 100 countries.99 Judges around the
world also interact in person in a wide range of settings, 100 and Justice Scalia
attention to originalist sources in determining the meaning of the Second Amendment, that "[w]e're
all originalists now").
95. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (relying on the
original understanding of the text of the Second Amendment in establishing an individual right to
possess a loaded handgun in the home); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (examining the historical
background of the Sixth Amendment to determine that the admission of certain testimony violated
the Confrontation Clause); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000) (appealing to the
original understanding of statutory text in determining whether the law demands an examination of
the defendant's state of mind); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (arguing that the
Constitution was not originally understood to permit Congress to subject nonconsenting states to
private damage suits in state courts); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-18 (1997)
(concluding that the Constitution was not originally understood to allow Congress to compel state
officers to enforce federal law).
96. Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 1 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); see also Claire
L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 17 (1998) (describing the occurrence of "cross-pollination and
dialogue between jurisdictions"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 191, 195 (2003) (discussing an increase in courts' citations to opinions from other
jurisdictions and attributing this phenomenon to a growing globalization ofjurisprudence).
97. A search on LexisNexis's database for law review articles published since January 1, 2007
that contain the word "originalism" in their title returns more than 100 sources.
98. Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking,
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx (choose "International Law" from the "All Subjects" drop-down
menu).
99. LexisNexis, LexisNexis Fast Facts, http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx.
100. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1120-22
(2000) (describing situations in which U.S. judges have personally interacted with their foreign
counterparts).
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is no exception. Justice Scalia took at least twenty-five trips to foreign loca-
tions for speeches, teaching, and conferences from 2003 to 2007.01
Originalism is a frequent topic of conversation at those appearances.l2
The trouble is, hardly anyone is biting. If we take originalism to require
that the original understanding of a constitutional text is presumptively dis-
positive when known, it is an exceedingly unpopular view around the world.
Michel Rosenfeld calls originalism "virtually nonexistent" in all of
Europe. 10 3 The highly influential German Constitutional Court has favored a
purposive approach to interpretation that generally privileges telos over
original intentions narrowly conceived. 10 4 The high courts of India, South
Africa, and Israel display something approaching open hostility to narrow
textualism or static historicism. 10 5 In Canada, as we shall see, even the most
vocal opponents of the Supreme Court's putatively activist decisions infre-
quently resort to originalist arguments. Australia's appears to be among the
world's very few established constitutional courts in which arguments from
the original understandings of the ratifying generation are taken seriously in
the face of contrary teleological arguments grounded in contemporary
understandings.
101. See Bill Mears, Justices Are Well-Off Well-Traveled, CNN.COM, June 6, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/06/scotus.finances/index.html (reporting that Scalia made
eight trips abroad in 2007 "to teach, give speeches, and attend judicial seminars"); Bill Mears,
Supreme Court Justices: Well-Off Well-Traveled, CNN.COM, June 8, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/
2007/06/08/news/newsmakers/scotus-finances/ (describing 2006 trips to Switzerland, Israel, Italy,
and Puerto Rico); Antonin Scalia, Financial Disclosure Report (Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with author)
(reporting reimbursements from two trips to Italy and trips to Ireland, Australia, and Turkey);
Antonin Scalia, 2004 Reimbursement and Gifts Report (May 23, 2005) (on file with author)
(reporting trips in 2004 to Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Greece); Antonin
Scalia, 2003 Reimbursement and Gifts Report (May 15, 2004) (on file with author) (reporting trips
in 2003 to France, Japan, Italy, and Canada).
102. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of
Ancestor Worship?, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000) (discussing Justice Scalia's appearance at a
1999 conference on constitutionalism held in Auckland, New Zealand); Kirk Malkin, Senior U.S.,
Canadian Judges Spar over Judicial Activism, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 17, 2007, at A2 (describing a
spirited debate over originalism between Justice Scalia and Canadian Justice Ian Binnie at McGill
University); John O'Sullivan, High Court Opposites Dazzling Off the Bench, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2005, at 43 (discussing a debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer held in
Melbourne, Australia).
103. Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 656.
104. Donald P. Kommers, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in INTERPRETING
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 52, at 161, 200-01.
105. See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Accountability in Israel: The High Court of Justice and the
Phenomena of Judicial Hyperactivism, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAELI PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 87,
95-96 (Moshe Maor ed., 2002) (noting a rise in judicial activism by the Israeli High Court of
Justice, including an increased focus by the Court on broad principles of law, morality, and policy);
Heinz Klug, South Africa: From Constitutional Promise to Social Transformation, in
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 52, at 266, 288-89 (noting
that the South African Constitutional Court employs a jurisprudence that tracks "evolving standards
of civilization"); Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 476, 480 (2003)
(describing how a reaction to contemporary human rights violations caused the Supreme Court of
India to adopt a broad reading of fundamental constitutional rights).
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These last two examples are the subject of this Part. In examining in
some detail the approaches the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court
of Australia take to the interpretation of their national constitutions, I hope to
generate hypotheses as to the causes of originalism's particular uses and rel-
ative popularity in the United States. Subpart III(A) discusses Canada, in
which the "living tree" analogy continues to exert a powerful influence on
constitutional discourse in rights and powers cases alike. Subpart III(B)
addresses the more complicated case of Australia, whose High Court has
traditionally espoused a textual literalism that is relatively strict and histori-
cally informed but has recently been receptive to purposivism and to the
dynamic influence of contemporary values.
A. Canada s Charter Evolution
Modem Canadian constitutionalism began, with modem Canada, in
1982. Although Canada became a distinct and de facto self-governing legal
entity with the enactment of the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA
Act), 10 6 it did not become formally sovereign until the Canada Act, 1982.107
The Canada Act declared more than thirty documents to constitute Canadian
Supreme Law, the most significant of which were the BNA Act (renamed the
Constitution Act, 1867),1°8 the Constitution Act, 1982 (Schedule B of the
Canada Act), and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the first 35 sections of
the Constitution Act, 1982).109 This Section broadly discusses judicial
review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Supreme
Court of Canada, first under the BNA Act-which principally involved fed-
eralism disputes-and more recently under the Constitution Act, 1982, where
Charter litigation predominates.
1. Judicial Review Under the BNA Act.-The BNA Act merged the
three British colonies of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into the
nation of Canada. °10 The former colony of Canada, previously subdivided
into East and West, was formally separated into the provinces of Qu6bec and
Ontario, giving the original nation of Canada a total of four provincial
governments.111 Canada was given a federal structure with a bicameral
parliament and a vertical separation of powers between the national and the
provincial governments. 12 Since the BNA Act did not include a bill of
rights, the Canadian Parliament was, like the British Parliament, supreme
106. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.).
107. See Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 2 (U.K.) (declaring Canada's sovereignty and formally
divorcing its lawmaking functions from British control).
108. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
109. Canada Act, 1982, § 1.
110. British North America Act, 1867, § 3.
111. Id. §§ 5-6.
112. Id.§§ 18,58.
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within its legitimate sphere of action.' 1 3 The content of that sphere was con-
tested from the start, however, as the boundaries between national and
provincial power were blurred in the BNA Act.1 14 Specifically, Section 91 of
the Act gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over several
broad areas thought to be of national interest, including "Trade and
Commerce," and Section 92 gives exclusive jurisdiction to provincial
governments over other broad areas thought to be locally focused, such as
"Property and Civil Rights." '1 15 It is easy to imagine examples in which these
grants of authority cannot be mutually exclusive.
1 6
The power of the Canadian national government was initially bounded,
moreover, by the superior authority of the Crown. British statutes applied in
full force in Canada until the Statute of Westminster, 1931, provided that
Canada's legislature could opt in or out.117 Canada did not formally acquire
the power to amend its own supreme law until 1982." l8 The British place
atop Canada's legal hierarchy was particularly relevant to the practice of
judicial review during Canada's early history. The Supreme Court of Canada
is a statutory animal, created by an act of the Canadian Parliament in 1875
and currently authorized not by the Constitution but by the Supreme Court
Act." 9 Until 1949 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sitting on
Downing Street, was Canada's appellate court of last resort, and over a fifty-
year period beginning in the late nineteenth century the Privy Council took a
rather heavy-handed approach to its Canadian constitutional duties.
120
The Privy Council set the interpretive tone early, with Lord Hobhouse
declaring in the 1887 case of Bank of Toronto v. Lambe' 2 1 that the BNA Act
should be treated "by the same methods of construction and exposition which
[British courts] apply to other statutes."' 22 What that meant in theory was
113. See Hodge v. The Queen, (1883) 9 App. Cas. 117, 132 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Ont.)
(U.K.) (declaring that both the national and provincial Canadian legislatures have plenary power
within the limits imposed by their jurisdictional provisions).
114. See Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 52, at 55, 66-69 (describing conflicts that
arose from the federal and provincial governments being granted exclusive, but overlapping,
powers).
115. British North America Act, 1867, §§ 91(2), 92(13).
116. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Canada v. Parsons, (1881) 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Can.) (U.K.) (granting provincial power over insurance regulation). The BNA Act
formally assigns to the national government the residual power to legislate "for the Peace, Order,
and good Government of Canada." British North America Act, 1867, § 91 (U.K.).
117. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4, pmbl. (U.K.).
118. Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
§§ 38-49 (U.K.).
119. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 3 (1985) (Can.).
120. See THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GROUP, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (Bakan et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2003) (characterizing the Privy Council as dominant during the late 1800s and early
1900s in that it established doctrine with little reference to the Canadian courts).
121. (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Que.) (U.K.).
122. Id. at 579.
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that constitutional interpretation was to be guided by literal, textual exegesis
that rigidly relied on original public meaning coupled with stare decisis and
strictly ignored extrinsic sources or reference to the intent of the
legislature. 123  What it meant in practice and in effect was a gradual
diminution in national power in relation to provincial governments. 24 From
1880 to 1896 the Privy Council decided twenty issues concerning the separa-
tion of powers between the federal and provincial governments, and it ruled
in favor of the provinces in fifteen of them.2 5 The strict federalism the Law
Lords enforced was arguably consistent with the text of the BNA Act but was
at odds with the constitutional vision of many of the Act's drafters. 
26
The Privy Council dramatically and self-consciously departed from
static text-bound interpretation in the 1930 case of Edwards v. Attorney-
General for Canada,127 popularly known as the Persons Case. The BNA Act
provides that the Canadian Senate is to comprise "qualified Persons,"'' 2 8 a
term whose original meaning, in the unanimous view of the Supreme Court
of Canada, did not include women. 129 The case might easily have stood as
Canada's Dred Scott v. Sandford,130 but Lord Sankey turned it into Canada's
123. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 79 (remarking that the Privy Council rigidly abided by stare
decisis when interpreting the BNA Act); Vincent C. MacDonald, Judicial Interpretation of the
Canadian Constitution, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 260, 268 (1936) (stressing that the canons of statutory
construction used by the Privy Council to interpret the BNA Act effectively excluded contemplation
of extraneous, nontextual matters).
124. See MacDonald, supra note 123, at 277-78 (documenting how the literalistic approach
combined with an underlying "instinct to protect provincial jurisdiction" to reduce the power of the
central government); see also Ian Binnie, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent, 23 Sup.
CT. L. REv. 2d 345, 357 (2004) ("The jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
led by Lords Watson and Haldane, narrowed the already truncated scope of federal powers in a
series of cases.").
125. PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 42 (3d ed. 2004). By contrast, during the four-year period prior to 1880 in
which it was Canada's court of last resort, the Supreme Court of Canada decided five of its six
federalism cases in the national government's favor. JOHN T. SAYWELL, THE LAWMAKERS:
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE SHAPING OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM 34 (2002).
126. See RUSSELL, supra note 125, at 42-43 (arguing that the Judicial Committee articulated a
"classical federalism" model for Canada rather than one in which the provinces were subordinate);
H.E. Smith, The Residue of Power in Canada, 4 CAN. B. REV. 432, 433 (1926) ("By
excluding.., historical evidence and considering the British North America Act without any regard
to its historical setting the courts have recently imposed upon us a constitution which is different,
not only in detail but in principle, from that designed at Charlottetown and Quebec."). There is no
consensus among Canadian legal academics as to the intentions of the "framers" of the BNA Act, in
part because there is no consensus over who counts as a framer. Binnie, supra note 124, at 375;
Peter W. Hogg & Wade K. Wright, Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme
Court: Reflections on the Debate About Canadian Federalism, 38 U.B.C. L. REV. 329, 331 (2005).
127. [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.).
128. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 24 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
129. Reference re The Meaning of the Word "Persons" in Section 24 of the British North
America Act, 1867, [1928] S.C.R. 276, 278 (Can.), rev'd sub nom. Edwards, [1930] A.C. 124.
130. 60 U.S. 393, 413 (1857) (holding that Dred Scott could not be a citizen of the United
States because the word "citizen" was not originally understood to include blacks).
[Vol. 88:1
On the Origins of Originalism
Brown v. Board of Education: "[T]he appeal to history," he wrote, "is not
conclusive."' 3 1 Rather, Lord Sankey said that constitutional interpretation
requires attention to the "continuous process of evolution" within Canadian
society. 32  In what has become the most famous passage in Canadian
constitutional law, he wrote further:
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable
of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the
Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. Like all written
constitutions it has been subjected to development through usage and
convention. Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this
Board-it is certainly not their desire-to cut down the provisions of
the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a
large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent,
but within certain fixed limits, may be a mistress in her own house, as
the provinces to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are
mistresses in theirs.'
33
In one stroke, Lord Sankey's opinion in Edwards effected four
reversals, each momentous standing alone. 3 4 First, and most immediately, it
overturned the Supreme Court and granted women the right to serve in the
Senate. 35 Second, in drawing a parallel between the sovereignty retained
within the provinces and that retained within the national legislature, the
Committee seemed to signal an end to its prior bias in favor of provincial
authority. Third, the Privy Council recognized Canada's autonomy to govern
her own internal affairs, 36 a nod to the Statute of Westminster that was
already en route to passage and a presage to the formal end to Privy Council
jurisdiction over Canadian cases, which would come nineteen years later.' 37
Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, the BNA Act would thence-
forward no longer be interpreted as an ordinary statute whose meaning is
inalterably fixed by the original meaning of its text and judicial interpretation
thereof.138 Instead, interpretation would be "large and liberal," with an eye
131. Edwards, [1930] A.C. at 134; cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)
(finding evidence of the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as to segregated schools
"at best.., inconclusive").
132. Edwards, [1930] A.C. at 134.
133. Id. at 136 (internal quotations omitted).
134. See SAYWELL, supra note 125, at 192 ("In its explicit reasoning and result, Edwards was a
sharp break with previous Judicial Committee jurisprudence.").
135. Edwards, [1930] A.C. at 143.
136. Id. at 136.
137. See, e.g., In re Regulation & Control of Radio Commc'n in Can., [1932] A.C. 304, 312
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.) (upholding the national government's power to pass
implementing legislation for an international agreement on radio under the general power to make
laws for "peace order and good government" even though "[tihis idea of Canada as a Dominion
being bound by a convention equivalent to a treaty with foreign powers was quite unthought of in
1867").
138. See, e.g., In re Regulation & Control of Aeronautics in Can., [1932] A.C. 54, 70 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.) (referring to the BNA Act as "a great constitutional charter" and
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trained not on narrow constructions of statutory text but on constitutional
purposes and national growth.
The idea of a constitution as a living entity was not, of course, invented
by Lord Sankey. Abbott Lawrence Lowell described a political system as
"not a mere machine [but] an organism" as early as 1889,139 and the notion of
fundamental law as essentially organic influenced the likes of Woodrow
Wilson and Oliver Wendell Holmes. 140  But the metaphor of constitutional
evolution ripened earlier in Canada than in the United States. Although
Edwards was in effect a rights case, the Judicial Committee quickly extended
the living-tree principle to structural cases. Thus, in Proprietary Articles
Trade Ass 'n v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada,141 the Committee affirmed the
authority of the national government to enact a statute criminalizing certain
anticompetitive practices even though the offenses were not criminal at the
time of confederation. 142 And in British Coal Corp. v. The King,143 the
Committee upheld a federal statute removing the Privy Council's criminal
appellate jurisdiction and reiterated that "in interpreting a constituent or
organic statute such as the [BNA] Act, that construction most beneficial to
the widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted. 1 44 As in the
United States during the same period, a rejection of originalism was usually
in the service of judicial restraint; the idea was that the Constitution should
not be construed so literally as to hamstring a government in responding to
the vital issues of the day.1
45
And as in the United States during the same period, judicial
conservatives went down fighting. In 1935 Lord Sankey, author of Edwards
and British Coal, was replaced as Lord Chancellor, and Lord Atkin became
counseling that, "[u]seful as decided cases are, it is always advisable to get back to the words of the
Act itself and to remember the object with which it was passed").
139. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 2-3 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co.
1889).
140. See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56
(1908) ("[G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the
universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.");
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.) ("[T]he provisions of the
Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic
living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the
line of their growth.").
141. [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.).
142. Id. at 323-24.
143. [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Que.) (U.K.).
144. Id. at 518, 522.
145. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 87-88 (describing the generally liberal interpretation of
power-allocation provisions, which tended to result in upholding the constitutionality of legislation
challenged on federalism grounds); F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, Permanence and Change in a
Written Constitution: The "Living Tree" Doctrine and the Charter of Rights, 1 Sup. CT. L. REV. 2d
533, 538 (1990) ("The original purpose of the 'living tree' doctrine in BNA Act jurisprudence was
to expand enumerated legislative powers.").
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the Judicial Committee's presiding Law Lord and intellectual leader. 146
Atkin, a former commercial lawyer, was sympathetic with the notion of free-
dom of contract and was known to be a staunch defender of stare decisis.
14 7
The timing of Lord Sankey's departure could hardly have been worse, then,
for Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's New Deal package of labor reforms and
social-insurance measures. In Attorney General v. Attorney-General
Ontario (The Labour Conventions Case),148 the Committee invalidated
Bennett's wage and hours measures on the ground that, though the statutes
were enacted pursuant to an international treaty under Section 132 of the
BNA Act, the measures improperly infringed on provincial autonomy over
property and civil rights granted by Section 92.149 Lord Atkin's opinion in
the Labour Conventions Case offered a lyrical rejoinder to the notion that the
decision would frustrate Canada's blossoming into a sovereign member of
the international community: "While the ship of state now sails on larger
ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments
which are an essential part of her original structure."' 5 o
Unemployment insurance was next, with Lord Atkin dismissing the
Dominion's argument that, even if insurance was traditionally within the
provincial bailiwick, the legislation creating an unemployment insurance
fund fell within its residual power to make laws for the peace, order, and
good government of Canada in a time of emergency. 15 1 The Judicial
Committee also struck down Dominion statutes regulating natural products
and unfair competition, 152 again on federalism grounds. With the New Deal
decisions, "[t]he approach to judicial review, heralded in Edwards ... was
not only abandoned but explicitly repudiated."'
' 53
146. See ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 26 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that, because Lord Sankey would not preside over the
Judicial Committee after Lord Hailsham replaced him as Chancellor in 1935, Lord Atkin assumed
the role).
147. See SAYWELL, supra note 125, at 218-19 (describing Atkin's natural hostility towards
central government control, his protectiveness of business freedom, and his reverence for
precedent).
148. [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.).
149. Id. at 350-54. Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court came out differently in the analogous
case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
150. [1937] A.C. at 354.
151. AG Can. v. AG Ont. (The Employment and Social Insurance Act), [1937] A.C. 355, 367
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.). The BNA Act was amended in 1940 to add unemployment
insurance to the federal domain. British North America Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6, ch. 36, § 1 (U.K.).
152. See AG Ont. v. AG Can. (The Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act), [1937]
A.C. 405, 416 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.) (agreeing with the Canadian Supreme Court
that parts of the Act were invalid as ultra vires); AG B.C. v. AG Can. (The Natural Products
Marketing Act), [1937] A.C. 377, 386-87 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (U.K.) ("There can be no
doubt that the provisions of the Act cover transactions [that] ... have no connection with the inter-
Provincial or export trade. It is therefore plain that the Act purports to affect property and civil
rights in the Province, and ... must be beyond the competence of the Dominion Legislature.").
153. SAYWELL, supra note 125, at 226.
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Lord Atkin announced all of the New Deal decisions on the same
January day in 1937.154 It is more than a little bit ironic that the decisions
came down as the U.S. Supreme Court was deep in deliberation over West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish.15 5 For while Justice Roberts was engineering the
switch in time that saved nine, Lord Atkin was unwittingly laying the
groundwork for abolition of appeals to his own court. The local reaction to
the Committee's New Deal decisions was swift and largely negative, in par-
ticular from a group of progressive scholars led by University of Toronto
Law School Dean William Paul McClure Kennedy and McGill law professor
Francis Reginald Scott. 156 Kennedy had written optimistically during Lord
Sankey's tenure that "the older constitutional law is being handed over to the
historians."' 157 Understandably, his optimism did not survive the New Deal
decisions. In a symposium in the Canadian Bar Review devoted to those
decisions, he wrote:
The time has come to abandon tinkering with or twisting the British
North America Act-a curiosity belonging to an elder age. At long
last we can criticize it, as the stem demands of economic pressure
have bitten into the bastard loyalty which gave to it the doubtful
devotion of primitive ancestor worship.
158
Referring to the necessary reliance of Canadian law on English
conventions of statutory interpretation, Kennedy virtually seethed, "We
would have faced this issue long ago had we not too largely believed that
constitutional and legal wisdom never really crossed the Atlantic."'
159
Writing in the same symposium, Scott sounded a similar note: "No
alterations to the British North America Act will ever achieve what
Canadians want them to achieve if their interpretation is left to a non-
Canadian judiciary." 160
Not just the academy bristled. The Senate instructed its counsel, W.F.
O'Connor, to prepare a report on the origins of the BNA Act and its inter-
pretation by the Privy Council. 16 1 The O'Connor Report, as it came to be
known, argued that the Privy Council had profoundly misinterpreted the in-
154. The decisions were handed down on January 28, 1937. Id.
155. West Coast Hotel was argued on December 16 and 17, 1936. 300 U.S. 379, 379 (1937).
According to a memo written by Justice Roberts and given to Justice Frankfurter some years later,
there were two conference votes on the case, first on December 19 and then again on February 6,
1937, barely a week after Atkin's New Deal decisions. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 311, 315 (1955).
156. Eric M. Adams, Canada's "Newer" Constitutional Law and the Idea of Constitutional
Rights, 51 MCGILL L.J. 435, 437-39 (2006).
157. W.P.M. Kennedy, Three Views of Constitutional Law, 9 CAN. B. REV. 553, 553 (1931).
158. W.P.M. Kennedy, The British North America Act: Past and Future, 15 CAN. B. REV. 393,
399 (1937).
159. Id. at 398.
160. F.R. Scott, The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions, 15 CAN. B. REV. 485, 494
(1937).
161. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GROUP, supra note 120, at 183.
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tended division of power between the national and provincial governments,
and that (unlike in the United States) authority was presumptively to rest
with the former.' 62  O'Connor's conclusions remained orthodoxy for three
decades, 163 during which time Ottawa made its move. In 1939, Tory MP
Charles Cahan introduced a bill abolishing all appeals to the Privy Council
and Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe referred the bill to the Supreme Court
for a ruling on its constitutionality. 164 The Court found the bill constitutional
and the Judicial Committee affirmed on the authority of the Statute of
Westminster, 1931.165 Appeals to the Privy Council were officially abolished
with passage of the bill and British approval in 1949.166
Once the Supreme Court of Canada officially became Canada's court of
last resort in 1949, it not only became far more hospitable to claims of
national authority, 167 but it also accelerated the judiciary's break from the
canons of British statutory interpretation. Thus, although the Court still ad-
heres to stare decisis in the ordinary course, it has on occasion refused to
follow precedents of the Privy Council. 68 Likewise, the strict ban on refer-
ence to parliamentary debate, not relaxed in the House of Lords until 1993,169
was lifted in Canadian constitutional cases in the 1970s, 170 and the Supreme
Court is not mechanically opposed to referring to the legislative history of
the BNA Act.171 Indeed, mitigation of the old English exclusionary rule with
respect to extrinsic sources has been justified by way of the living-tree
metaphor. In the Residential Tenancies Act 1979172 reference, the Court
162. See WILLIAM F. O'CONNOR, REPORT PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE TO THE
HONOURABLE THE SPEAKER BY THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL: RELATING TO THE ENACTMENT
OF THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, 1867, annex 1, at 42 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer 1961) (1939)
("The legislative authority that the Imperial Parliament 'meant' the Parliament of Canada to have
was not that emasculated authority which [the Privy Council has invented]. It was, instead, that
unrestricted and exclusive authority to make laws .... ").
163. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GROUP, supra note 120, at 183-84.
164. SAYWELL, supra note 125, at 229.
165. Reference re Legislative Competence of Parliament to Enact Bill No. 9, [1940] S.C.R. 49,
70 (Can.), aff'd sub nor. AG Ont. v. AG Can., [1947] A.C. 127, 154-55 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Can.) (U.K.) (relying on Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (U.K.)).
166. See SAYWELL, supra note 125, at 238 ("In 1949 the only certainty was that, as the court of
last resort, the Supreme Court would be free of the threat of review.").
167. Id. at 247.
168. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 79 (citing three constitutional cases where the Court has
explicitly refused to follow the Privy Council's precedent: Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (Can.); Reference re Bill 30 (Ontario Separate School Funding), [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1148 (Can.); Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.)).
169. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593, 594 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
170. See Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 386-88 (Can.) (admitting
extrinsic evidence directed at establishing relevant legislative facts); Stgphane Beaulac,
Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?, 43
MCGILL L.J. 287, 303 (1998) (describing how rules relating to the permissibility of extrinsic
material and parliamentary debate began to shift in the 1970s).
171. Hogg, supra note 114, at 78-79.
172. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (Can.).
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permitted admission of various policy reports of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission. 173 Wrote Justice Dickson, "A constitutional reference is not a
barren exercise in statutory interpretation. What is involved is an attempt to
determine and give effect to the broad objectives and purpose of the
Constitution, viewed as a 'living tree', in the expressive words of Lord
Sankey."
174
The Court has used the metaphor regularly since the late 1970s,
coinciding roughly with the strength of the patriation movement. Thus, the
Court held in 1979 that a Quebec law declaring that official publication of
statutes was to be in French alone was inconsistent with Section 133 of the
BNA Act, which requires that provincial legislative acts be published in both
English and French. 175  In addressing whether "regulations" published in
French also fell within the purview of Section 133, which refers only to
"acts," the Court cited Edwards and wrote: "Dealing, a[s] this Court is here,
with a constitutional guarantee, it would be overly-technical to ignore the
modern development of non-curial adjudicative agencies which play so
important a role in our society ... .,,176 The living-tree doctrine served
provincial rather than federal ends in another pre-Charter federalism case,
Attorney-General British Columbia v. Canada Trust Co., 17 7 in which the
Court refused to limit the scope of provincial taxing authority to property,
even though "direct taxation within the province," authorized by Section 92
of the BNA Act, may not have been understood in 1867 to permit in
personam taxes. 1
78
The living-tree metaphor has had a nebulizing effect in structural cases,
freeing both provincial and federal power to spread into domains not origi-
nally anticipated. As we shall see, however, the metaphor has been most
fertile in rights cases, in which its effect is quite the opposite.' 79
2. A Tree Grows in Canada: Judicial Review Under the Charter.-The
advent of the Constitution Act, 1982 meant that for the first time in its history
the Supreme Court of Canada would be constitutionally committed to hold-
ing parliamentary and provincial acts invalid on the ground that they violated
individual rights. 80 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes an exten-
173. Id. at 720.
174. Id. at 723.
175. AG Que. v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 1030 (Can.).
176. Id. at 1029.
177. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 466 (Can.).
178. Id. at 480, 491.
179. See Morton & Knopff, supra note 145, at 538-39 (asserting that the use of the living-tree
metaphor in civil-liberties cases obstructs majoritarian democracy because courts use the doctrine to
"dictate to the legislature what it may not do").
180. See Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11, § 52 (U.K.) (declaring the Constitution of Canada to be the supreme law of Canada and any
inconsistent law to be of no force or effect). The Canadian Parliament enacted a statutory Bill of
Rights in 1960. An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
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sive list of enumerated rights, including the "fundamental freedoms" of
conscience and religion; thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
press and other media of communication; peaceful assembly; and
association.' 1 The Charter also guarantees, among other things, the rights to
vote, to receive a host of criminal procedural protections, and to be free from
unreasonable search or seizure, arbitrary detention, and cruel and unusual
punishment. 182  The Charter studiously avoids the phrase "due process of
law," on which more later, but it does guarantee equality "before and under
the law"'183 and "the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice."' 84
Although the Constitution Act, 1982 contains a Supremacy Clause,'8 5 it
also subjects constitutional guarantees to two express limitations. First, the
enumerated rights and freedoms are pronounced "subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.'' 186 The Charter, then, makes explicit what in the
United States has been left to judicial construction: a decision rule for
declaring actionable rights violations. 87 Second, Section 33 of the Charter
permits either the national or a provincial legislature to declare that a legisla-
tive act remains in force notwithstanding a judicial determination that it
violates certain individual rights guaranteed under the Charter.' 88  The
declaration lasts five years and is subject to renewal by a second vote of the
legislature. 189  Quebec, which is bound by but has not ratified the
Constitution Act, 1982, retroactively inserted a notwithstanding declaration
into all of its domestic laws in 1982, and its national assembly invoked the
notwithstanding clause for every piece of legislation passed between 1982
Freedoms, 1960, S.C. ch. 44 (Can.). It remains in effect but it applies only against the national
government and has largely been superseded by the Charter. While in force, it was widely viewed
as ineffectual. See LAW, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CANADA 401 (F.L. Morton ed.,
2d ed. 1992) ("The Court's self-restrained and deferential interpretation of the 1960 Bill of Rights
effectively prevented that document from having any significant legal or political impact.").
181. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 2.
182. Id. § 2 (fundamental freedoms); id. § 3 (voting); id. § 8 (search and seizure); id. § 9
(arbitrary detention); id. § 10 (counsel and habeas corpus); id. § II (additional criminal procedural
protections); id. § 12 (cruel and unusual punishments).
183. The Charter expressly shields affirmative-action programs from an equality-based attack.
Id. § 15.2.
184. Id. § 7.
185. Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 52.
186. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1.
187. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2004)
(discussing the evolution of constitutional decision rules used by the U.S. judiciary to determine
violations of constitutional rights).
188. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33. Section 33 does not apply to democratic rights,
mobility rights, or language rights. Id.
189. Id.
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and 1985.190 Outside of Qu6bec, however, use of the notwithstanding
mechanism is rare-it has been invoked remedially only thrice by other
provinces and never by the federal parliament.19'
The sole remaining official recourse against an unpopular Charter
decision is constitutional amendment, but this avenue is only moderately
easier than the Article V process under the U.S. Constitution. 192  Most
Charter amendments require agreement of both the House of Commons and
the Senate as well as seven of the ten provincial assemblies. 193 Moreover, an
informal norm has developed in Canada of submitting amendments to popu-
lar referendum. This process has included some spectacular and politically
inopportune defeats, including most prominently the 1992 Charlottetown
Accord, which was designed to secure Qu6bec's ratification of the
Constitution.194  Even though the federal government, all ten provincial
assemblies, the leaders of the three most powerful political parties, and the
leaders of four national aboriginal groups supported the Accord, it was
defeated 54% to 46%.195  Says Peter Hogg, "One must conclude that
significant amendments to the Constitution of Canada are, at least for the
foreseeable future, impossible."'
' 96
All of which is to say that judicial interpretations of the Charter are
immensely consequential political acts. In light of the Court's history-two
decades earlier Ronald Cheffins had labeled it "The Quiet Court in an
Unquiet Country" 97-it was not inevitable that it would shed its customary
timidity upon enactment of the Charter, but the Justices took to their new role
with uncharacteristic verve. So much so that by the Charter's tenth
anniversary, former Chief Justice Antonio Lamer was prepared to call the
Charter "a revolution on the scale of the introduction of the metric system,
the great medical discoveries of Louis Pasteur, and the invention of penicillin
190. Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the
Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255, 281 n. 1 (2001).
191. DAVID JOHANSEN & PHILIP. ROSEN, PARLIAMENTARY INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., THE
NOTWITHSTANDING CLAUSE OF THE CHARTER 11-12 (2008), http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/
library/PRBpubsibp194-e.pdf. Prospective rather than remedial invocation of Section 33 has been
somewhat more frequent but is far less politically visible. See Kahana, supra note 190, at 274
(explaining that prospective uses of the notwithstanding clause "were invisible because they dealt
with issues that were not on the public's agenda prior to their enactments").
192. Although the Constitution Act, 1982 has been formally amended eight times, none was of
national importance. Hogg, supra note 114, at 57 n.9.
193. Id. at 57.
194. See id. (stating that the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords "have
persuaded Canadian politicians that constitutional amendment is not a career-enhancing
opportunity").
195. See RUSSELL, supra note 125, at 192-93, 227 tbl.2 (discussing the multilateral nature of
the negotiations that produced the Charlottetown Accord and documenting the results of the
referendum).
196. Hogg, supra note 114, at 57.
197. Ronald I. Cheffins, The Supreme Court of Canada: The Quiet Court in an Unquiet
Country, 4 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 259 (1966).
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and the laser."' 98 In twenty-two years of adjudication under the 1960 statu-
tory Bill of Rights, only 5 of 35 plaintiffs won their Supreme Court cases,
and the Court invalidated only one federal statute.199 Over the first twenty-
four years of judicial review under the Charter, the Court invalidated 89
laws, including 53 federal statutes.2°°
The range of cases to which the Canadian judicial power has extended is
broader than in the United States. Canada has no political-question or
ripeness doctrines, and its mootness and standing rules are lax by
201comparison. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada regards its compe-
202tence as comprising a broad remedial authority. Thus, in Vriend v.
Alberta,2 °3 the Court found unconstitutional the Alberta Individual Rights
Protection Act for a sin of omission, that is, for not including sexual orienta-
204tion as a protected ground from employment discrimination. As a remedy,
the Court read sexual orientation into the statute despite a deliberate legisla-
tive decision to exclude it.205 In defense of the aggressive remedy, Justice
lacobucci wrote, "By definition, Charter scrutiny will always involve some
interference with the legislative will. 206
More startling from a U.S. constitutional orientation is Reference re
Secession of Qudbec,20 7 in which the Court was asked to decide whether
Qu6bec could unilaterally secede from Canada. 20 8 For a court even to answer
such a question is, in a manner of speaking, foreign to our constitutional
198. F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY
13 (2000).
199. Id. at 14. The statutory provision was Section 94(b) of the Indian Act, invalidated in R. v.
Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282, 283 (Can.).
200. See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 75, 97 tbl.1 (1997) (indicating that, by 1997, the Court had invalidated sixty-six laws,
forty-three of which were federal statutes); Peter W. Hogg et al., Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or
"Much Ado About Metaphors," 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 51, 52 tbl. 1 (2007) (noting that since
1997 the Court invalidated another twenty-three laws, ten of which were federal statutes).
201. Hogg, supra note 114, at 71; cf Geoffrey Cowper & Lome Sossin, Does Canada Need a
Political Questions Doctrine?, 16 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2d 343, 344 (2002) (arguing that the role of the
Supreme Court of Canada with respect to the legislature has not been clearly established).
202. Hogg, supra note 114, at 71; see also MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 198, at 15 ("Under
the Charter, the Supreme Court has sanctioned judicially ordered affirmative remedies. That is,
they no longer just tell policymakers what they may not do but also what they must do.").
203. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.).
204. Id. at 498; cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that the Boy
Scouts' associational rights were violated by the application of New Jersey's public-
accommodations law, which required the Boy Scouts to retain an openly gay scout leader).
205. Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 574.
206. Id.
207. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
208. Id. at 228. Under the Supreme Court Act, the federal Cabinet may refer important legal
questions to the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 53
(1985) (Can.).
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sensibilities. 20 9  Qu6bec's as well, I should add-the province refused to
participate in the case on political-question grounds. 210 The Supreme Court
of Canada not only answered the question-in the negative-but it did so
without reference to anything so concrete as text or history, the confluence of
which forms the core of Our Originalism. Rather, the Court derived its deci-
sion from what it identified as four unenumerated but fundamental principles
that "breathe life" into the Canadian Constitution: federalism; democracy;
constitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect for minorities. 211  The
Court wrote in its per curiam opinion: "[O]bservance of and respect for these
principles is essential to the ongoing process of constitutional development
and evolution of our Constitution as a 'living tree' .... ,,212 The Court ulti-
mately decided that while Qu6bec could not secede unilaterally, if the people
of Qu6bec were clearly to express a desire to secede, all other parties to
Confederation would be obligated to renegotiate the Constitution to give
voice to that expression.213 A judicious decision, to be sure, but not one
many Americans would recognize as properly judicial.
The post-Charter Supreme Court of Canada has, with limited
exceptions, been at least as hospitable to rights claims as the U.S. Supreme
Court. It has found comparable constitutional protections in areas such as
criminal procedure, religious freedom, freedom of association and assembly,
and privacy rights.214  As the Vriend case suggests, the Supreme Court of
Canada has far outpaced its American cousin in prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.215 Canada's high court is also more receptive
to claims that sound in group rights. The Charter specifically protects both
affirmative-action policies 216 and minority-language rights,217  and any
209. Cf Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 507 (2004) ("Some, but not all, of the political
questions associated with efforts to prevent secession and Civil War were resolved into judicial
questions.").
210. Peter Leslie, Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec,
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1999, at 135, 138.
211. Secession of Qu~bec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 248. The Qu~bec Secession reference is not the
first time the Supreme Court of Canada has rested a decision on the authority of unwritten
constitutional principles. See, e.g., Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of
P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 13-14 (Can.) (applying unwritten principles to hold that provinces cannot
reduce the salaries of provincial court judges without first consulting an independent commission).
212. Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 248.
213. Id. at 220-21.
214. Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence in Canada and the United States:
Significant Convergence or Enduring Divergence?, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES 63, 67-74 (Stephen L. Newman ed., 2004).
215. See, e.g., Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 728 (Can.) (upholding
federal power to mandate the legality of same-sex marriage); M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 13 (Can.)
(invalidating Ontario's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage benefits); Egan v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 532 (finding unanimously that sexual orientation is a prohibited basis for
discrimination under Section 15 of the Charter).
216. See Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
§ 15(2) (U.K.) (providing that the Charter's guarantee of equality rights "does not preclude any law,
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constitutional amendment dealing with language rights requires unanimous
support from the provinces.21 8 Indeed, among the few individual rights that
the Supreme Court of Canada protects less than the U.S. Supreme Court are
those that are competitive with group claims. Thus, the Court not only has
upheld a national hate-speech law 219 but also has permitted the criminaliza-
tion of pornography that degrades women, on the theory that it harms the
community in a manner similar to hate speech.22°
But the substantive differences between Canadian and American rights
jurisprudence are minor by comparison to the methodological and rhetorical
gulf separating the two Supreme Courts. The former gulf is, understandably,
narrower than the latter. As Part II discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court is
methodologically pluralistic, and the bark of the domestic originalism
movement has always been worse than its bite. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Canada has never suggested that original understanding, even at a
relatively low level of abstraction, is wholly irrelevant. 22' But it does not
overstate things to suggest that a decision like Heller is unimaginable in
Canada. Among jurists, legal scholars, and (by all indications) the Canadian
public, the notion that a court's conclusions as to the expectations of the rati-
fying generation should be sufficient to dispose of a present individual-rights
case is nearly risible.
A couple of examples should set the mood. Consider first Reference re
Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act.222 At issue was the constitutionality
of a British Columbia law that made driving with a suspended license a
strict-liability criminal offense with a mandatory jail term.223 The Supreme
Court of Canada held, unanimously, that criminal liability and imprisonment
without a mens rea element violated the Charter-enshrined right not to be
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals
or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability").
217. Id. §§ 16-23.
218. Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 43(b).
219. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 795 (Can.).
220. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 496-97, 500-01, 509-10 (Can.). Catharine MacKinnon
worked on an influential amicus brief in the case on behalf of the Women's Legal Education and
Action Fund. Factum of the Intervener Women's Legal Educ. & Action Fund as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Doc. 22191); see also Tamar Lewin, Canada
Court Says Pornography Harms Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7 (highlighting
MacKinnon's work with the Fund).
221. See Reference re Employment Insurance Act, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, 690, 2005 SCC 56
(Can.) ("While the views of the framers are not conclusive where constitutional interpretation is
concerned, the context in which the amendment was made is nonetheless relevant."); Bradley W.
Miller, Beguiled by Metaphors: The 'Living Tree' and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in
Canada, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 331, 344-45 (2009) (categorizing the Court's appeals to
originalism into three types: "gratuitous reference" cases, "confederation bargain" cases, and cases
that employ originalism as a justification for dissent or for overturning precedent).
222. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.).
223. Id. at 493-94.
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deprived of liberty "except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. ' '224 That language, found in Section 7 of the Charter, is deliberately
tortured. Prior to adoption of the Charter, the legislative committee tasked
with reviewing the draft heard testimony from numerous Department of
Justice Canada officials who explained that in composing the text they
specifically refrained from using the term "due process" so as to avoid the
paradoxically substantive connotations of that phrase in U.S.
jurisprudence.225
That bit of history did not impress the Court. Writing for himself and
four of his colleagues, Justice Lamer wrote that such testimony was entitled
to "minimal weight., 226 It was impossible, in his view, to locate a general
legislative intent, and it would be inappropriate to make dispositive in
Charter interpretation "the comments of a few federal civil servants. 227
Moreover, placing any significant weight on the committee proceedings
would mean that:
[T]he rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect
become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing
societal needs .... If the newly planted "living tree" which is the
Charter is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time,
care must be taken to ensure that historical materials ... do not stunt
its growth.228
Instead, the Court said unequivocally that interpretation under the
Charter was to be "purposive"-that is, with reference to the interests a given
provision is meant to protect.229 Quoting Chief Justice Dickson's earlier
statement in R. v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd.,23° Justice Lamer wrote that any
interpretation of Charter rights should be "a generous rather than a legalistic
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection. 231
This approach marks a significant departure from U.S. jurisprudence
along several dimensions. First, the Court's dismissive attitude toward
drafting records is not just anti-originalist but is more broadly anti-historicist.
The intentions of the framers of the U.S. Constitution, specific and otherwise,
224. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 515-16 (quoting Charter of Rights and Freedoms
§ 7); accord id. at 521 (McIntyre, J., concurring); id. at 534 (Wilson, J., concurring).
225. Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Spec. J. Comm. of the S. and of the H. of
Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st Sess. of the 32d Parliament, 46:32 (1981) (statement
of Barry Strayer, Assistant Deputy Minister, Dep't of Justice); Hogg, supra note 114, at 83.
226. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 509.
227. Id. at 508.
228. Id. at 509.
229. Id. at 511.
230. [1985] 1 S.C.R, 295 (Can.).
231. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 500 (quoting Big M, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 344).
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remain a vital source of American constitutional wisdom.23 2  Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in Heller sought to counter Justice Scalia not
through an appeal to the living Constitution but through relentless emphasis
on the intent of the drafters of the Second Amendment. 33 If the Great Divide
in the United States is, as Justice Scalia says, between original meaning and
current meaning, the Supreme Court of Canada has pledged its allegiance to
the latter in the clearest of terms.234
Second, even granting a stateside trend away from original-intent
originalism, 235 the approach reflected in Justice Lamer's opinion is starkly
different from U.S. orthodoxy. Public-meaning originalism does not depend
on drafting history to determine constitutional meaning, but as Justice Scalia
has acknowledged, debating history can provide clues as to the original
understanding of the ratifying public.236 The Supreme Court of Canada could
have profitably adopted this approach in the Motor Vehicle Act reference:
Barry Strayer, one of the Charter's principal drafters, testified that he
understood "fundamental justice" to be interchangeable with "natural
justice,, 237 and indeed the Supreme Court itself had given the terms equiva-
lence in Duke v. The Queen,238 which construed "fundamental justice" under
the Canadian Bill of Rights. 239 Natural justice is a familiar common law and
administrative law concept in Canada that generally refers to procedural, not
232. See Fallon, supra note 31, at 1198-99 (documenting the usage of both specific and general
forms of original intent on the U.S. Supreme Court); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 (1981) ("Judicial opinions at least purport to take original intent
seriously, apparently reflecting the belief that the original intent mode is not simply a matter of
expository style in opinion writing. It is, rather, a way of thinking about constitutional 'meaning'
that follows from the basic concepts that legitimate judicial review .... (footnote omitted)).
233. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the original intent of the Second Amendment was to protect state militias, not private
civilian use).
234. See Ont. Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Bd.), [1993] 3 S.CR. 327, 409 (Can.) ("This
Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United States of basing constitutional
interpretation on the original intentions of the framers of the Constitution.").
235. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
236. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 38 (explaining that he refers to the writings of some
Constitutional Convention delegates because their writings indicate how the constitutional text was
originally understood by "intelligent and informed people"); cf Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (acknowledging that the drafting history of a treaty "may of course be
consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous").
237. See sources cited supra note 225; see also Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and
Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 J. INT'L CONST. L. 1, 23-24 (2004) (describing how Strayer and
the Canadian Department of Justice deliberately chose the term "fundamental justice" because of its
synonymity with "natural justice," thereby-supposedly-avoiding any Lochner-type
constitutionalization of substantive due process).
238. [1972] S.C.R. 917 (Can.).
239. See id. at 923 (explaining that, to adhere to the principles of "fundamental justice," a court
must "act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial temper, and must give to [the appellant]
the opportunity adequately to state his case").
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substantive, fairness.24 ° Justice Lamer's refusal to accord decent respect to
the opinions of the Charter's drafters even to clarify the original understand-
ing reflects a singular discomfort with turns to history as an interpretive
aide. 4'
Finally, and perhaps most unusually from a U.S. perspective, the Motor
Vehicle Act reference committed the Court to a specific and aggressive
method of constitutional interpretation. Self-proclaimed and unanimous
confidence in the high court's preferred interpretive methodology is un-
known this side of the St. Lawrence. Not only is it rare for the U.S. Supreme
Court to coalesce around a specific interpretive approach, but it is relatively
uncommon for Court opinions to contain extended discussions of
constitutional theory.242
Not so the Supreme Court of Canada, which with little controversy has
invoked the living-tree metaphor-an explicit excursion into constitutional
theory-in no fewer than nineteen lead opinions since the Charter was
enacted.243 Indeed, the Court used the metaphor in its very first case under
the Charter, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker,244 in which it held
that an Ontario law limiting bar membership to Canadian citizens did not
240. See Martin Loughlin, Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law
Theory, 28 U. TORONTO L.J. 215, 217-18 (1978) (chronicling courts' historical application of the
rules of natural justice); see also H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (defining "natural justice" as "[t]he
principles which require courts, in applying general rules to particular cases, to be without personal
interest in the outcome or other bias and to hear arguments on matters of law and proofs of matters
of fact from both sides of a dispute"); Jeremy Waldron, Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1135, 1145 (2008) (referring to Hart's rules of natural justice as "the truly
procedural principles").
241. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 79, 83. The Court has occasionally resorted to originalism in
order to preserve a specific historic compromise, particularly in aboriginal cases. See, e.g., R. v.
Blais, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236, 237, 2003 SCC 44 (Can.) (holding based on historical context that the
M~tis are excluded from the definition of "Indian" in the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 548 (Can.) (holding it consistent with a
purposive interpretive approach to declare that the aboriginal rights protected in Section 35 of the
Charter are not dynamic but instead include only traditions identifiable prior to aboriginal contact
with Europeans); Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, 611 (Can.) (refusing to extend state support
for minority denominational schools in Ontario and Quebec, as established under the BNA Act, to
other sectarian schools).
242. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L.
REv. 747, 752 (1992) (asserting that Supreme Court Justices are rarely motivated by theoretical
concerns in writing their opinions); cf Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) ("Our
history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain the disposition of cases.").
243. See Morton & Knopff, supra note 145, at 533 ("While the living tree doctrine evolved in
the judicial interpretation of the [BNA Act], especially the law of federalism, no one has questioned
the appropriateness of transferring it to the Charter."); cf Raymond Bazowski, For the Love of
Justice? Judicial Review in Canada and the United States, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 214, at 223, 231 (concluding that the legislatures'
silence after the Canadian Supreme Court announced its intention to engage in broad purposive
analysis almost immediately after the Charter's passage demonstrates their acceptance of that
interpretive approach).
244. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (Can.).
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offend the Charter.245 In a lengthy discourse on the fundamentals of
interpretation of a constitutional instrument, complete with quotations from
Marbury v. Madison246 and McCulloch v. Maryland,247 the Court stated that
"[n]arrow and technical interpretation, if not modulated by a sense of the
unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and hence the
community it serves. 248
More recently, the Court used the living-tree analogy to uphold the
constitutionality of a federal law fixing a gender-neutral definition of
marriage. 249 Notwithstanding the obvious rights implications of the decision,
it arose as a federalism question: with characteristic opacity, the BNA Act
places the subject of "Marriage and Divorce" under the head of exclusive
federal jurisdiction, while "Solemnization of Marriage in the Province" is an
exclusively provincial matter.250 The Supreme Court found that this gave the
federal government domain over marriage capacity and the provinces domain
over marriage performance. 251 But was the meaning of marriage the same as
the common law definition circa 1867? We now know enough about the
Court to answer this question without even reading the opinion. That is, as
the Court wrote, "[t]he 'frozen concepts' reasoning runs contrary to one of
the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation:
that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive
interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modem life. 252
3. Critics of Canadian Activism.-The Supreme Court's hostility to
constitutional historicism and its repeated incantations of the living-tree
metaphor do not seem to have damaged its credibility with the public, nor are
these significant concerns even of the Court's academic critics. There is little
evidence of widespread Canadian opposition to the Court's exercise of power
under the Charter's auspices.253 A 2007 survey of Canadians found that 54%
of respondents thought the Supreme Court was "moving ou[r] society in the
right direction," whereas 37% thought the Court was moving society in the
wrong direction.254 Remarkably, even among those in the "wrong direction"
cohort, opposition to the Court was not framed in terms of judicial activism
245. Id. at 382-83.
246. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
247. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
248. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. at 366.
249. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [20041 3 S.C.R. 698, 700, 2004 SCC 79 (Can.).
250. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, §§ 91(26), 92(12) (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
251. Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 708-09.
252. Id. at 710.
253. See MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 198, at 17 (observing that a majority of the Canadian
public has greater confidence in courts and judges than in legislatures and politicians, despite the
increasing influence of the courts over policy and the rise of "court bashing" in the press).
254. SES RESEARCH, STAT SHEET-2007Q1 NATIONSTATE OMNIBUS SURVEY-VIEWS ON
SUPREME COURT 1, http://www.nanosresearch.com/library/polls/POLNAT-W07-T219.pdf.
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or the countermajoritarian difficulty familiar to U.S. discourse. Asked the
open-ended question of why they believed the Court was moving society in
the wrong direction, 25% expressed general dissatisfaction with the Court's
work, and 26% suggested that the Court was soft on crime.255 The sorts of
criticisms that tend to recur in books like Mark Levin's Men in Black,256 on
talk radio, and at congressional hearings-"[o]ut of touch with mainstream
society" (4.6%); "[t]oo political" (3.5%); "allowing abortion/same-sex
marriage" (2.2%)-barely registered.257
None of which is to say that the Court is without its critics. The
"activism" of the Supreme Court of Canada is a frequent topic of discussion
among academics and politicians. 258 But vanishingly few of the Court's crit-
ics insist that its members should be constrained by the historical meaning of
the Constitution.259 Indeed, two of the most prominent among them, F.L.
Morton and Rainer Knopff, argue that the Court's incorporation of evolu-
tionary principles into constitutional interpretation is an error only of degree.
They write, "We are not opposed to all possible uses of the 'living tree'
analogy, and our critique of its more extreme version does not imply the
acceptance of similarly extreme (and simplistic) versions of the 'original
intent' or 'frozen concepts' approaches to constitutional interpretation.,
260
Rather, Morton and Knopff invoke the Canadian tradition of parliamentary
supremacy to argue for greater deference to the democratic decision making
of the whole, as against the narrow interests of aboriginal groups and other
minorities. 26 1 They argue, echoing James Bradley Thayer, that granting
courts the power to render inconclusive the results of democratic deliberation
weakens the national commitment to robust democracy.262 Theirs is, in that
sense, a critique in the minimalist tradition.
255. Id. at 2. The Court's criminal-procedure decisions have been its least popular, but
complaints in this area have not typically been originalist in nature. See, e.g., Celeste McGovern,
Benevolent Monarch, ALTA. REP., Sept. 21, 1998, at 20 (using a case in which an alleged murderer
was freed due to excluded evidence as a paradigmatic example of Supreme Court activism under the
Charter).
256. See generally LEVIN, supra note 41 (asserting that activist judges have improperly used the
concept of a living constitution to advance certain moral or political aims at odds with the original
intentions of the founders).
257. SES RESEARCH, supra note 254, at 2.
258. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 74-80 (2001) (summarizing conservative criticisms of judicial activism
under the Charter).
259. See Bazowski, supra note 243, at 230 (arguing that the American debate between
"interpretivists" and "noninterpretivists" does not "translate in the Canadian context quite the same
way, even though their political subtext is certainly not unknown in Canada").
260. Morton & Knopff, supra note 145, at 544.
261. See MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 198, at 157 (arguing that the institutional transfer of
power over policy matters to the courts is "a way of substituting coercion for government by
discussion").
262. See id. at 149 (explaining that their primary objection to the Charter Revolution is that "it
is deeply and fundamentally undemocratic, not just in the simple and obvious sense of being anti-
majoritarian, but also in the more serious sense of eroding the habits and temperament of
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Likewise, when the Supreme Court received an unusual and much-
discussed rebuke in a unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal of
Newfoundland and Labrador, Justice William Marshall made no reference to
the text, history, or structure of the Charter. The case, Newfoundland
(Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland Ass 'n of Public Employees,263 concerned
whether the Charter's equality provision granted female public-healthcare
workers a right to negotiated, retroactive pay-equity adjustments notwith-
standing a legislative determination that honoring the adjustments would
violate a recently enacted fiscal-restraint law. 264 Justice Marshall argued that
the Supreme Court had not given sufficient attention to the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers in its proportionality decisions under Section 1 of the
Charter: "[I]t cannot be said that s. 1 endows the judiciary with license to
stand in the shoes of the other branches of government as ultimate arbitrator
of which policy choices were in the best interests of the governed., 265 The
reason Justice Marshall believed that Section 1 had been misapplied was not
because of how it was intended or understood in 1982 but rather because he
believed the Court was trampling on an unwritten constitutional
convention.
266
Legal academics frequently argue that the debate over judicial activism
in the United States is hollow. The activist judge, after all, is the one who
267gets it wrong.  There being no shortage of Canadians who think the
Supreme Court of Canada gets cases wrong, and frequently so, the charge of
judicial activism is a familiar one north of the border. As Sheldon Pollack
writes, "There has been comparable disagreement in Canada over how active
a role, and to what purpose, the Supreme Court should play in divining and
articulating rights under the authority of the Charter., 268 What has not been
comparable is the rhetoric of the Courts' critics. The substantial movement
in the United States that views judicial activism in terms of inattention to the
original meaning of the Constitution has no Canadian counterpart. Rather,
representative democracy"); see also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901)
("The tendency of a common and easy resort to [judicial review] ... is to dwarf the political
capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.").
263. [2002] 221 D.L.R.4th 513, 2002 NLCA 72 (Can.).
264. Id. at 521-25.
265. Id. at 647.
266. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with Justice Marshall on appeal, stating (without irony)
that "the separation of powers cannot be invoked to undermine the operation of a specific written
provision of the Constitution like s. I of the Charter." Nfld. (Treasury Bd.) v. Nfld. Ass'n of Pub.
Employees, [2004] S.C.R. 381, 425, 2004 SCC 66 (Can.).
267. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 37-39 (2006) (arguing that,
to have any useful meaning, judicial activism must be understood as implicating illegitimate judicial
decisions).
268. Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation from Two Perspectives: Canada and the
United States, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note
214, at 35, 37.
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both the Canadian judiciary and its many critics have, for much of the
Charter's history, been "virtually unanimous" in endorsing a "living tree"
269approach to articulating Charter rights. Canadian jurists apply the living-
tree metaphor not only to changes in fact-as, say, even an American origi-
nalist might view the application of the First Amendment to broadcast
television2 70 but to changes in the meaning of the Constitution itself.
27 1
B. Australia's Faint-Hearted Originalism
At first blush, the preferred approach of the High Court of Australia to
interpretation of its Constitution is very nearly the mirror image of that of the
Supreme Court of Canada. Both Courts began the last century quasi-
committed to British sovereignty but deeply committed to British modes of
statutory interpretation. In both countries a seminal Progressive Era judicial
decision has served as a reference point in most discussions of the degree to
which constitutional interpretation should be originalist or evolutionary;
textualist or purposive; large and liberal or narrow and conservative. But
whereas Edwards and the living-tree metaphor it sprouted represent a depar-
ture from Canada's British origins,272 the case whose principles continue to
set the terms of debate in Australian constitutional law is instead a symbol of
British continuity. Thus, in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide
Steamship Co. (The Engineers Case),273 Justice Higgins wrote:
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are
subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent
of the Parliament that made it; and that intention has to be found by an
examination of the language used in the statute as a whole. The
question is, what does the language mean; and when we find what the
language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to
obey that meaning, even if we think the result to be inconvenient or
impolitic or improbable.
274
269. Jackson, supra note 52, at 947. As Vicki Jackson observes, the living-tree metaphor is not
conceptually identical to the "living constitution" idea that was once more popular in American
discourse. Id. at 943. The anatomy of a tree as root and branches "suggests that constitutional
interpretation is constrained by the past, but not entirely." Id. at 926. In that sense, the analogy
might compare more favorably with Ronald Dworkin's well-known chain-novel metaphor. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986) (describing judicial interpretation as analogous
to a novel produced serially by authors, each one drawing on and interpreting the chapters of earlier
authors in the chain).
270. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 12, at 45 (allowing that an originalist might still need to apply
constitutional text to "new and unforeseen phenomena").
271. Cf Morton & Knopff, supra note 145, at 539-40 (distinguishing changes in fact from
changes in meaning and arguing that the latter represents a problematic exercise of "judicial veto").
272. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
273. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129 (Austl.).
274. Id. at 161-62 (Higgins, J.). See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY
47-58 (2008) (describing the common law roots of reliance on the authority of the "intent of the
act").
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As I discuss below, the literalist approach taken in the Engineers Case,
which treats the Australian Constitution like the British statute that it is, was
the dominant approach of the High Court until Anthony Mason became Chief
Judge in 1987, roughly coinciding with Australian constitutional sovereignty
one year earlier. It remains rhetorically potent today. As Brad Selway has
written, "In contrast to the various divergent approaches that exist in United
States jurisprudence, all Australian High Court judges are likely to be viewed
as being fundamentally 'textualists.'
275
Part of the reason why Australia would have taken to purposive, value-
laden, or evolutionary jurisprudence much later than Canada seems obvious.
First, Australia lacks a bill of rights. The few enumerated rights in the
Australian Constitution generally apply only against the federal
government;276  adjudicating constitutional disputes, much less those
involving individual rights, is a relatively minor chore for the Court.277
Second, unlike in Canada, the upshot of High Court literalism was strong
deference to the power of the Commonwealth in federalism disputes.278
Taken in combination, those two considerations suggest a hypothesis: if nar-
row textualism threatened neither the power of the national government nor
the articulation of rights, it is unclear that it ever would have fallen out of
favor in either Canada or the United States.
But the case is more complex than that. Australian literalism, often
called legalism in its more sophisticated and plenary form, is more broadly
practiced but less reactionary and less historicist than American originalism.
As we shall see, legalism is an exercise in judgment, not a salve for it.
1. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.-The
Australian Constitution was the product of a domestically convened
constitutional convention spanning 1897 to 1899 at which each of the six
275. B.M. Selway, Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of
Australia, 14 PUB. L. REV. 234, 239 (2003).
276. The constitutionally enshrined individual rights are the rights to just terms in the event of a
taking of property, AUSTL. CONST. ch. 1, pt. 5, § 51(xxxi); to criminal trial by jury, id. ch. III, § 80;
and to freedom of religion, id. ch. V, § 116. The Constitution also guarantees that those qualified to
vote in state elections shall be qualified to vote in Commonwealth elections, id. ch. IV, § 41, but the
scope of this provision has been limited through judicial interpretation. See GEORGE WILLIAMS,
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 103 (1999) (explaining that Section 41
of the Australian Constitution is so infrequently applicable that the Australian Constitutional
Commission recommended its removal in 1998). State governments are forbidden from
discriminating against residents of other states. AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 117.
277. Constitutional cases rarely form more than 10% of the Court's annual docket. Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 52, at 106, 113. Rights cases are not dominant within that
category. See Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison
of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) (asserting that the
significant constitutional issue facing the Australian High Court has been separation of powers, not
individual rights).
278. See Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 136-41 (claiming that the judiciary's emphasis on
legalism allowed a massive expansion of Commonwealth power).
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colonies was represented. 279  The resulting Constitution was submitted for
referendum within five of the six colonies and was submitted to the
Parliament at Westminster for approval in 1900.280 The final version was
little changed by Parliament and went into effect as the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act on January 1, 1901.281 The Constitution estab-
lished a tripartite federal system of government, with a legislative, executive,
and judicial branch,282 although by convention the executive is under the con-
trol of the national legislature. 283 The principal federalism-related provisions
are Sections 51 and 52, which enumerate the powers of the Parliament,284 and
Sections 106-120, which include a supremacy clause and a full-faith-and-
credit clause, and which grant certain affirmative powers and impose certain
285limitations on state governments.
Like the U.S. counterpart on which it was modeled, the Australian
Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review, but there is
evidence that the power to review legislation for constitutionality was
assumed.286 The High Court is a constitutional creation, its composition and
jurisdiction the subject of Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 287 The Court began
to sit in 1903, when Parliament conferred jurisdiction upon it to decide con-
stitutional cases.288 Its constitutional jurisdiction permits it to hear appeals
279. THE CENTENARY COMPANION TO AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 11-12 (Helen Irving ed.,
1999).
280. Id. at 12-13. The final colony, Western Australia, approved the Constitution by
referendum after the passage of the bill in Parliament. Id. at 14.
281. See id. at 14 (describing the January 1, 1901 ceremony in Sydney that marked the
inauguration of the new Commonwealth). The Australian Constitution is contained within the final
clause of a nine-clause act of the British Parliament. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,
1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12, § 9 (U.K.).
282. AUSTL. CONST. chs. 1-111.
283. See W.G. McMINN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 59 (1979) (asserting
that at the time of the colonial constitutions, the Governor's executive power was contingent on the
advice of ministers responsible to the legislature); GEOFFREY SAWER, THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION 26-27 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that the members of the main body of Australia's
executive branch, the Cabinet, must all either be members of Parliament or become members within
three months of appointment). But see Christos Mantziaris, The Executive-A Common Law
Understanding of Legal Form and Responsibility, in REFLECTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION 125, 130-35 (French et al. eds., 2003) (observing that, while almost all executive
actions are ostensibly under parliamentary scrutiny, judicial expansion of executive power and the
executive's progressively greater dominance of Parliament in fact shield the executive branch from
a large measure of legislative scrutiny and control).
284. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51-52.
285. Id. ch. V, §§ 106-120.
286. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 110; see also Australian Communist Party v.
Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 262 (Austl.) (Fullagar, J.) ("[I]n our system the principle of
Marbury v. Madison is accepted as axiomatic.").
287. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 72 ("The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be
vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia .. "); id. § 73
(establishing the High Court's jurisdictional limits).
288. See Judiciary Act, 1903, ch. 6, pt. 4, § 30 (Austl.) (giving the High Court jurisdiction over
"all matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation").
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from both lower federal courts and from state courts (including on state-law
issues), 289 although today its jurisdiction is limited by statute to discretionary
appeals in cases involving divisions of authority in the lower courts or raising
issues of national importance.29 °
The Constitution also provides for the possibility of appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.29 1 Significantly, however, in cases
involving an inter se federalism question, appeal to the Privy Council from
High Court decisions originally required certification from the High Court
itself 292 The Court certified only one question, in 1913,293 before most
appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1968.294 Direct appeals from
state courts were not constitutionally barred, but the High Court ruled in
1907 that it was not bound by any Privy Council decisions on inter se affairs,
even when the Committee properly had jurisdiction.295 The state-court loop-
hole was subsequently closed later that same year when the Australian
Parliament provided that the High Court's jurisdiction over inter se matters
was exclusive of the state supreme courts'.29 6 As a practical matter, then, the
Privy Council has had very little effect on the development of Australian
constitutional law.297
Amendments to the Australian Constitution require passage in
Parliament and approval through referendum of the majority of voters
nationwide and in a majority of the states.298 Although on paper the amend-
ment process is easier than in either the United States or Canada,
constitutional amendment has not in practice been a significant avenue of
constitutional revision in Australia.299
2. Legalism at the Bar of the High Court.-The interesting question of
the extent to which judges should apply the same methods of interpretation to
constitutions as to statutes is more interesting still in countries with an
289. Id. § 73(ii).
290. Judiciary Amendment Act (No. 2), 1984, ch. 12, § 4 (Austl.).
291. AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 73.
292. Id. § 74.
293. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 111. The case was Attorney-General Australia v.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237 (P.C. 1913) (appeal taken from Austl.) (U.K.).
294. See Privy Council (Limitations of Appeals) Act, 1968, ch. 32, § 3 (Austl.) (barring appeals
from High Court decisions if they involved "application or interpretation" of the Constitution or an
instrument of the Parliament).
295. Baxter v. Comm'rs of Taxation (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1087, 1093 (Austl.).
296. Judiciary Act, 1907, ch. 8 (Austl.); LESLIE ZINES, COWEN AND ZINES'S FEDERAL
JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA 8-9 (3d ed. 2002).
297. See Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at Ill (observing that the Privy Council has rarely been
involved in constitutional cases since the 1907 Judiciary Act).
298. AUSTL. CONST., ch. VIII, § 128.
299. See Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 111 ("The Privy Council became involved only
intermittently... and even then it often merely affirmed the views of either the majority or minority
in the High Court. It therefore had a much less substantial impact on the development of Australian
constitutional law than on that of Canada.").
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ongoing tradition of parliamentary supremacy. It may be that we must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding, but the question was more
complicated early in Australia's constitutional history. The Australian
Constitution is a statute, after all, and not even an Australian statute at that.3 °0
It would have seemed obvious to many turn-of-the-century Commonwealth
jurists that the text, narrowly construed, fixed the intentions of the British
MPs whose assent was relevant to the status of the Constitution as law.
And indeed it was obvious to many. In Tasmania v. Commonwealth,3 °'
the High Court was called upon to decide a dispute over customs duties in
which it was claimed that an ambiguity in one section of the Constitution
should be read in accordance with common sense rather than so as to
conform, arguably absurdly, to another section.30 2 Put another way, by Chief
Justice Samuel Griffith:
We were invited by [Tasmania's counsel] to apply, in construing the
Constitution, some higher rule of construction; to look beyond the
letter of the Constitution; to adopt something which would commend
itself to our minds as being a principle of abstract justice, and if
possible to read the Constitution in conformity with that principle.
303
Griffith's words carry special weight in Australia, as he is often
described as the father of its Constitution, but he was careful to describe the
document as an Act of Parliament, to which "[t]he same rules of interpreta-
tion apply that apply to any other written document. ,34 Namely, the rules
were to be those that the House of Lords applies to statutes. First, "they
should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed
the Act. If the words of the Statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in
their natural and ordinary sense.,
30 5
Second, a court tasked with interpreting either a statute or a constitution
should not "decide such a question.., under the influence of considerations
of policy, except so far as that policy may be apparent from, or at least con-
sistent with, the language of the legislature in the Statute or Statutes upon
which the question depends. 30 6 The other two judges hearing the Tasmania
case, writing seriatim, agreed with Griffith. Justice Barton wrote:
It would be an enormity to hold that a Judge who thinks that a certain
course, laid down with apparent clearness in an Act of Parliament, is
300. See supra note 281.
301. (1904) 1 C.L.R. 329 (Austl.).
302. Id. at 334.
303. Id. at 338 (Griffith, C.J.).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 339 (quoting The Sussex Peerage, (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1057 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (Tindal, L.C.J.)).
306. Id. (quoting Hardy v. Fothergill, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 351, 358 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (Selborne, Earl)).
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absurd, may use every means to get rid of that literal meaning which,
to the minds of responsible legislators, who were in an equal position
to judge of its absurdity, appeared to be reasonable. 30 7
Justice O'Connor added that, in his view, "it [cannot] be too strongly stated
that our duty in interpreting a Statute is to declare and administer the law
according to the intention expressed in the Statute itself. In this respect the
Constitution differs in no way from any Statute of the Commonwealth or of a
State. , 3
0
Students of the debate on the modem U.S. Supreme Court over statutory
interpretation will recognize the voice of Justice Scalia.30 9  He has also
suggested that so far as the text is clear, it is a complete statement of
legislative intent, for "[m]en may intend what they will; but it is only the
laws that they enact which bind us." 310 It has long been thought by most
American judges and scholars that such a rigid rule of interpretation has no
place in constitutional law.3 11 That suggestion rests on one or both of two
assumptions: first, that a constitution meant to endure over time cannot pos-
sibly specify in advance how it should apply to unforeseen circumstances,
and second, that a constitution is difficult to amend and so must be tethered
to the contemporary will of the people in the course of judicial review.
Accepting the first assumption suggests the large and liberal interpretation
recommended in Edwards, and accepting the second means that, with due
respect to Chief Justice Griffith, constitutional judges should pay some at-
tention to considerations of policy. Where the constitution is in fact a statute
of a quasi-foreign sovereign, either assumption rests on shakier footing. A
constitution that doubles as ordinary legislation might be presumed to lack
the intransigence of a higher-law document, and one tethered from the
beginning to the will of foreigners challenges the democratic premise of the
two assumptions. What a foreign sovereign gives it conceivably may take
away.
307. Id. at 346-47 (Barton, J.).
308. Id. at 358 (O'Connor, J.).
309. Compare Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 105 (2007) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("As long as [the] driving policy [behind a purposive interpretation] is faithful to the
intent of Congress . . . -which it must be if it is to override a strict interpretation of the text-the
decision is also a correct performance of the judicial function."), with id. at 114 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Contrary to the Court and Justice Stevens, I do not believe that what we are sure the
Legislature meant to say can trump what it did say.").
310. Scalia, supra note 12, at 17.
311. The classic statement is John Marshall's: "A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of
all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
Justice Scalia agrees that constitutions are different, but in degree only. See Scalia, supra note 12,
at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us
not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation-though not an interpretation that the language will not bear.").
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The High Court's abandonment of special rules of interpretation for the
Constitution, evidenced in the Tasmania case, was sanctified in the Engineers
Case. At issue was whether a federal arbitration award could be applied
against a state.31 2 As in the United States during roughly the same era,31 3 the
High Court carefully scrutinized the (porous) boundary between interstate
and intrastate authority in a series of cases during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. And as in the United States, 3 14 the Court's federalism
decisions were difficult to predict in advance. Thus, the Court held in 1904
that the state of Tasmania could not tax the salary of a federal officer even
though Section 107 of the Constitution grants the power of taxation to the
states and does not expressly limit that power.3 15 Barely a decade later, the
Court upheld a Queensland statute taxing leasehold estates in federal land.3 ,6
Both decisions employed the structural, purposive, and extratextual reasoning
that the Engineers Case sought to end. Rather than engage in the guesswork
required of such reasoning, Justice Isaacs wrote that the Court's task in con-
stitutional interpretation was "faithfully to expound and give effect to [the
Constitution] according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words
of the compact, and upholding it throughout precisely as framed., 31 7 Isaacs
further explained that the Court should undertake this interpretation "clear of
any qualifications which the people of the Commonwealth or, at their request,
the Imperial Parliament have not thought fit to express. 31 8 The alternative,
he said, was "referable to no more definite standard than the personal opinion
of the Judge who declares it."
31 9
The Engineers Case is an immensely important landmark in Australia's
constitutional jurisprudence for two interrelated reasons. First, in upholding
the federal arbitration award the Court vanquished the concept of implied
intergovernmental immunities.32 ° Second, and most germane to our inquiry,
312. Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co. (The Engineers Case) (1920) 28
C.L.R. 129, 141 (Austl.).
313. See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922) (invalidating a federal
tax on manufacturing income derived from child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-
72 (1918) (invalidating congressional regulation of interstate commerce in the products of child
labor); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (invalidating application of the
Sherman Act to a consolidation of sugar manufacturing).
314. Compare Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72 (restricting federal authority), with Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1903) (upholding federal authority).
315. D'Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91, 104, 120 (Austl.).
316. AG Queensl. v. AG Austl. (1915) 20 C.L.R. 148, 159-60.
317. The Engineers Case, 28 C.L.R. at 142.
318. Id. at 160.
319. Id. at 142; see also id. at 145 (lamenting that the Queensland case was decided according
to "the opinions of Judges as to hopes and expectations respecting vague external conditions" rather
than through reliance on "any specific language to be quoted" or "any recognized principle of the
common law of the constitution").
320. See id. at 155 (declaring that acts of the Commonwealth will always override conflicting
State acts). As it did with respect to Canada, the Privy Council tended to favor provincial over
national rights in federalism cases. See, e.g., Webb v. Outtrim, [1907] A.C. 81 (P.C.) (appeal taken
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the case expressly established that interpretation of the Australian
Constitution would follow a British model of statutory interpretation rather
than an American model of constitutional interpretation. The High Court
would henceforward obey "[t]he settled rules of construction which ... have
been very distinctly enunciated by the highest tribunals of the [British]
Empire."32' To wit, "[t]he first, and 'golden rule' or 'universal rule,' ' 322 was
that judges interpreting a statute should:
[E]xclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as
it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by reading
it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section.
Subject to this consideration,... the only safe course is to read the
language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.
323
Specifically with respect to interpretation of a written constitution, the
rule would be:
[1]f the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and
what it forbids. When the text is ambiguous, as, for example, when
the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide
enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had
to the context and scheme of the Act.
324
Put differently, interpretation of the Australian Constitution would be by
reference to its plain text, structure, and statutory context. In the service of
judicial restraint, any reference to the intentions of the drafters was strictly
forbidden.
Variants on this approach to constitutional interpretation go by various
names around the world-originalism being one of them-but Australians
call it legalism. And it has had a distinguished pedigree since the Engineers
Case. At his 1952 swearing-in as Chief Justice of the High Court, Owen
Dixon said, "It may be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I
should be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide
to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legalism. 325
From the time of the Engineers Case roughly until Australian constitutional
sovereignty, it was orthodox on the High Court to interpret the Constitution
from Vict.) (U.K.) (holding that Commonwealth officers are subject to state income tax). Since it
was disempowered to review inter se federalism questions, however, the Committee's views on the
matter were far less relevant in Australia. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
321. The Engineers Case, 28 C.L.R. at 148.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 149 (quoting Vacher's Case, [1913] A.C. 107, 113 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales) (U.K.) (Haldane, L.C.)).
324. Id. at 150 (quoting AG Ont. v. AG Can., [1912] A.C. 571, 583 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Can.) (U.K.) (Loreburn, L.C.)).
325. Owen Dixon, Swearing In of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice (Apr. 12, 1952), in (1952)
85 C.L.R. xi, xiv (Austl.); cf °Scalia, supra note 12, at 25 ("Of all the criticisms leveled against
textualism, the most mindless is that it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is, of course it's
formalistic! The rule of law is about form.").
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according to the "ordinary or technical meaning" of the text, to refuse to
expand or limit that meaning by reference to the purpose of a given provision
or of the Constitution as a whole, and to "accept[] that, unless formally
amended, the words of the Constitution continue to mean what they meant in
1 9o0.
"
,326
That is not to say that the Australian Constitution is wholly impervious
to technological innovation or changes in social fact. The Court has held and
continues to maintain that "[t]he connotation of words employed in the
Constitution does not change though changing events and attitudes may in
some circumstances extend the denotation or reach of those words., 327 The
High Court has frequently relied upon the distinction between the
"connotation" of the Constitution's text-its meaning as of 1900-and its
"denotation"-the category of objects to which that meaning applies.328
Justice Dawson has said that the Court's idiosyncratic usage derives from
that of John Stuart Mill, 329 who in A System of Logic described a
"connotative term" as "one which denotes a subject, and implies an
attribute[,]" as "white" might denote the color of snow. 330  As used on the
High Court, the distinction parallels the familiar distinction in American con-
stitutional theory between original semantic meaning and original expected
application.331 So just as an American originalist might allow that the Fourth
326. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 121-22, 136; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tasmania (The
Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, 127 (Austl.) ("[M]ere expectations held in 1900 could
not form a satisfactory basis for departing from the natural interpretation of words used in the
Constitution."); AG Vict. v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 614-15 (AustI.) (Mason, J.)
("[A] constitutional prohibition must be applied in accordance with the meaning which it had in
1900."); South Australia v. Commonwealth (The First Uniform Tax Case) (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373,
422 (Austl.) (upholding a federal taxation scheme whose obvious purpose and effect was to deprive
states of their constitutionally guaranteed right to impose income taxes); see also Craven, supra
note 6, at 171 ("[T]he dominant interpretative ideology of the Court has been, at least since
Engineers, some variant of more or less strict literalism."); David Tucker, Textualism: An
Australian Evaluation of the Debate Between Professor Ronald Dworkin and Justice Antonin
Scalia, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 567, 579-80 (1999) (stressing the continued importance of the "take-
the-accepted-meaning of a term" rule of interpretation from the Engineers Case in guiding the High
Court's work).
327. King v. Jones (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 229 (Austl.) (Barwick, C.J.).
328. See, e.g., R. v. Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Comm'n; Ex parte Prof l
Eng'rs Ass'n (1959) 107 C.L.R. 208, 267 (Austl.) (Windeyer, J.) ("The denotation of words
becomes enlarged as new things falling within their connotations come into existence or become
known."); see also Street v. Queensl. Bar Ass'n (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461, 538 (Austl.) (Dawson, J.)
(listing cases in which the Court relied on the distinction between "connotation" and "denotation").
329. Street, 168 C.L.R. at 537 (Dawson, J.).
330. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 19
(Longmans, Green & Co. 1959) (1843).
331. See Christopher Birch, The Connotation/Denotation Distinction in Constitutional
Interpretation, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS, 445, 466-67 (2003) (comparing Dworkin's distinction
between semantic and expectation originalism to the High Court's distinction between connotation
and denotation); Tucker, supra note 326, at 585-86 (calling Justice Toohey's opinion in McGinty v.
Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 200-02, which recognized an evolving conception of
"representative democracy," "an Australian version" of Dworkin's argument in favor of evolution
in the application of abstract constitutional phrases); see also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, (1999)
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Amendment extends to wiretapping,332 the High Court held in 1935 that radio
broadcasts constitute "telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services" while
admitting no embarrassment to its legalist credentials.333 As if to prove the
resiliency of those credentials, however, the Court held in 1972 that Section
41 of the Constitution, which guarantees the franchise in federal elections to
"adult person[s]" who may vote in state elections, only applies to those who
were considered adults in 1901-i.e., twenty-one-year-olds-not to those
who are of adult age under current state law.334
On its face, then, Australian legalism appears to mirror the form of
originalism promoted by Justice Scalia, mapped onto the entire Court.33 5
Like Justice Scalia in statutory cases, the pre-1986 High Court refused out-
right to consult legislative debates either to reveal legislative purpose or as an
aid in ascertaining the contemporaneous meaning of the text. 336 Even when
the Court finally reversed its blanket rule, it said it would restrict the usage of
such debates to narrowly defined circumstances:
Reference to [legislative history] may be made, not for the purpose of
substituting for the meaning of the words used the scope and effect-
if such could be established-which the founding fathers subjectively
intended the section to have, but for the purpose of identifying the
contemporary meaning of language used [and] the subject to which
that language was directed ....
198 C.L.R. 511, 552 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.) (suggesting that Dworkin's distinction between concepts
and conceptions is consistent with High Court precedent).
332. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 32, at 168 (arguing that the fact that the Fourth Amendment
was framed by men who did not foresee electronic surveillance" does not mean that judges are
wrong to apply the Amendment's provisions to electronic invasions of privacy).
333. R. v. Brislan; Ex parte Williams (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262, 273 (AustI.) (quoting AUSTL.
CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51).
334. King v. Jones (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 243 (Austl.).
335. See Tucker, supra note 326, at 581 (analogizing the High Court's textualism in the
Engineers Case to Justice Scalia's views). One way in which High Court orthodoxy departs
dramatically from Justice Scalia is in its regard for stare decisis. Prior to the mid-1980s, the Court,
true to English tradition, regarded even wrongly decided precedent as nearly unimpeachable,
whereas Justice Scalia tends to view it as a necessary evil. See JASON L. PIERCE, INSIDE THE
MASON COURT REVOLUTION: THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA TRANSFORMED 178 (2006)
(summarizing the historic progression of the treatment of precedent in the High Court); Scalia,
supra note 12, at 140 (incorporating stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to Justice Scalia's
"originalist philosophy").
336. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 124; see, e.g., AG Vict. ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth
(1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 578 (Austl.) (claiming that legislative history merely distracts the Court
from the plain meaning of the text); AG ex rel. McKinlay v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1,
17 (Austl.) ("[lit is settled doctrine in Australia that the records of the discussions in the
Conventions and in the legislatures of the colonies will not be used as an aid to the construction of
the Constitution.").
337. Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360, 385 (Austl.).
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Likewise, Justice Scalia has suggested that certain aspects of ratification
history may assist the originalist judge in determining the original meaning
of the Constitution's text.
338
As we shall see, however, the High Court's consideration of Convention
debates, which has increased dramatically in the years since constitutional
sovereignty, carries a different import than Justice Scalia's use of ratification
history to divine original meaning. The Great Divide in Australia is not bet-
ween original meaning and current meaning but between original meaning
and original intent. Use of legislative debates, then, represents a momentous
departure from orthodox Australian legalism. In combination with other in-
novations of the Mason Court, the turn to extrinsic evidence has contributed
to a palpable tension between the Court's legalistic tradition and its
potentially purposive future.
3. The Mason Court Revolution.-Like Canada and New Zealand,
Australia became fully patriated in the 1980s. The Statute of Westminster,
1931 had liberated the Commonwealth to legislate extraterritorially and
ended the repugnancy doctrine, whereby Australian laws would be invali-
dated if they conflicted with United Kingdom law. 339 But with consent the
British Parliament still had authority to legislate for Australia, and the states
remained bound by the repugnancy and extraterritoriality doctrines.
340
Moreover, as of the 1980s, the Privy Council still had the constitutional
power to adjudicate appeals from the supreme courts of the various states.341
That all ended With the Australia Act, 1986. The Act, which comprised joint
statutes of the British and Australian Parliaments, effectively severed all
remaining legal ties between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.342
Australian constitutional independence nearly perfectly coincided with
the ascendancy of Anthony Mason to the position of Chief Justice of the
High Court in 1987. Mason had not been thought a particularly reform-
minded jurist during his fifteen years on the High Court prior to his tenure as
338. Scalia, supra note 12, at 38; see also supra note 236 and accompanying text.
339. MCMINN, supra note 283, at 160.
340. NICHOLAS ARONEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF A FEDERAL COMMONWEALTH: THE MAKING
AND MEANING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 60 (2009).
341. MCMINN, supra note 283, at 106.
342. See Australia Act, 1986, ch. 2, § 1 (U.K. & Austl.) ("No Act of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend,
to the Commonwealth, to a State or to a Territory as part of the law of the Commonwealth, of the
State or of the Territory."). Some nominal ties remain. For example, the Queen of England wields
formal executive authority, although that authority is legally independent of her role as head of the
British monarchy. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. II, § 61 (noting that the executive power of the
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen); David Estep, Losing Jewels from the Crown: Considering
the Future of the Monarchy in Australia and Canada, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 217 n.3
(1993) (remarking that the Queen is the sovereign of nine countries independent of her role as the
Queen of Great Britain). Also, the text of Section 74 of the Australian Constitution still permits
appeals to the Privy Council upon certification by the High Court, but that provision was officially
ruled a dead letter in Kirmnani v. Captain Cook Cruises (No. 2), (1985) 159 C.L.R. 461,465 (Austl.).
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Chief Justice, 343 but his impact as Chief is perhaps best expressed by political
scientist Jason Pierce's conclusion based on more than eighty interviews with
Australian appellate judges: "Australia's appellate judges tend to speak in
'then and now' terms regarding the High Court, such that the 'then' encom-
passed the years from federation to the mid-1980s, while the 'now' meant the
years since the mid-1980s." 3" According to Mason's former colleague
Justice McHugh, Mason viewed constitutional sovereignty not simply as a
change in the formal status of the Commonwealth's relationship with the
United Kingdom but rather as a mandate to conceptualize constitutional
interpretation and rights formation in broader terms.345
With the help of relatively reform-minded colleagues such as William
Deane, Mary Gaudron, and John Toohey, Mason inaugurated a departure
from the strict legalism associated with the Engineers Case and with Chief
Justice Dixon. 346 Mason, Deane, and Gaudron had all been educated at the
University of Sydney, where, according to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, they were
exposed to "more pragmatic, consequentialist legal theories" than many of
their predecessors.347 Accordingly, the Mason Court was more willing to en-
gage in purposive analysis, more willing to find implied rights within the
constitutional structure, more willing to allow for constitutional evolution,
and increasingly likely to look to transnational sources for constitutional
wisdom.
In a speech given one year before he became Chief Justice, Mason
announced what he perceived to be an emerging trend in Australian
constitutional law, namely a "move[] away from 'strict and complete
legalism' and toward a more policy oriented constitutional interpretation."
348
Most would agree that the statement was more predictive than descriptive.
Two years later, in its unanimous per curiam decision in Cole v. Whitfield,349
the same case in which the Court explicitly abandoned its rule against refer-
ence to convention debates, the Court warned of "the hazards of seeking
certainty of operation of a constitutional guarantee through the medium of an
artificial formula. Either the formula is consistently applied and subverts the
substance of the guarantee; or an attempt is made to achieve uniformly satis-
factory outcomes and the formula becomes uncertain in its application. 350
343. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 204.
344. Id. at 42; accord Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 144 ("It is generally agreed that in the
late 1980s the Court took a new direction, adopting a more purposive and even creative approach in
constitutional and other cases.").
345. Michael McHugh, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989-2004, 30
SYDNEY L. REv. 5, 6 (2008) ("[Mason] regarded Australia's evolving status as an independent
nation as inevitably requiring a change in the approach of High Court justices to judging.").
346. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 208-11.
347. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 155.
348. Mason, supra note 277, at 5.
349. (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360 (Austl.).
350. Id. at 402; cf BICKEL, supra note 9, at 95-96 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should
not give sanction to the actions of the political branches except when consistent with principle).
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Sophisticated observers recognized the announcement of a more open em-
brace of policy balancing and purposive interpretation.351 And indeed the
decision itself held that Section 92 of the Constitution-providing that "the
imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse
among the States ... shall be absolutely free"352-does not quite mean what
it says. The Court held that Convention debates revealed that the purpose
behind the provision was not to allow "anarchy" in trade but to prevent
"discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind., 353 In limiting the text of
Section 92 to the scope consistent with its historical purpose, the Court
overruled some 127 cases and, it should be noted, took Justice Stevens's side
of the interpretive debate at the heart of Heller.354
There was much more to the Mason Court revolution. As discussed
above, Australia's Constitution guarantees precious few individual rights.355
But Lionel Murphy's appointment to the Court in 1975 produced consistent
calls for recognizing a variety of implied constitutional rights, most promi-
nently including the right to political communication. 356 The argument, very
much in the spirit of Charles Black, was that the Constitution's provisions for
parliamentary elections and representative state governments implied a basic
3358freedom to express political ideas.357 Miller v. TCN Channel Nine Pty.,"'
involving a prosecution for a television station's use of an unauthorized
transmitter for an interstate broadcast,359 presented the Court with an
opportunity to declare such an implied right in 1986. Justice Murphy
reiterated his view that such a right exists, but the other six Justices resolvedthe0
the case on alternative grounds.36°
351. See Dan Meagher, Guided by Voices? Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court,
7 DEAKIN L. REv. 261, 262 (2002) (calling Cole a "mortal blow" to literalism); Leslie Zines,
Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law, 5 CONST. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 24
(2002) (discussing Cole as emblematic of "a rejection of formal criteria, a more open application of
policy considerations, and, where appropriate, a deliberate balancing of conflicting social interests
or values").
352. AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 92.
353. Cole, 165 C.L.R. at 394.
354. The number of overruled cases comes from McHugh, supra note 345, at 12.
355. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
356. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY 1159 (Tony Blackshield & George
Williams eds., 3d ed. 2002) (discussing Justice Murphy's role in introducing implied-freedoms
discourse into Australian constitutional law).
357. See Ansett Transp. Indus. (Operations) Pty. v. Commonwealth (1977) 139 C.L.R. 54, 88
(Austl.) (Murphy, J.) ("Elections of federal Parliament provided for in the Constitution require
freedom of movement, speech and other communication, not only between the States, but in and
between every part of the Commonwealth."); cf CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-43 (1969) ("[T]he nature of federal government, and
the states' relations to it, compels the inference of some federal constitutional protection for free
speech ...").
358. (1986) 161 C.L.R. 556 (Austl.).
359. Id. at 557.
360. Id. at 556, 581-85.
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Six years later, however, following constitutional sovereignty, five
Justices were prepared to announce an implied freedom of political
communication. Wrote Justice Brennan in Nationwide News Pty. v. Wills,
3 61
"Freedom of public discussion of government (including the institutions and
agencies of government) is not merely a desirable political privilege; it is in-
herent in the idea of a representative democracy., 362 In the companion case
of Australian Capital Television Pty. v. Commonwealth,363 Chief Justice
Mason acknowledged that the founding generation had deliberately omitted
judicially enforceable individual rights from the Constitution, preferring to
leave rights enforcement to the principle of responsible government.
364
Crucially, however, that decision was made before 1986, which "marked the
end of the legal sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament and recognized that
ultimate sovereignty resided in the Australian people. 365  Under the new
populist order, parliamentary representatives "are accountable to the people
for what they do and have a responsibility to take account of the views of the
people on whose behalf they act .... Indispensable to that accountability and
that responsibility is freedom of communication, at least in relation to public
affairs and political discussion." 366 The implication was that the right did not
exist on the day of federation but arose incident to the sort of democracy the
Australian nation had become.
The cat thus out of the bag, in Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times
Ltd. ,367 the Court wielded the right of political communication to erect a con-
stitutional defense to defamation.36 8 And in Leeth v. Commonwealth,36 9 three
Justices were of the view that the Constitution contained an implied individ-
ual right to equal treatment under the law.370 To an American audience, the
hue and cry the Court's implied-freedoms cases sparked in Australian legal
361. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
362. Id. at 48 (Brennan, J.); accord id. at 72 ("The people of the Commonwealth would be
unable responsibly to discharge and exercise the powers of governmental control which the
Constitution reserves to them if each person was an island, unable to communicate with any other
person.").
363. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.).
364. See id. at 135 (noting that the principle of responsible government is "an assumption upon
which the actual provisions [of the Constitution] are based," and that "the founders assumed that the
Senate would protect the States").
365. Id. at 138.
366. Id.
367. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.).
368. Id. at 130; see also Stephens v. W. Austl. Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211, 232
(finding the right of political communication within state constitutions as well); Coleman v. Power
(2004) 220 C.L.R. 1, 33 (Austl.) (invalidating a conviction for insulting a police officer on the
grounds that application of the statute under the circumstances burdened the implied freedom of
political communication). The High Court's rule was similar to that announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which requires a public official
to prove "actual malice" to recover damages for defamation. Id. at 279-80.
369. (1992) 174 C.L.R. 455 (Austl.).
370. Id. at 485 (Deane & Toohey, JJ., dissenting); id. at 502 (Gaudron, J., dissenting).
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circles will seem like much ado about very little. But against the backdrop of
Australian legal norms, judicial creativity of this sort was exceptionally rare
prior to constitutional independence.
In addition to engaging more frequently in purposive analysis and
occasionally finding implied individual rights in the Constitution, the Mason
Court was more openly willing to allow that the Constitution may adapt to
changed circumstances. The boundary between connotation and denotation
has never been airtight, and many Australian court watchers believe that even
the committed legalist has often been able to squeeze his way through just
fine. 371 But in select cases the Mason Court was unusually open about
constitutional updating.
Thus, in Street v. Queensland Bar Ass 'n,372 the Court had to decide
whether the State of Queensland could restrict bar admission to state
residents, notwithstanding Sections 92 and 117 of the Constitution, which
generally prohibit interstate discrimination.373 The Court had held in a prior
case, Henry v. Boehm,374 that those constitutional provisions did not apply
because the challenged statute did not require anyone to abandon his or her
domicile. 375 Following the pre-Mason Court preference for formal rules over
balancing tests, the Henry Court held moreover that the discriminatory char-
acter of a state law should be determined by its formal operation rather than
by its practical effect.376 The High Court reversed Henry outright, with Chief
Justice Mason writing that "[i]t would make little sense to deal with laws
which have a discriminatory purpose and leave untouched laws which have a
discriminatory effect. 377 It had long been thought that permitting judges to
look beyond the face of a statute to its actual operation would interfere with
legislative prerogatives and destabilize constitutional interpretation: a statute
thought constitutional at time To could become unconstitutional at time T1
solely through judicial assessment of social facts. 378 The Court expressed no
such concern in Street.
371. See, e.g., LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-29 (2008) (arguing
that drawing the connotation-denotation distinction is in practice a purposive rather than a logical
inquiry); Kirby, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that judges inevitably make law rather than merely
declare it); Mason, supra note 277, at 5 (disputing the notion that judges can interpret a constitution
divorced from values).
372. (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461 (Austl.).
373. Id. at 485. Section 117 has been compared to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
U.S. Constitution and was drafted with that Clause in view. Id.
374. (1973) 128 C.L.R. 482 (Austl.).
375. Id. at 490.
376. See id. at 487 ("We are here concerned only with the application of the actual words of the
Constitution ... ").
377. Street, 168 C.L.R. at 487-88.
378. See, e.g., Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co. (The Engineers Case) (1920)
28 C.L.R. 129, 142, 145 (Austl.) (declaring that the High Court can interpret only the language of
the Constitution and may not look to policy or vague notions concerning the spirit of the document);
cf R. v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41, 67 (Austl.) ("A statute is only a means to an end, and its validity
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More recently, in Sue v. Hill37 9 the Court held that British subjects were
citizens of a "foreign power" under Section 44(i) of the Constitution and
therefore could not be members of Parliament.380 The controversy stemmed
from the fact that the United Kingdom was not a foreign power in 1901. The
Court's lead opinion stated that "[w]hilst the text of the Constitution has not
changed, its operation has.... The Constitution speaks to the present and its
interpretation takes account of and moves with these developments. 381
Notably, the Court said so without any reference to its connotation-
denotation distinction, which seems a natural fit for the case. This language
was sufficiently alarming that Justice Callinan, who voted to dismiss the case
on jurisdictional grounds, wrote a concurring opinion in which he called into
question the petitioner's "evolutionary theory" of the case as introducing too
much uncertainty into the law.
382
Relying upon Sue v. Hill among other cases, Justice Michael Kirby has
articulated what he calls a "living force" theory that, as of 2000, he believed
was "gradually emerging as the theory proper to the construction of the
Constitution.'" 383 Kirby suggests that High Court case law over the last two
decades has been slowly conforming to the view of constitutional interpreta-
tion held by Andrew Inglis Clark,384 a leader in the Australian federation
movement who also happened to be an expert on the U.S. Constitution and a
friend of Oliver Wendell Holmes.385 His writings on Australian interpreta-
tion resembled Holmes's later opinion in Missouri v. Holland:
[T]he social conditions and the political exigencies of the succeeding
generations of every civilized and progressive community will
inevitably produce new governmental problems to which the language
of the Constitution must be applied, and hence it must be read and
construed, not as containing a declaration of the will and intentions of
men long since dead ... but as declaring the will and intentions of the
present inheritors and possessors of sovereign power, who maintain
the Constitution and have the power to alter it, and who are in the
immediate presence of the problems to be solved. It is they who
enforce the provisions of the Constitution and make a living force of
that which would otherwise be a silent and lifeless document.
38 6
depends upon whether the legislature is or is not authorized to enact the particular provisions in
question, entirely without regard to their ultimate indirect consequences.").
379. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 462 (Austl.).
380. Id. at 503.
381. Id. at 496.
382. Justice Callinan wrote: "The great concern about an evolutionary theory of this kind is the
doubt to which it gives rise with respect to peoples' rights, status and obligations as this case
shows." Id. at 571-72 (Callinan, J., concurring).
383. Kirby, supra note 102, at 11.
384. Id.
385. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 36.
386. A. INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (1901).
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Three different Justices, including Kirby himself, have cited favorably to
Clark's "living force" theory in High Court opinions, 387 although as I discuss
below, it does not command a majority on the current Court.
The final piece to the Mason Court's constitutional law revolution-in
addition to purposive analysis, recognition of implied constitutional rights,
and explicitly evolutionary jurisprudence-is incorporation of transnational
legal sources into Australian constitutional law. Given that Australia was
only quasi-sovereign at federation and modeled its Constitution expressly on
that of the United States, it is to be expected that reference to foreign law has
388a long pedigree in Australian jurisprudence. But citations to cases of
foreign nations other than the United Kingdom accelerated dramatically in
the 1980s. American cases, for example, were cited in 13% of High Court
decisions in the 1970s, as compared to 25% in the 1980s and 41% in the
1990s. 389 Canadian cases were cited in just 10% of High Court decisions in
the 1970s, but 21% in the 1980s and 37% in the 1990s. 390  Cases from the
constitutional courts of South Africa, New Zealand, and India are also more
frequently cited than in years past,39' as are international conventions and
legal norms.392
American originalists are apt to point out that reference to contemporary
foreign and international law to define the substance and scope of constitu-
tional provisions is difficult to reconcile with traditional forms of
originalism. 393 But in Australian Capital Television, for example, several
High Court Justices articulated limitations on the implied freedom of politi-
cal communication by reference to precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court and
the European Court of Human Rights rather than to any original understand-
ing particular to the Australian tradition.394 Where aids to interpretation once
387. E.g., Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 79-80 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.); McGinty v.
Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 200 (Toohey, J.); Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly
Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. 104, 171-73 (Austi.) (Deane, J.).
388. See Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 135 (noting that the High Court has always heavily
relied on American, British, and Canadian cases); Brian Opeskin, Australian Constitutional Law in
a Global Era, in REFLECTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 283, at 171, 183-
84 (describing an increase in the percentage of foreign citations in Australian constitutional cases
from 1900 to 2000).
389. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 172.
390. Id.
391. See Opeskin, supra note 388, at 184-85 (observing an increase in references to decisions
from New Zealand (4%), India (1%), and South Africa (5%)).
392. See PIERCE, supra note 335, at 172-75 (giving examples of Australian court opinions
relying on international treaties, conventions, and obligations).
393. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519, 525-26 (2005) (recording Scalia's argument that, with the
exception of old English law, foreign law is irrelevant in determining what the Constitution meant
to the society that adopted it).
394. Australian Capital Television Pty. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 144 (Mason,
C.J.) (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 15 (1976)); id. at 241 (McHugh, J.) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)); id. at
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could not be extrinsic to the text of the Constitution, they now may be
extrinsic to the Commonwealth itself.
4. The Gleeson Counterrevolution.-Controversy has attended virtually
all of the changes introduced during Chief Justice Mason's tenure. Few
would doubt, moreover, that the Court backtracked, arguably a great deal,
during the recent tenure of Murray Gleeson as Chief Justice. Gleeson was a
classmate of former Liberal Party Prime Minister John Howard's at the
University of Sydney,395 and Howard appointed Gleeson to the Chief
Justiceship in 1998.396 Australia's Liberal Party is misleadingly named from
an American perspective. Its liberalism is more Friedman than Rawls: it is
associated with laissez-faire economics and social conservatism. 397 Gleeson
brought that conservatism with him to the High Court. Directly contrary to
the themes of the Mason Court, Gleeson has written that "the members of the
Court are expected to approach their task by the application of what Sir
Owen Dixon described as 'a strict and complete legalism.'
' 398
Gleeson's account is hortatory. The battle for the soul of the High
Court over the last decade has been open and notorious. The Court's
conservatives, in the persons of Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan,
have sought to curtail much of the discretion inherent in the Mason Court
reforms, while more liberal members, Justice Kirby most persistently, have
sought instead to broaden it. Singh v. Commonwealth399 is emblematic.
Section 51 (xix) of the Constitution empowers Parliament to legislate with
respect to "naturalization and aliens., 400 Tania Singh was born in Australia
to undocumented Indian parents. 401 Although Australia does not confer auto-
matic birthright citizenship, Singh argued that she was nevertheless not an
"alien" and therefore could not be deported pursuant to a statute enacted
under the authority of Section 51 (xix). 402
Chief Justice Gleeson's opinion in Singh includes a lengthy discourse,
far longer than any in the U.S. Reports, on the nature of constitutional inter-
159 (Brennan, J.) (citing Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 14 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 153, 178 (1991)).
395. Gleeson graduated in 1962 and Howard in 1961. See Univ. of Sydney, Prominent Alumni,
http://www.usyd.edu.au/about/profile/prominent-alumni.shtml (providing their respective class
years).
396. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 278.
397. See JUDITH BRETT, AUSTRALIAN LIBERALS AND THE MORAL MIDDLE CLASS 1 (2003)
(explaining that Howard's conception of the Liberal Party as combining liberal economic and
conservative social traditions translated into market-based economic policies and support of
traditional family values).
398. MURRAY GLEESON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 85 (2000) (quoting
Dixon, supra note 325, at xiv).
399. (2004) 222 C.L.R. 322 (Austl.).
400. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(xix).
401. Singh, 222 C.L.R. at 323 (Austl.).
402. Id. at 323-24.
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pretation. It should by now be clear that such discourse is not unusual in
High Court opinions, which are issued seriatim and are therefore more
personal than the typically antiseptic majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Gleeson's view is an orthodox originalist one: "Judicial review of the
validity of legislative action by reference to the Constitution is conducted
upon the hypothesis that the terms, express and implied, of a written
instrument, brought into existence more than a century ago, bind present and
future parliaments, and courts.,, 40 3 The meaning of those terms would be de-
termined not by modem exigencies but by "the contemporary meaning of the
language used in 1900." 4 04 Here, it was clear to Gleeson that as of 1900 the
Parliament had the authority to determine the scope of alienage and not
merely of citizenship.4 °5 Concurring, Justice Callinan warned against
overuse of the connotation-denotation distinction: "Judges should in my
opinion be especially vigilant to recognise and eschew what is in substance a
constitutional change under a false rubric of a perceived change in the
meaning of a word, or an expression used in the Constitution.4 °6
Justice Kirby agreed with Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Callinan in
result but engaged them directly on constitutional interpretation.40 7 He re-
ferred to the theory that constitutional text should receive "'the same
meaning and intent with which [the Constitution] spoke when it came from
the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people,"' and
placed those words in the mouth of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.408 Because a constitution must endure through the ages, Kirby
said, "the ambit of the power [of interpretation] is not limited by the wishes,
expectations or imagination of the framers. They did not intend, nor did they
enjoy the power, to impose their wishes and understanding of the text upon
later generations of Australians., 40 9 Justice Kirby ultimately concluded that
Parliament had the power to declare Singh an alien, but he did so by refer-
ence to the chameleonic nature of the term "alien"; 410 to international law
norms of dual and birthright citizenship; 411 to the Fourteenth Amendment to
403. Id. at 330 (Gleeson, C.J.).
404. Id. at 338.
405. Id. at 341.
406. Id. at 424 (Callinan, J.).
407. Id. at 420 (Kirby, J.).
408. Id. at 412 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857)).
409. Id. at 412-13.
410. See id. at 413 (describing how the High Court has frequently departed from the original,
generally accepted meaning of a term to accommodate changes in the world).
411. See id. at 413-14 (arguing that the existence of competing civil and common law
approaches to citizenship suggests the appropriateness of allowing Parliament to define the term
"alien").
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the U.S. Constitution; 412  to precedent; 413  and to potential policy
414
consequences.
These battle lines recur elsewhere. In McGinty v. Western Australia,415
decided in the brief interregnum between the Mason and Gleeson Courts,
416
Justice McHugh and Justice Toohey jousted over whether a freestanding
principle of representative democracy underlies the Constitution and may be
given dynamic content by judges.417 In the case Re Wakim; Ex parte
McNally,418 Justice McHugh and Justice Kirby locked horns over the role
convenience and policy should play in determining whether Parliament had
the power to vest jurisdiction in federal courts to decide issues of state law, a
matter on which the Constitution is silent.419 In Eastman v. The Queen420 and
Brownlee v. The Queen,421 both criminal procedure cases, Justices McHugh
and Kirby were at it again, delivering lengthy and detailed opinions on the
relative merits of originalism and "living force" constitutionalism. 422 In each
of those cases, the "living force" view was in dissent, leading many observ-
412. See id. at 416 (noting that the drafters of the Australian Constitution could have followed
the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment and enshrined birthright citizenship into the
constitutional text, but deliberately chose not to do so).
413. See id. at 417-18 (suggesting that recent High Court decisions have implied that the word
"alien" is not fixed in its meaning).
414. See id. at 418 (stressing that the judiciary can and should check an overbroad meaning of
"alien" if it leads to legislative abuse).
415. (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140 (Austl.).
416. Gerard Brennan was Chief Justice from 1995 to 1998. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 245.
417. Compare McGinty, 186 C.L.R. at 200 (Toohey, J.) (arguing that the Constitution must be
treated as a living document because democracy is inherently dynamic), with id. at 231-32
(McHugh, J.) (countering that the principle of representative democracy is not an independent
source of law and cannot be used to derive constitutional meaning not expressly stated in the text).
418. (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511 (Austl.).
419. Compare id. at 548-49 (McHugh, J.) (arguing that while the public interest requires that
federal courts have jurisdiction over questions of state law, "the function of the judiciary ... is to
give effect to the intention of the makers" and it "has no power to amend or modernise the
Constitution to give effect to what the judges think is in the public interest"), with id. at 599-600
(Kirby, J.) (insisting that once the Constitution was enacted by the electors of Australia, "it took
upon itself its own existence and character" separate from the wishes and expectations of its
makers).
420. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
421. (2001) 207 C.L.R. 278 (Austl.).
422. Compare Eastman, 203 C.L.R. at 49-50 (McHugh, J.) (arguing that because the makers'
objective intent as expressed in the text, as opposed to their subjective or actual intent, is relevant to
constitutional interpretation, the application of constitutional concepts may be informed by
contemporary circumstances), and Brownlee, 207 C.L.R. at 284-85 (Gleeson, C.J.) (explaining,
along with Justice McHugh, that the significance of the historical context of the drafting of the
Constitution may vary based on the problem at hand, but a provision nonetheless has a meaning that
is "not tied to current practice"), with Eastman, 203 C.L.R. at 79-81 (Kirby, J.) (arguing that the
Constitution's words must be read in accordance with contemporary meanings in order to allow the
government to meet the needs of its citizens), and Brownlee, 207 C.L.R. at 322 (Kirby, J.) (arguing
that reading the Constitution according to modern meanings also allows a judge to apply the
Constitution's provisions to contemporary institutional settings in accordance with accepted modem
democratic standards).
2009]
Texas Law Review
ers to conclude that the Gleeson Court had successfully reinvigorated
Australian legalism.
423
Reinvigorated but not reinaugurated. All that is orthodox on the High
Court today is that, relative to the past, little is orthodox. The lasting legacy
of the Mason Court is not that it made Australian constitutional interpretation
purposive but that it made it, like ours, pluralistic. Throughout his battles
with Justice Kirby, Justice McHugh maintained that the High Court employs
the many tools available to common law judges in its constitutional
decisions:
The common law constitutional method is a house of many rooms. It
emphasizes text and the drawing of constitutional implications from
the text and structure of the Constitution. It relies heavily on previous,
authorities and the doctrines associated with those authorities. It uses
history, particularly for ascertaining the purpose of particular
constitutional provisions. But it recognises that none of these tools-
including textual analysis-may be decisive.... And since the
beginning of the Mason Court, where the constitutional text is not
compelling, as is often the case, it takes into account conflicting social
interests, values and policies in seeking to give the Constitution a
424
construction that accords with the needs of contemporary Australia.
This approach has become relatively common ground among High
Court Justices. 425 Recognition of its own pluralism brings the Court into line
with much of the world,426 but it represents monumentally different rhetoric
from what prevailed two decades ago.427 The Court as a whole remains more
enamored of text and original meaning than a typical European, Canadian, or
even American jurist, but its originalism is, as Justice McHugh has said,
"faint-hearted. ''428 It is text-focused but not fetishistic; it is able to accommo-
423. See McHugh, supra note 345, at 7 ("[B]y 2003, commentators were contending that the
emphasis of the majority of the Gleeson Court was legalism.").
424. McHugh, supra note 345, at 8-9.
425. See, e.g., SGH Ltd. v. Comm'r of Taxation (2002) 210 C.L.R. 51, 75 (Austl.) (Gummow,
J.) ("Questions of construction of the Constitution are not to be answered by the adoption and
application of any particular, all-embracing and revelatory theory or doctrine of interpretation. Nor
are they answered by the resolution of a perceived conflict between rival theories, with the placing
of the victorious theory upon a high ground occupied by the modem, the enlightened and the
elect."); Selway, supra note 275, at 246 (noting that a number of the High Court Justices decline to
rely on only one method of constitutional interpretation).
426. See Jackson, supra note 52, at 925-26 (referring to the "ubiquity" of "multi-sourced
methods of interpretation" in countries with well-established traditions ofjudicial review).
427. See McHugh, supra note 345, at 6 (quoting State Gov't Ins. Comm'n v. Trigwell (1979)
142 C.L.R. 617, 633 (Austl.) (Mason, J.)) (remarking upon the dramatic shift in Mason's own view
of the proper role of a judge under the Australian Constitution).
428. Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 44 (Austl.); cf Scalia, supra note 32, at 862,
864 (referring to himself and others as "faint-hearted" originalists).
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date extrinsic evidence and is willing openly to consider the policy
implications of a too-literal reading of the document.429
Australian jurists have long been and to a great extent remain
"originalist." The reaction of the Australian bench to the Mason Court
revolution has been stark and, in significant respects, negative. Pierce's
study begins with an accounting of some of the colorful adjectives used by
the judges he interviewed to describe the Mason Court: "hyperactive,"
"adventurous," "incomparably activist," "composed of judicial legislators,"
"controlled by Jacobins," "under the influence of left-wing theorists,"
"deciding cases as Marx or Freud would have," and "overcome with
delusions of grandeur., 430 It is my impression as an American constitutional
scholar that the rhetoric in U.S. legal circles is less heated, even though the
Supreme Court itself is less text-bound, more creative, and more pluralistic
than the High Court of Australia.
As I discussed in section II(B)(2), however, the Great Divide in
Australia is different than it is here. American scholars, not to mention the
lay public, tend to lump together original intent and original meaning as two
different ways of practicing a methodology whose essential features they
share: attention to a fixed historical meaning as a tool for restraining judges.
History is linked to judicial restraint. But it is recognized (and feared) in
Australia that history can do much more than that. It can provide clues as to
original purposes and expectations, can alter both the connotation and the
denotation of constitutional text, and can even change the holistic purposes
of constitutionalism itself. In that sense, history can be generative rather than
constraining. As Justice McHugh has written, even the conservative Gleeson
Court "has seen constitutional history as an ongoing narrative[;] ... [o]n this
view, the state of the law in 1900 provides context, but it is not an interpreta-
tive straitjacket., 43 1 And even on the orthodox legalistic view dominant prior
to the Mason Court, restraint was achieved not through a focus on history-
which is extrinsic and contestable-but by a focus on text and on existing
doctrine.432 Stare decisis is not a pragmatic exception to Australian legalism
but lies at its core. That is, the view is Burkean, not Scalian.
429. Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 159. The methodological direction of the High Court
under Chief Justice Robert French, who succeeded Gleeson in 2008, is not yet clear.
430. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 3.
431. McHugh, supra note 345, at 22; see also Craven, supra note 6, at 176 ("[T]here can be
little doubt that any theory of original intent stands in flat contradiction to the existing orthodoxy of
constitutional interpretation in Australia."); Selway, supra note 275, at 250 ("The [Gleeson Court]
approach is fundamentally conservative and legalistic, based upon precedent and logical analysis.
But the approach is not rigid or 'tied to the past."').
432. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & THEORY, supra note 356, at 322 (describing
the legalist view regarding constitutional text and related precedents as sufficient to dispose of any
interpretive question).
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IV. Six Hypotheses
We have, then, a not insignificant paradox. Many sober and respectable
academic theorists, judges, and ordinary citizens of the United States find
originalism a tidy, even compelling response to the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. Yet hardly any sober or respectable foreign nation, our closest cousins
included, boasts a similar mass of opinion in favor of American-style origi-
nalism. Even in other democratic nations with long traditions of
constitutional judicial review, with deep common law roots, and with diffi-
cult processes of constitutional amendment, resistance to judicial activism
does not commingle with historical fetishism. The wisdom of crowds is no
help here: it damns equally the notions that originalism either is uniquely
suited to judicial review of a written constitution in a democracy or is, in
short, "bunk.
' 4 3 3
The paradox recommends an answer-namely, that the measure of
originalism's success lies not in originalism but in ourselves. Aspects of our
history and political culture are apt to heighten our sensitivity to the histori-
cist appeals that characterize the originalism movement of the last three
decades. This Part suggests six hypotheses that help to explain the origins of
Our Originalism. First, I argue that the passage of time, in combination with
our revolutionary history, indoctrinates a filiopietistic attitude toward the
founding generation.434 Second, I suggest that our revolutionary political
origins also focus constitutional interpretive attention on that era to an extent
not possible in Canada or Australia. Third, we remain in the grips of an anti-
rights backlash that is directly responsive to the perceived excesses of the
Warren Court. Fourth, our public participates more intimately in the selec-
tion of judges to the constitutional court than either Canada's or Australia's,
which can introduce populist appeals into constitutional politics. Fifth, rela-
tive to Canada (but not Australia) we tend to emphasize a monolithic vision
of the legal and political order that is hospitable to originalism. Finally, a
suspicion of evolution and an embrace of the binding authority of sacred
texts features prominently in our religious culture.
I use the term "origins" guardedly. It is not to be confused with
"causes" or "requisites." It is worth repeating that this is not a scientific
inquiry, and it is not amenable to the scientific method. The question this
Article seeks to answer is one not of necessary causation but of influence and
association. Consider by analogy the origins of a cold. We may identify
risks-insufficient hand washing, hanging around toddlers, exhaustion, and
so forth-but the actual operation of the virus may remain elusive.
433. Berman, supra note 32, at 6.
434. See Siegel, supra note 55, at 218 (recounting President Reagan's use of filiopietistic
appeal to legitimize the New Right's interpretation of the Constitution); Aviam Soifer, Full and
Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 469, 473 n. 15 (2000) (contrasting the filiopietistic
attitude towards the framers' interpretation of the Constitution that exists today with the lack of
reverence for authority that characterized American society at the time of the Revolution).
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A. Fixating on the Framers
In November 2008 the American Constitution Society sponsored a
conference called "The Second Founding and the Reconstruction
Amendments: Toward a More Perfect Union., 435 The mission statement for
the conference observed that "[i]n current legal debates, many invoke 'the
founding' of the Constitution yet focus only on the eighteenth-century
framing, and ignore the significant changes to our country and our
Constitution wrought by the Civil War. 4 36  Less charitably, Canadian
Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie is said to have told a New Zealand
conference that "the approach of [his] counterparts in the United States could
only be explained by appreciating that Americans were engaged in a ritual of
ancestor worship. 437
It is beyond any doubt that Americans revere the Washingtons,
Jeffersons, Hamiltons, and Madisons of the founding generation. There are
many explanations for this, but one is the passage of time itself.43' That
generation created a nation that, nominally at least, has endured for more
than 230 years and has enabled us to breathe what Charles Black called "the
sweet air of legitimacy., 439 Meese began his July 1985 speech to the ABA
with the declaration that "[w]e Americans rightly pride ourselves on having
produced the greatest political wonder of the world-a government of laws
and not of men., 440  Meese's pride emanates from the durability of the
American experiment: the passage of time canonizes the ideas and historical
figures of the Founding Era. So, Justice Scalia may say, and indeed may
believe, that he so frequently refers to the Federalist Papers because they are
emblematic of contemporaneous usage of constitutional text,441 but it is more
435. See Am. Constitution Soc'y, The Second Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments:
Toward a More Perfect Union, http://www.acslaw.org/secondfounding (providing an overview and
recap of the conference).
436. Id.
437. Kirby, supra note 102, at 2. Justice Binnie has written of his own country:
We do not have a Jefferson or a Madison or a Hamilton whose philosophic writings
have entered the national psyche ... and whose works can be mined for nuggets of
shared wisdom. Sir John A. [Macdonald] is deservedly a revered icon, but he
considered his political skills to be practical rather than philosophical, his Scottish
tastes being libatious rather than literary.
Binnie, supra note 124, at 375-76.
438. Not that the passage of time is strictly necessary. As Jefferson wrote as early as 1816,
"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ar[k] of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more
than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1816-1826, at
37, 42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899).
439. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 35 (1960).
440. Meese, supra note 16, at 455.
441. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 38 (defending his reliance on Hamilton's and Madison's
writings in the Federalist Papers "because their writings, like those of other intelligent and
informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood").
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significant that he is availing himself of the rhetorical purchase the views of
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay confer.
As the mission of the Second Founding Conference suggests, American
jurists often emphasize narratives of continuity with the Founding Era even
when Reconstruction narratives of conflict are more compelling. In New
York Times v. Sullivan,4 42 for example, the allegedly libelous statements at
issue targeted Southern resistance against the efforts of the civil rights
movement to redeem the promise of the Reconstruction Amendments, and
the Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle through which the First
Amendment applies to the states.443 Yet the Court made no reference to
Reconstruction, instead resting its historical argument for a heightened stan-
dard for libel of public officials on Madison's and Jefferson's opposition to
the Sedition Acts.444 Grounding the authority of originalism in a conception
of the framers as uniquely "wise and farsighted"-what Michael Dorf has
labeled "heroic originalism"445-- evokes a certain sense of national pride. As
Vicki Jackson writes, "Given the impoverished discourse and absence of
visible public virtues of self-restraint in today's national elected politics, a
choice that is expressed as being between the 'Founding Fathers' and anyone
living today makes it likely that nostalgia will trump. 446
There are a number of obstacles to peoples of other nations viewing
their framers in this way. For one thing, the constitutions of countries like
Germany and Japan were forcibly imposed from without,447 and in the case
of Canada and Australia, the framers were subjects of the British Crown and
did not enjoy formal lawmaking authority. But historical distance itself is
also of some consequence. Those who promote originalism in the United
States were not present at the founding, were not privy to the compromises
that generated the Constitution's text, and did not know the framers person-
ally. By contrast, many of the current Justices on the Canadian Supreme
Court are old enough to have had personal relationships with the people who
crafted the Charter and find it "hard to imagine present-day political leaders
possessing the unimpeachable political wisdom that some might be disposed
to attribute to more ancient constitution-makers. 4 48 Recall, for example, the
442. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
443. Id. at 264 n.4.
444. See id. at 273-77 (stating that the lesson to be drawn from the Sedition Act controversy-
and Madison's and Jefferson's opposition to the Act-is that factual error and defamatory content
are insufficient to strip criticisms of official conduct of their constitutional protection).
445. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case
of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1803 (1997).
446. Jackson, supra note 52, at 942.
447. The Allies gave the Germans some latitude in drafting the Basic Law. Kommers, supra
note 104, at 162. Latitude, however, is not autonomy.
448. Bazowski, supra note 243, at 231. Moreover, the federalism disputes that have featured so
prominently in Canadian constitutional law and gave birth to the living-tree metaphor lend
themselves to judicial invention. The overlapping provincial and national heads of jurisdiction
bespeak a fundamental indeterminacy that presents little occasion for reverence.
[Vol. 88:1
2009] On the Origins of Originalism 65
dismissive attitude the Supreme Court of Canada took toward the drafters of
the fundamental justice provision of the Charter in the Motor Vehicle Act
reference.449 Canadian Justices are also able to rely on contemporaneous
knowledge that the Charter was originally expected, by many at least, to be
interpreted progressively. 450 It is more difficult to make originalist argu-
ments when there is persuasive evidence that the framers were not
originalists.451
It is furthermore difficult to discern, even in principle, who constitutes
the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982. Although it is fair to call Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau the most significant motivating force behind
Canadian patriation, the Constitution Act, 1982 itself owes its present form to
a series of negotiations among numerous federal and provincial ministers, a
parliamentary committee, and a multitude of interest groups. 452 "The inter-
ests represented covered a wide spectrum," Canadian legal scholar Peter
Russell writes of this last category.453 It included "native peoples, the multi-
cultural community, women, religions, business, labour, the disabled, gays
and lesbians, trees, and a number of civil liberties organizations. Most of
those who appeared pressed for a stronger Charter of Rights, and a number of
them actually saw their ideas adopted., 454 The fiction that all of these dispa-
rate groups aligned on a single understanding of much of anything in the
Charter is too fantastic for most judges to entertain, much less those who
lived through the drafting process.
The outright hostility of early Australian justices to references to the
Convention debates might also be explained in part by the fact that they
themselves were participants in those debates. Justice Kirby writes: "They
remembered. They did not need to be reminded, least of all of the words of
other delegates, some of whom they may have held in low regard.
'
"
455
Former Chief Justice Mason observed on the eve of constitutional
sovereignty that criticizing the Constitution as anachronistic-"as a product
of the horse and buggy age"-was a vibrant political strategy in Australia but
not in the United States. 456 As I discuss below, that sentiment is no doubt
related to the fact that the Australian Constitution was, in meaningful ways,
449. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
450. See PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER,
FEDERALISM, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 78-88 (1987) (explaining the drafters'
presumption that the Canadian constitutional tradition would confront ambiguous Charter language
without deference to the framers' intent); Hogg, supra note 114, at 87 (noting ample evidence that
the Charter's drafters and adopters expected courts to interpret the text independently).
451. Cf H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 888-89 (1985) (arguing that the framers of the U.S. Constitution did not view their subjective
intent as binding future generations).
452. RUSSELL, supra note 125, at 114.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Kirby, supra note 102, at 9.
456. Mason, supra note 277, at 1.
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not fully Australian. But it is also the product of a particular moment in
Australia's political time.
Our own reverence for the eighteenth-century founding is likewise
temporally contingent. It is worth remembering that much of the twentieth
century was hardly the best of times for the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
Scholars such as Charles Beard and Arthur Schlesinger sought to dismantle
the idea that the framers deserved particular reverence.4 7 As Martin Flaherty
writes, "For the Progressives, American constitutional claims were more than
erroneous or even irrelevant. They were deceitful. 45 8  Reframing the
framers as fundamentally committed to popular sovereignty and classical
liberalism, achieved in part through the efforts of scholars like Bernard
Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and Akhil Amar, was no doubt helpful to the revitali-
zation of American originalism.
459
B. Revolution vs. Evolution
The prime location of the founding generation within the American
ethos has been consecrated not only by time but, of course, by deeds. The
dominant narrative of American constitutionalism is that the sovereignty of
the American people was established through force of arms during the
American Revolution and was consummated through the drafting of an
enduring Constitution. That Constitution is, moreover, both a locus for
popular sovereignty and a distinctly political site for American identity.460
Jed Rubenfeld has contrasted the "democratic constitutionalism" of the
United States with the "international constitutionalism" of many European
457. See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 9-12 (1913) (criticizing prior analyses of the founding as too reverential and
arguing that economic concerns drove the drafting of the Constitution); Arthur M. Schlesinger, The
American Revolution Reconsidered, 34 POL. SCI. Q. 61, 74-78 (1919) (arguing that the American
Revolution was born of an uneasy alliance between self-interested merchants and southern
plantation farmers, and was overtaken by radical and intransigent egalitarians).
458. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 523, 532 (1995).
459. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 279-80 (2005)
("True ... Philadelphians said antidemocratic and antirepublican things behind closed doors....
But what do such quotations prove? Many of the statements were made on behalf of proposals that
the Convention ultimately voted down-a point rarely noted by Beardians."); BERNARD BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at vi-vii (1967) ("[T]he American
Revolution was above all else an ideological, constitutional, political struggle and not primarily a
controversy between social groups undertaken to force changes in the organization of the society or
the economy."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 383 (1969)
("[D]evelopments in America since 1776 had infused an extraordinary meaning into the idea of the
sovereignty of the people. The Americans were not simply making the people a nebulous and
unsubstantial source of all political authority.").
460. Cf Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTL.
J. LEGAL PHIL. 185, 186-87 (2000) (arguing that the United States' ethos lies within its ideology
and "shared values").
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states. 461 American sovereignty is bound up with its Constitution, and its na-
tional identity is notionally stated in political rather than ancestral terms.
462
The revolution that produced that sovereignty and that political identity is
dated.
The absence of a comparable moment of sovereignty has been a source
of considerable angst in Canadian and Australian political and legal circles.
Russell's book, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign
People?,463 was written in 2004, more than two decades after, by all outward
appearances, Canada became sovereign.464 Yet, Canadian sovereignty is an
ongoing process that began before 1867 and continues to this day. Russell
begins his book with a quote from a letter written by three of the fathers of
the BNA Act: "It will be observed that the basis of Confederation now pro-
posed differs from that of the United States in several important particulars.
It does not profess to be derived from the people but would be the constitu-
tion provided by the imperial parliament, thus remedying any defect. ' ' 65
Russell later observes that the constitutional vision underlying the BNA Act
was Burkean rather than Lockean. It was conceived not as a single founda-
tional document "drawn up at a particular point in time containing all of a
society's rules and principles of government, but as a collection of laws,
institutions, and political practices that have passed the test of time and
which have been found to serve the society's interests tolerably well., 466 It
was sober rather than airy; practical rather than aspirational; secular rather
than mystical; "thick" rather than "thin," in the parlance of Mark Tushnet.46 7
Moreover, it was, formally speaking, British rather than Canadian. Such a
document is hardly likely to inspire a popular politics of originalism.
468
Quite the opposite in fact. The living-tree analogy was part of Lord
Sankey's project of freeing the Canadian Parliament from the vise of the
Privy Council. 469 Canadian sovereignty has long been identified with a meta-
461. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 1971
(2004).
462. See Post, supra note 460, at 187 (citing the United States' ideologically based ethos as an
example of a nonethnic basis for nationality).
463. RUSSELL, supra note 125.
464. See Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 2 (U.K.) ("No Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of
its law.").
465. RUSSELL, supra note 125, at 3.
466. Id. at 247.
467. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-14 (1999)
(distinguishing between the "thick" Constitution-the rules and structural provisions of the
Constitution-from the "thin" Constitution-the hoary principles enshrined most prominently
within the Declaration of Independence).
468. Cf Bazowski, supra note 243, at 230 (arguing that the sharp divergence of views about the
Canadian Constitution and its drafters thwarts originalism's claim to interpretive preeminence in
Canada).
469. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
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phor of evolution and growth,470 as opposed to the "frozen concepts"
approach of Lord Atkin.471 The Charter, though rights oriented, continues to
be understood in that spirit. More than just progressive constitutional
doctrine, the living tree, rhetorically, holds out the promise of self-
government.
One could tell a similar story about Australia. Its Constitution, though
inspired by a domestic political movement, was negotiated in London and
was formally enacted by the British Parliament.472 Justice Kirby has said that
"[t]wenty or 30 years ago, especially in legal circles, the ultimate foundation
of the legitimacy and binding force of the Constitution was given, virtually
without dissent, as the Act of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. ' '473 It
should not be surprising, then, that the Mason Court's impatience with origi-
nalism coincided with Australian constitutional independence. Writes Mason
himself, "[T]he legislation that terminated Australia's residual constitutional
links with the United Kingdom... now provides a firmer foundation for the
view that the status of the Constitution as a fundamental law springs from the
authority of the Australian people. 474
Australia's discomfort with originalism came far later in time and in far
milder form, of course, than that of the Supreme Court of Canada. For this it
is tempting to blame, inter alia, the relatively diminished role of the Privy
Council in Australia's internal affairs,475 but the story may be more compli-
cated. The historical Australian Constitution is not wholly without
democratic purchase in Australia. It was drafted and de facto ratified by
Australians and, unlike the BNA Act, was designed to serve as a popular
Constitution.476 Its preamble refers to "the people" of its various states and
describes the Commonwealth as "indissoluble. 477  Like the U.S.
470. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
472. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12, pmbl.
(U.K.) (proclaiming that the people of Australia have agreed to unite in a Commonwealth "under
the Crown of the United Kingdom").
473. Kirby, supra note 102, at 7; see also Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co.
(The Engineers Case) (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 153 (Austl.) (rejecting the idea that the Australian
Constitution is a compact between sovereign states); Owen Dixon, The Law and the Constitution,
51 LAW Q. REv. 590, 597 (1935) ("[The Australian Constitution] is not a supreme law purporting to
obtain its force from the direct expression of a people's inherent authority to constitute a
government. It is a statute of the British Parliament enacted in the exercise of its legal sovereignty
over the law everywhere in the King's Dominions.").
474. Mason, supra note 277, at 24.
475. See Mason, supra note 277, at 3 (chronicling the progressive elimination of the Privy
Council's appellate review of Australian matters).
476. See Craven, supra note 6, at 180-81 (rebuffing the claim that Australia's Constitution was
developed solely in Britain and positing that the "real basis" of the Constitution was in "its popular
genesis within Australia").
477. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12, pmbl. (U.K.).
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Constitution, it was "not merely a text but a deed-a constituting.''471 It
might be useful to describe Australia as having not one but two moments of
sovereignty, the first in 1900 and the second in 1986. The competing narra-
tives of the Gleeson Court reflected a struggle over which of these moments
deserved the High Court's fidelity.479
C. Rights and the Right
As Part II discusses, the to-do in the United States over originalism is a
temporally sensitive feature of our politics, raging at opportune moments and
fading away when no longer useful. The present moment arose in part
because many of the politically salient opinions of the Warren and Burger
Courts were individual-rights cases susceptible to critique on originalist
grounds. It is difficult to imagine Justice Scalia and all he represents existing
in the absence of Roe v. Wade, Miranda v. Arizona, Mapp v. Ohio, and like
opinions. These opinions enable him, as Claudius enables Hamlet.
It is also difficult to imagine a comparable movement developing within
a legal culture like Australia's, whose Constitution lacks a bill of rights.
Individual-rights cases acquire a certain visibility that seems less likely to
attach to disputes over, say, the vesting of state-law jurisdiction in federal
480courts. Protection of individual social and political rights also enjoys an
obvious compatibility with theories of constitutional evolution, and stands in
obvious tension-here, "incompatibility" would be too strong481 -with a
commitment to parliamentary supremacy.
Australia's constitutional structure does not, then, encourage a rights
revolution at all, much less an antirights backlash. It is nevertheless worth
noting that the most prominent reaffirmations of Australian legalism arose in
a posture of opposition. The Engineers Case was an effort by Justices Isaacs
and Higgins to repudiate decisively the reserved-state-powers doctrine and
the putatively loose interpretive principles that generated it. 482 And most ob-
478. AMAR, supra note 459, at 5; see also Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 106-07 ("Given
[its] history and [its] words, it was accepted from the beginning that, although [the Constitution's]
legal authority derived solely from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, its political
authority and legitimacy were equally due to its having been agreed upon by representatives, and
assented to by a majority of the voters, of each colony.").
479. See supra section III(B)(4).
480. See Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 539-40 (Austl.) (invalidating
legislation that authorized states to vest jurisdiction in federal courts to decide certain state law
questions).
481. Australians, like the British, do not perceive an inherent incommensurability between
taking rights seriously and vesting rights-protection in Parliament. See, e.g., Mason, supra note
277, at 11 (explaining that Australians do not see "legislative supremacy ... as an instrument by
which the majority will ... oppress a minority and threaten their fundamental rights").
482. See supra notes 273-76, 320-26 and accompanying text.
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servers consider the Gleeson Court a deliberate foil for the perceived
excesses of the Mason Court.483
Canada's rights revolution, on the other hand, is more than competitive
with that of the Warren Court. 4 84 Negative-rights cases brought under the
Charter had a 39% success rate from 1982 to 2002, and positive- and group-
rights cases had a 27% success rate.485 And although there is evidence within
the Canadian legal academy of nascent unease with living-tree interpretation,
there is nothing approaching a serious suggestion of originalism.
486
There are at least four possible reasons for the relative lack of embrace
of originalism by an antirights backlash movement in Canada. First, the
Canadian experience with aggressive rights protection is more recent than
that of the United States. 487  It takes time for a political movement to
mobilize, and it takes considerable effort and imagination for such a
movement to mobilize around a set of interpretive principles. 88 As Morton
and Knopff write, "The Charter revolution has unfolded so quickly that it is
hard to gain perspective on it."'489  It does not help that the Liberal Party,
which, unlike its Australian namesake, is politically aligned with the U.S.
Democratic Party, controlled the Canadian government and Canadian judicial
appointments from 1993 to 2006,490 when many of the most controversial
Charter opinions issued. This era of Liberal Party dominance both stocked
the judicial bench with like-minded judges and may have sapped conserva-
tive politics of the intellectual vitality needed to coalesce around an effective
foil to living-tree interpretation.
Second, the availability of legislative override under Section 33,491
though rarely invoked, both removes a rhetorical arrow from the quiver of
the Court's opponents and raises the stakes of political success. That is, the
483. See PIERCE, supra note 335, at 257-61 (describing the Gleeson Court's putative departure
from the politicized role that had previously been ascribed to the Mason Court).
484. See supra section III(A)(2).
485. Hirschl, supra note 214, at 66. In the United States from 1975 to 2002, negative-rights
cases had a 41% success rate and positive-rights cases had a 16% success rate. Id.
486. See supra section III(A)(3); see also Grant Huscroft, The Trouble with Living Tree
Interpretation, 25 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 3, 4-5 (2006) (suggesting the false dichotomy between
living-tree interpretation versus originalism); Miller, supra note 221, at 331-32 (describing the
Canadian legal academy's neglect of originalist scholarship and the concurrent lack of advances in
living-tree constitutional doctrine).
487. See supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text.
488. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 1, at 679-82 (recounting conservative efforts in the 1970s
and 1980s to frame an attack on the Warren Court in methodological terms); Post & Siegel, supra
note 39, at 554-61 (suggesting a disconnect between originalism as a methodology and originalism
as a political practice).
489. MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 198, at 21.
490. See Clifford Krauss, Canadian Voters Oust Incumbent for Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Jan
24, 2006, at Al (recording the end of the Liberal Party's thirteen-year run controlling the Canadian
government).
491. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
§ 33 (U.K.); see supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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possibility of legislative correction may channel criticism of the Court's
work away from judicial methodology and into the political arena. The
gravitational pull of the override mechanism towards the political process
may be strengthened further by Canada's majoritarian parliamentary
structure, which rewards political victory with a realistic prospect of agenda
setting.492
Third, much of Charter interpretation toils in the vast fields left open by
Section 1, the Limitations Clause.493 That Section's text refers to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society, 4 94 not those that are, say, "consistent with our
history and traditions." An originalist construction of Section 1 would
therefore be violently atextual. 495 Fourth, as discussed, the Charter's drafting
history itself suggests an expectation of progressive interpretation.496
It bears mention, finally, that the antirights orientation of American
originalism also relates significantly to its aggrandizement of the American
founding. A constitutional jurisprudence whose essential point of reference
postdates World War II is more likely to view excessive positivism with sus-
picion.497 Proponents of that jurisprudence are also more likely to express
discomfort with, and to be suspicious of, the perceived failure of American
originalists to recognize the limitations of positivism confirmed by the
European experience. Originalism is associated with the American right498
and with a constitutionalism that much of the world has no desire to
emulate.499
492. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and
Violence, in PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 223, 228 (Arend Lijphart ed.,
1992) (confirming that majoritarian parliamentary systems are substantially less likely than
presidential systems to have minority-party executives).
493. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 70 ("Section 1 is... an issue in nearly every case where a
law is challenged on Charter grounds.").
494. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1.
495. The test for whether a challenged statute passes muster under Section I is provided in R. v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105-06 (Can.). A limitation's objective must relate to "pressing"
societal concerns and the means employed must be "reasonable and demonstrably justified." Id.
496. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
497. See Rubenfeld, supra note 461, at 1985-86 (contrasting the postwar American surge in
nationalism with the European abhorrence of it due to its association with the populist Nazi and
Fascist movements).
498. When discussed in Canadian and Australian articles, American originalism is almost
invariably associated with Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 102, at 4-6 (discussing a
debate between Justice Scalia and Canada's Justice Binnie); Miller, supra note 221, at 338 (using
Justice Scalia as an originalist prototype).
499. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al (explaining that foreign courts in recent years have been decreasingly
willing to follow American jurisprudence).
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D. The Politics of Judicial Nominations
The entry for Bork (v.)-"to defame or vilify (a person) systematically,
esp. in the mass media, usually with the aim of preventing his or her
appointment to public office; to obstruct or thwart (a person) in this way"-
first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 2002.500 Robert Bork's
1987 Supreme Court confirmation hearing was a media and interest-group
frenzy the likes of which the United States had not known before but has
known several times since.50 1 The ritual wherein Court nominees are meticu-
lously demolished by partisans over several months, brought before
television cameras to parry the stylized soliloquies of Judiciary Committee
members, and condemned or praised by literally hundreds of interest groups
is a familiar feature of our judicial politics. 50 2 It has become typical for the
public interrogation of a Supreme Court nominee to include extensive dis-
cussion of the nominee's "judicial philosophy., 50 3 Abetted by this process,
constitutional methodology, and originalism in particular, has become a site
for popular political mobilization. °4
This rite is unknown to Canada or Australia. Befitting nations in which
legislative majorities are likely to control the government,0 5 in neither coun-
try does the national parliament have any formal role in the nomination of
high court justices, and in neither country has the nomination process been
remotely as politicized as it is in the United States. By comparison to the
United States, nominations are low-visibility events in both countries.
Justices are selected by the ruling government against background norms of
qualification for the position.506 Writes Peter Hogg of the situation in
Canada, "[Sluccessive governments have evidently concluded that it is good
politics to make good appointments, and the quality of appointments is gen-
erally agreed to be high. There has never been any serious suggestion that
500. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/0030895 1?single= 1&
query-type-word&queryword=Bork.
501. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS 4-6 (2005).
502. See id. (discussing the increasing role of interest groups, the press, and the public in the
selection and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices).
503. See Greene, supra note 1, at 691-92 (documenting the rise in questioning nominees on
their judicial methodology during confirmation hearings); see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER,
THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 98 (2007)
(referring to "judicial philosophy" as "the Holy Grail of Senate confirmation hearings").
504. See Post & Siegel, supra note 39, at 554 (noting originalism's unique ability to inspire
popular political mobilization); see also Greene, supra note 1, at 694 (remarking that public interest
in originalism has risen concurrently with public interest in confirmation hearings). More than 400
interest groups weighed in on the Bork nomination. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 7 (paperback ed. 1998).
505. Powell, supra note 492, at 228.
506. In Australia the government is statutorily required to consult with the state attorneys
general, but it is not bound by their views. High Court of Australia Act, 1979, ch. 137, § 6.
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Canadian governments have attempted to 'pack' the court with judges of a
particular approach or ideology."5 °7
There have been intermittent calls for a broader public discussion of
Supreme Court nominees in Canada, 50 8 and the 2006 appointment of
Marshall Rothstein to the Court featured the first public interview process for
a high court nominee in Canada. 50 9 Even then, though, Justice Rothstein's
hearing before an ad hoc parliamentary committee was barely three hours
long and betrayed not a hint of acrimony.510 And the future of even this low
level of public participation in the nomination process is unclear. When
Justice Bastarache's resignation created a vacancy on the Court in 2008,
Prime Minister Harper unceremoniously selected Thomas Cromwell without
adhering to the quasi-public process Harper himself had earlier endorsed.
51
As one columnist writes, "Whenever someone suggests that ... we ought to
have some kind of a public discussion about the kinds of views and philoso-
phies we want on the bench, the idea is immediately batted down. Too
American."
51 2
In Australia, too, there have long been calls to bring more transparency
and accountability to the judicial nomination process, but even critics of the
process concede that "governments have usually exercised this power with
due care and regard for the Court, including that it be composed of the best
legal talent and that it be able to maintain public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice. ' '51 3 The grass is always greener indeed.
I have argued elsewhere that the originalism movement is a populist
one. It flaunts originalism's elegance, the simplicity with which it may be
explained to nonprofessional audiences, its neutering of the decision-making
authority of legal elites, and its fundamentally nationalist orientation. 51 4 In
the United States, the judicial nomination process is the most prominent site
at which that set of ethical values is transcribed onto judicial practice.515
Even if the same set of ethical values has purchase in Canada or Australia,
507. Hogg, supra note 114, at 59.
508. See, e.g., id. (asserting that the lack of transparency in the appointment process is "widely
recognized as a deficiency that should be corrected").
509. Peter W. Hogg, Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of
Canada, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 527, 528-30 (2006).
510. Id. at 530-31.
511. Philip Slayton, Ottawa's Best-Kept Secret?, MACLEAN'S (Can.), Feb. 2, 2009, at 20.
512. Anthony Keller, Wanted: A Public Word with the Would-Be Judges, GLOBE & MAIL
(Can.), Dec. 1, 1997, at A17; see also MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 198, at 17 & 169 n.22
(collecting sources discussing the need for greater public involvement in the selection of Justices to
the Supreme Court of Canada).
513. George Williams, High Court Appointments: The Need for Reform, 30 SYDNEY L. REV.
161, 161 (2008); cf Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 112 (asserting that most judicial appointees are
well qualified).
514. Greene, supra note 1, at 708-14.
515. See id. at 694 (describing the highly public, televised nature of confirmation hearings in
the United States).
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the absence of public involvement in judicial selection deprives domestic
politics of a prime opportunity to tie those values to originalism.
E. Pluralism and Nomos
American originalism is radically jurispathic. The term is Robert
Cover's, and he used it to refer to the role of the court as a suppressant of
law. Law in this sense is not, or rather is not only, the rules that the state is
prepared to enforce through violence, but refers to a legal meaning particular
to a community's normative universe, or nomos. 5 16 Cover said that courts
arise out of "the need to suppress law, to choose between two or more laws,
to impose upon laws a hierarchy. It is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity
of the jurisgenerative principle, that creates the problem to which the court
and the state are the solution.,
517
Constitutional interpretation, even as judicially enforced, can seek to
preserve a space for multiple nomoi to coexist. Constitutional principles may
be understood to have meanings that are not fixed in time but evolve through
higher-order social and political competition.i t Constitutional law as en-
forced by the state may be understood, then, as distinct from what the
Constitution means. In other work I have referred to this distinction as "thin"
versus "thick" constitutional law: because not all constitutional law is equally
shared, not all constitutional law is equally stable.519 A little instability in
constitutional law preserves a space for competing constitutional narratives
to breathe that sweet air of legitimacy.
Originalism generally rejects all I have just said. Indeed, it is chiefly
promoted as the most effective means of establishing the falsity of competing
520
narratives. Original understanding supplies a criterion for what the law is
that is thought to frustrate the social and political capture of judges. The
chief lament of many of the Australian judges in Pierce's study is telling:
"[T]here was a certainty about law fifty years ago which most practitioners
516. See Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983)
(arguing that, although diverse communities theoretically create and give meaning to laws through
their distinctive narratives and precepts, the "jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning
proliferates ... never exists in isolation from violence").
517. Id.
518. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 30, at 301-02 (explaining that changes in constitutional
interpretation may be the result of political and social arguments about the restorative and
redemptive potential of a constitution's text); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1323, 1323 (2006) ("Social movement conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture,
can create new forms of constitutional understanding ... .
519. Greene, supra note 1, at 700.
520. See Scalia, supra note 32, at 862 (praising originalism for "prevent[ing] the law from
reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks
fundamentally undesirable" and "requir[ing] the society to devote to the subject the long and hard
consideration required for a constitutional amendment before those particular values can be cast
aside").
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would tell you is now absent., 521 "There was a conscious jettisoning [by the
Mason Court] of the notion that certainty is the object of the legal
System .... ,522 "The High Court itself has been very active in recent
years... some would say overactive to the extent there has been an element
of instability infused in some areas of the law which is perhaps felt to be
undesirable. '" 523 For law to hold out the possibility of capture is bound to
create uncertainty and instability, but for many marginalized communities it
is what makes the legal-language game worth playing. 5
24
A constitutional interpretive methodology designed to suppress
competing narratives is a poor fit for Charter interpretation and for Canada's
national ethos more generally. In particular, accommodation of the interests
of the Qu~b~cois was a precondition to patriation and is expressed in numer-
ous Charter provisions, and the ongoing tension surrounding Canada's
fundamental heterogeneity has produced several constitutional crises over the
last three decades. 525  The Charter itself guarantees a number of express
rights to language minorities;126 guarantees the right to travel; 527 protects the
rights of aboriginal peoples (including treaty rights);528 grants rights to
sectarian schools;5 29 and requires that the Charter "be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heri-
tage of Canadians., 530  The very existence of the Federal Department of
Canadian Heritage suggests a certain insecurity about Canada's cultural
unity, and as if to assuage any suggested affinity for hegemony, the
521. PIERCE, supra note 335, at 48.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 417 (1987) (explaining that because blacks
historically experienced a legal system that did not provide structured expectations or allow
reasonable reliance, the possibility of attaining "full rights under the law" has been fiercely
motivational). Jerome Frank suggested, controversially, that in craving certainty in the law we
yearn for an "incomparable, omnipotent, infallible father" who can assert a form of parental control
over the chaos life invariably presents. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 20-21
(1930). For many women, blacks, immigrants, gays, and members of other historical out-groups,
the "Founding Fathers" to whom originalists turn for certainty not only do not look like their fathers
but symbolize a hostile, even genocidal, social order. The objection to originalism here differs from
the standard "dead hand" critique: the Founding Era is deficient not just in failing to fully represent
but in failing to universally resonate or pacify.
525. In addition to the strained patriation movement itself, I refer here to the Meech Lake
Accord, negotiated in 1987 and abandoned in 1990, and the failed Charlottetown Accord. See Peter
H. Russell, Can the Canadians Be a Sovereign People? The Question Revisited, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 214, at 9, 14-15
(referring to patriation, Meech Lake, and Charlottetown as intense efforts to establish a collective
identity).
526. Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 16-23.
527. Id. § 6.
528. Id. §§ 25, 35.
529. Id. § 29.
530. Id. § 27.
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Department has stated its two "strategic outcomes" in full: "Canadians
express and share their diverse cultural experiences with each other and the
world," and, "Canadians live in an inclusive society built on intercultural un-
derstanding and citizen participation. 531 Quebec in fact still has not ratified
the Charter, and efforts to institute reforms that would bring Quebec fully
into the national fold have failed.532 Canadians have never quite been one
people, and the Charter has not succeeded in its lofty though necessarily half-
hearted ambition to make them so.
533
To be sure, the same could be said of Americans-but not so fast. The
United States has no significant separatist movement, its aboriginal popula-
tion is much smaller than Canada's, 534 and its minority populations are,
ironically perhaps, insufficiently insular to enjoy political power comparable
to that of the Qu~b~cois.535 It is easier for an assimilationist ethic to flourish
in the United States--or in Australia, for that matter 536-than in Canada.
Public-values surveys conducted by the research firm Environics throughout
the 1990s show the number of Canadians who said they "relate to
nonconformists" remaining consistently at two-thirds, but the number of
Americans who said the same dropping from 64% in 1992 to 52% in 2000. 537
During the same period, the number of Canadians agreeing that "[n]on-
531. BEVERLEY J. ODA, DEP'T OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, 2007-2008 ESTIMATES PART III:
REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES 11 (2006), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/PCH/pch-
eng.pdf.
532. Hogg, supra note 114, at 57.
533. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 125 (discussing the inability of Canadians to become a
sovereign people and legitimate the Charter). Peter Hogg and Wade Wright have concluded that the
BNA Act was deliberately vague in order to permit mutual accommodation of the conflicting goals
of its drafters-"a desire for a strong central government (English-Canada) and the desire to protect
local languages, cultures, and institutions (French-Canada and the Maritimes)." Hogg & Wright,
supra note 126, at 338.
534. Compare STATISTICS CAN., CANADIAN 2006 CENSUS OF POPULATION: ABORIGINAL
IDENTITY POPULATION (2008), http://www 12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/highlights/
Aboriginal/pages/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&Code=O1 &Table = I &Data=Dist&Sex= 1 &Age = 1 &
StartRec=l&Sort=2&Display=Page (reporting that aboriginal peoples made up 3.8% of Canada's
population in 2006), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION WHO ARE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE ALONE (2008), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GRT
Table?_bm=y&-geoid=O1000US&- box head nbr-R0203&-ds name=ACS_2008_IYR_GOO_
(reporting that American Indians and Alaska Natives made up 0.8% of the U.S. population in 2008).
535. See Hogg, supra note 114, at 94 (arguing that a minority population concentrated in one
geographic region, like the Qurbrcois, is likely to rely on provincial action to protect its interests,
while a more widely dispersed minority group, like the African-American population of the United
States, typically looks to the federal government for redress); cf Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985) (asserting that, if all other factors are
equal, "discreteness and insularity" will act as a bargaining advantage for a minority population
involved in "pluralist American politics").
536. See Goldsworthy, supra note 277, at 156-57 (observing that Australia is "much more
culturally homogenous" than either Canada or the United States).
537. MICHAEL ADAMS, FIRE AND ICE: THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND THE MYTH OF
CONVERGING VALUES 55 (2003).
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whites should not be allowed to immigrate to this country" rose from 11% to
13%, while in the United States it rose from 16% to 25%.538
The U.S. Constitution is an important conduit for American
assimilation: the dominant domestic narrative, part of the legacy of Brown v.
Board of Education, remains that separate is inherently unequal. 539 But the
ethic extends beyond race. Justice Scalia is conspicuously fond of relying
upon it in constitutional cases. His spirited dissent in the VMJ case quoted
approvingly the school's Code of a Gentleman and praised the "manly
'honor"' the school instilled in students through its single-sex, military-style
indoctrination.54°  In a recent case considering whether the Ten
Commandments could be posted in a courthouse, Justice Scalia suggested
that public acknowledgement of the Ten Commandments is distinguishable
from government endorsement of religion on the grounds, in part, that 97.7%
of Americans practice monotheistic faiths.541 It was the very commitment to
equality as against appreciation of difference that Justice Scalia cited in
Employment Division v. Smith,542 which rejected the claim of a Native
543American to constitutional protection of his peyote use.
Consider also Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,54 4 in which the Court refused to extend visitation rights to the biological
father of a child born to a woman married to another man.545 Justice Scalia
denied the claim to constitutional protection of the out-of-wedlock relation-
ship between the petitioner and the mother in part on the ground that it has
not "been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society., 546 Criticizing Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition, Justice Brennan
wrote in dissent:
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to those
interests specifically protected by historical practice,... the plurality
ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists. We are
not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
538. Id. at 66.
539. See Harry T. Edwards, The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v.
Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 944-46 (2004)
(discussing Brown's philosophical underpinnings and their reaffirmation in the 2003 Grutter
decision).
540. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 601-03 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
541. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "acknowledgement of a single Creator" and "the establishment of a religion" are
distinguishable because the former is "'a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country"' (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983))).
542. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
543. Id. at 888 ("Any society adopting [a strict scrutiny test for religious-exemption claims]
would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity
of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.").
544. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
545. Id. at 131-32.
546. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion).
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one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar
or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects
our own idiosyncra[s]ies.547
Justice Brennan identified a set of fault lines often neglected in
interpretive debates. Originalists tend to disfavor particularized claims of
right and seek to conform our constitutional history to that posture. Such
claims must of necessity remain viable within a political culture that, like
Canada's, cannot afford to celebrate assimilation.
F. Constitutional Faith
The living-tree metaphor is not unique to Canadian law. Elliot Dorf and
Arthur Rosett have emphasized that Jewish law is distinct from biblical law
insofar as, although based on the Bible, it has evolved "through
interpretation, legislation, and custom. ' 548 They write: "The rabbis of the
classical tradition claimed that their interpretations were the new form of
God's revelation, replacing visions and voices. Those features of Jewish law
proclaim loudly that it is intended to be a law for all generations, and so Jews
have lived it."'549 It is in part for this reason that Jewish law has been com-
pared within that classical tradition to a "living tree. ' 550 The analogy derives
from the Book of Proverbs:
I give you good instruction; never forsake My Torah.
It is a tree of life for those who hold fast to it, and those who uphold it
are happy.
Its ways are pleasant, and all its paths are peace.551
As we have seen, the dichotomy between revelation and interpretation
recurs in debates over the authority of statutory and constitutional text as
originally enacted and understood. Justice Kirby equates British statutory
interpretation with the notion that judges "had to find their authority in a text
of the law, just as the new bishops after the Reformation were expected to
find theirs in the text of Scripture. 5 52 It was not only "very English" but
,'very Protestant" to "demand fidelity to the text so as to curb the inventions
and pretensions to unwarranted power."
553
As Jaroslav Pelikan noted in his insightful comparison of biblical and
constitutional interpretation, the first of Martin Luther's Ninety-Five
Theses-"Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, when He said Poenitentiam
547. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
548. ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF
JEWISH LAW 13 (1988).
549. Id. at 14.
550. Id.
551. Proverbs 4:2, 3:17-18.
552. Kirby, supra note 5, at 2.
553. Id.
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agite, willed that the whole life of believers should be repentance" 554-is no
less than "an appeal from the current teaching and practice of the church to
the original intent and sensus literalis of the Gospels. 555 The point here is
that the "original, grammatical meaning of Scripture" commands a devotion
to a life of repentance, not the performance of penance or "the ritual of
contrition, confession, and satisfaction" commanded by the Roman Catholic
Church.556 Luther was appealing to the original meaning of the text rather
than the scriptural decision rule crafted by the Church.
There are numerous reasons to think this dichotomy liable to concretize
within the American imagination. The American attitude toward the
Constitution is frequently described in terms of worship, reverence, and
fidelity.557 Max Lerner once described the Constitution as America's "totem
and its fetish., 558 He wrote:
In fact the very habits of mind begotten by an authoritarian Bible and
a religion of submission to a higher power have been carried over to
an authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of submission to a
"higher law;" and a country like America, in which its early tradition
had prohibited a state church, ends by getting a state church after all,
although in a secular form.559
554. MARTIN LUTHER, DISPUTATION OF DOCTOR MARTIN LUTHER ON THE POWER AND
EFFICACY OF INDULGENCES (THE NINETY-FIVE THESES) (1517), translated and reprinted in 1
WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 29, 29 (Henry Eyster Jacobs et al. trans. & ed., 1915).
555. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 100 (2004).
556. Id. at 100-01.
557. See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 225 (1986) (referring to the emergence in the 1920s of"a
constitutional cult. . . that manifested strong religious overtones"); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with
Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1721-22 (1997) (analogizing
fidelity in a personal relationship to having faith in an institution such as the Constitution);
Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071,
1072 (1936) (describing American constitutional symbolism as "consecrate[ing] an already
established order of things" that "harks back to primitive man's terror of a chaotic universe, and his
struggle toward security and significance behind a slowly erected barrier of custom, magic, fetish,
[and] tabu"). See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (questioning the
link between affirmation of national identity and unqualified devotion to the Constitution). Henry
Monaghan's critique of substantive due process proponents as advocating a "perfect" constitution
begins by quoting an emblematic if not quite characteristic indulgence:
Our great and sacred Constitution, serene and inviolable, stretches its beneficent
powers over our land ... like the outstretched arm of God himself ... the people of the
United States . .. ordained and established one Supreme Court-the most rational,
considerate, discerning, veracious, impersonal power-the most candid, unaffected,
conscientious, incorruptible power.... 0 Marvelous Constitution! Magic Parchment!
Transforming word! Maker, Monitor, Guardian of Mankind!
Monaghan, supra note 232, at 353 (quoting Henry D. Estabrook, The Constitution Between Friends
(Sept. 26, 1913), in Mo. BAR ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE MISSOURI BAR ASSOCIATION 270, 278 (1913)).
558. Max Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937).
559. Id. at 1294-95; see also PELIKAN, supra note 555, at 7 ("With the reduction in the private
authority of Christian Scripture, and especially in its public authority, American Scripture has been
called upon to fill some of the gap.").
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On this conception the difficulty of constitutional amendment through
Article V, which could theoretically argue in favor of evolutionary interpre-
tation by judges, instead facilitates the iconography of the Constitution as a
sacred text. What Ackerman calls constitutional moments Scalia might call
apocrypha, as far as their authority over him extends. Add to this broth the
evangelical movement, which generally favors literal interpretation of the
Bible-that is, according to the author's original semantic intention560-and
which is, relatedly or not, suspicious of metaphors of evolution, and the rela-
tive popularity of originalism in the United States begins to look less
mysterious.
5 6
'
Consider the religious makeup of each of the countries we have studied.
Roughly half of all Americans self-identify as Protestant, roughly half of that
562number self-identify as evangelical Protestant, and roughly 4 in 10
Americans say they attend church weekly.563 Almost half of American
evangelicals-the most of any religious group surveyed-believe that there
is "only [o]ne true way to interpret the teachings of my religion." 564
Evangelicalism is far less prevalent in Canada and Australia. Approximately
a quarter of the population of either country is Protestant,5 65 and more than
15% of the population of each country has no religious belief at all.566 By
contrast only 4% of U.S. adults report that they are atheist or agnostic.567
Although both Canada and Australia have larger Roman Catholic populations
560. See J.I. PACKER, FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY 48 (Regent College Publ'g 2003) (1981)
("Exegesis means drawing from each passage the meaning and message which it was conveying to
its writer's own first readers. The exegetical task is to read everything out of the text while taking
care to read nothing into it.").
561. A recent MIT public-opinion survey finds a statistically significant correlation between
Americans' approval of originalism and their belief in the literal truth of the Bible. See Mass. Inst.
of Tech., Attitudes and Perceptions About the Constitution (2009) (data on file with the author).
562. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 12
(2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
563. Id. at 154.
564. Id. at 178. By comparison, fewer than 1 in 10 American Jews hold this view. Id.
565. Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Canada, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos!ca.htm (last updated Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter The World
Factbook: Canada]; see Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Australia, https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html (last updated Sept. 29, 2009)
[hereinafter The World Factbook: Australia] (noting that 18.7% of Australia's population is
Anglican, 5.7% belongs to the Uniting Church, and 3% is Presbyterian).
566. The World Factbook: Australia, supra note 565; The World Factbook: Canada, supra note
565. The Canadian Election Study 2004-2006 found a negligible number of Canadians who self-
identify as evangelical. See UNIV. OF TORONTO, CANADIAN ELECTION SURVEY, 2004 AND 2006,
http://rl.chass.utoronto.ca/sdaweb/sdapub/ces06/doc/ces0003l.htm (summarizing study data and
finding that 0.2% of Canadians surveyed identified themselves as evangelical). A 2003 survey by
the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (an advocacy group) puts the number at 19% based on the
group's assessment of responses to specific questions about respondents' religious beliefs. AILEEN
VAN GINKEL, EVANGELICAL FELLOWSHIP OF CAN., EVANGELICAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: A
SUMMARY OF THE 2003 IPSOS-REID SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2003), http://files.efc-canada.net/gen/
CFTEvangelicalBeliefs.pdf. The true tally is likely somewhere in between.
567. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 562, at 12.
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than the United States,568 Catholic biblical interpretation is traditionally
eclectic and purposive rather than dogmatic and strictly textualist.
569
"Restoration" and "redemption" are, as Jack Balkin writes, "the key
tropes of constitutional interpretation by social movements and political
parties. 57 ° Successful claims on the meaning of the Constitution call for
either a "return to the enduring principles of the Constitution" or "fulfillment
of those principles., 571  As a traditionally restorative modality, originalisrn
might be viewed as a secular corollary to "the fall" in Christian theology. In
the originalist narrative the Founding Era is a prelapsarian state, a pure
source of constitutional meaning and legal authority. Originalism promises a
return to this state and a cleansing of the corrupting influence of unelected
judges over constitutional law.572
The six hypotheses just sketched are interrelated. One could as easily
state them as a single hypothesis with multiple elements: The United States is
a country with a large evangelical population and in which much of the pop-
ulation holds a reverential attitude toward the Constitution and toward the
war heroes who forged it. That Constitution is a source of political identity
for many Americans, and as a symbol of American sovereignty it is a potent
reference for narratives of both restoration and redemption.573 The rights
revolution of the Warren and Burger Courts led to a conservative backlash
that, owing in part to the public nature of the judicial-nomination process,
was able to frame its critique through the medium of constitutional interpre-
tive methodology. Thus, a particular orientation combined with a particular
568. Compare id. (noting that 23.9% of Americans are Catholic), with The World Factbook:
Australia, supra note 565 (noting that 25.8% of Australians are Catholic), and The World Factbook:
Canada, supra note 565 (noting that 42.6% of Canadians are Catholic).
569. See PELIKAN, supra note 555, at 55-57 (describing the Church's magisterium, or infallible
teachings, as comprising both formal pronouncements and what comes to be universally
incorporated into everyday preaching and worship); PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMM'N, THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE IN THE CHURCH (1993), available at http://catholic-resources.org/
ChurchDocs/PBCInterp-FullText.htm (noting that the study of the Bible "is never finished; each
age must in its own way newly seek to understand the sacred books"); cf Powell, supra note 451, at
889-91 (locating the intellectual origins of revolutionary American ideas about interpretation within
British Protestantism and its opposition to papal corruption of Biblical authority). That the Court's
two most devout originalists, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, are also Catholic does nothing to
diminish the point that originalism itself is a more fundamentally Protestant mode of interpretation.
570. Balkin, supra note 30, at 301.
571. Id.
572. Cf PELIKAN, supra note 555, at 45 (citing the opening language of Zwingli's Sixty-seven
Conclusions, the first Protestant confession: "'All who say that the gospel is nothing without the
approbation [and interpretation] of the church err and slander God."').
573. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 506 (arguing that when social movements appeal to the
Constitution, "they naturally adopt the rhetorical tropes of restoration and redemption that are
characteristic of our history"); Post & Siegel, supra note 39, at 574 (advocating that in order to
counter conservative politics of restoration mediated through originalism, progressives must
develop an equally potent politics of either restoration or redemption).
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objective and an opportunity to create an originalism "movement" that has no
parallel in either Canada or Australia.
The direction of causation in this story is concededly enigmatic.
Sustained glorification of originalist interpretive methods might well have
backwash effects that serve to reinforce our reverence for the founding gen-
eration or even perhaps our affinity for literalism in biblical exegesis. I do
not, moreover, wish to minimize the significance and the agency of a moti-
vated social and political movement in the proliferation of originalism in the
United States. I may have identified factors that have led us to the waters of
originalism, but only a committed movement can force us to drink.
What I do wish to deny is that the failure of originalism to spread to
Canada, or of more historicist originalism to spread to Australia, is or can be
attributed to simple lack of effort or internal persuasiveness. It depends,
rather, on the attitude we take towards the authority of the past and towards
the value of metaphors of evolution, and on the attitude our legal institutional
structures take towards popular engagement with constitutional method.
Originalism and historicism are socially embedded and culturally
contingent.574 Their success requires not just an argument, or even one
coupled with a movement, but also an audience sensitized by culture and by
history.
V. Originalism as Ethical Argument
When Justice Hugo Black delivered the inaugural James Madison
lectures at New York University School of Law in 1960, he began his speech
by recounting Madison's role in the founding of the nation. Madison, he
said, "lived in the stirring times between 1750 and 1836, during which the
Colonies declared, fought for, and won their independence from England.,
575
Black said that the government those colonists set up was "dedicated to
Liberty and Justice," and said that because of Madison's outsized role as "the
Father of our Constitution," his words "are an authentic source to help us
understand the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.
5 76
In the lecture that followed that eulogistic introduction, Black offered
his well-known theory on the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, that
"there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on
purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions
to be 'absolutes.' ' 577 As Charles Black has observed, it seems that Justice
574. See Daniel Levin, Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and
Democratic Theory, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 105, 108-10 (2004) (comparing originalism to other
attempts throughout American history to define an authentic American identity).
575. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 865 (1960).
576. Id.
577. Id. at 867.
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Black cannot have meant what he said.578 It cannot be that Congress truly
can make no law abridging the freedom of speech, and Justice Black, a de-
ceptively learned man, must have known that. Professor Black seeks to
rescue his eponymous contemporary with something of a lawyer's trick: even
on Justice Black's view, freedom of speech remains to be defined, and the
same sort of balancing Justice Black criticizes in his opponents he himself
may employ in deciding in the first instance what that freedom entails.
579
The difference, then, between Justice Black and his adversaries is not in their
relative commitments to the Constitution but in what Professor Black calls
"attitude., 580 A posture of absolutism is a prophylaxis against dilution of our
constitutional rights.
In Justice Black's hands, originalist argument was, sub silentio, an
argument about the sort of attitude judges should take toward the
Constitution. For Justice Black, that attitude was deeply informed by the
lessons of American history. In the Madison lectures he articulated his own
version of the fall:
Today most Americans seem to have forgotten the ancient evils which
forced their ancestors to flee to this new country and to form a
government stripped of old powers used to oppress them. But the
Americans who supported the Revolution and the adoption of our
Constitution knew firsthand the dangers of tyrannical governments.
They were familiar with the long existing practice of English
persecutions of people wholly because of their religious or political
beliefs. They knew that many accused of such offenses had stood,
helpless to defend themselves, before biased legislators and judges. 581
Black is storytelling. He is using anecdote to evoke feelings of
nostalgia, patriotism, and pride in favor of an attitude of caution and
prophylaxis toward judicial authority to determine the scope of constitutional
rights. This way of arguing about methodology is available to him because
of the passage of time and the historical and cultural moment the Revolution
represents in the American imagination. Writing at the height of the Cold
War and less than a generation removed from World War II, Black's narra-
tive is less populist than Justice Scalia's-it instead is antistatist, rights-
friendly, less suspicious of difference, and focused on concepts like liberty
and justice-but it is no less American.
Constitutional theory has a name for this style of argument, and it is not
"originalism." In 1982 Philip Bobbitt articulated a typology of constitutional
argument that has become familiar to legal academics. Bobbitt divided con-
578. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER's, Feb. 1961, at 63, 65; see also BICKEL, supra note 9, at 96-97 (examining Professor
Black's gloss on Justice Black).
579. Black, supra note 578, at 65-66.
580. Id. at 66.
581. Black, supra note 575, at 867.
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stitutional argument into six modalities: historical, textual, structural,
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical.582 Originalism is typically associated with
his first kind of argument, historical, but this Article suggests that it is also
associated with his last kind, ethical. Ethical argument represents
''constitutional argument whose force relies on a characterization of
American institutions and the role within them of the American people. 583
In Bobbitt's account, such arguments advance "the character, or ethos, of the
American polity" as legal authority.584 Bobbitt concluded that a surprising
range of decisions employ primarily ethical argument-from the Cherokee
Cases585 to Trop v. Dulles586 to the Pentagon Papers Case,587 among
others.588
More interestingly for our purposes, Bobbitt also seemed to recognize
implicitly that historical argument is, in important ways, ethical. In cri-
tiquing an originalist position, Bobbitt relied on the familiar argument that it
is difficult to imagine what members of the founding generation would have
thought about how to apply the general principles of the Constitution to
modern issues. He argues:
Such imagining.., depends also on assumptions about intention, but
in a peculiar way: that the whole life of an eighteenth-century agrarian
society should govern us since the Founders were of that special day
and that we, from our very different lives, can know what those people
would have thought in situations within which they would have been,
of course, very different people. It is easy to see that such arguments
are better for dissent than for the Court because ... they express a
particular moral point and are therefore more effective as rhetoric than
as decision procedure.
589
Though Bobbitt does not say so, he is describing a form of ethical
argument. The rhetoric upon which originalist arguments rely, often
successfully, is driven by a narrative about the American ethos. 590 Originalist
arguments help to construct and then embed themselves within "the
community's self-conception of its values and commitments, and the stories
that it tells about itself to itself.",591  Much more than textual, structural,
582. BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 7-8, 93.
583. Id. at 94.
584. Id.
585. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831).
586. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
587. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
588. See BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 96-119.
589. Id. at 24.
590. See Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29
(1990) (observing that the claim that the framers or ratifiers meaningfully speak for present
generations "is neither more nor less than a characterization of the national ethos").
591. Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 706-07 (2005).
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doctrinal, or prudential argument, historical argument in the United States is
about storytelling. That was difficult to recognize-if it was true at all-
before historical argument in the United States became so self-referential.
As Bork and Scalia have noted, there was a time when it was unusual for
American judges to suggest any alternative to originalism.592 But in the great
battles between Justices Black and Frankfurter and Justices Breyer and
Scalia, the originalist position has indeed become as much "rhetoric as
decision procedure."
When multiple modalities are made available and become the subject of
judicial discussion, conventions develop for choosing among them. Put
differently, there are modalities for choosing modalities. The scope of
conventional argument about modality is easier to see in Canada and
Australia, the high courts of which are more self-conscious about
interpretation than is our own. 593 The argument for living-tree interpretation
in Canada is partly doctrinal, relying expressly on the Persons Case.594 One
could advance a persuasive textual argument that the Supreme Court of
Canada should interpret Section 1 of the Charter through an evolutionary
modality. The argument for legalism in Australia was doctrinal prior to the
Mason Court, based on the Engineers Case,595 but under the Gleeson Court it
was perhaps better characterized as prudential, designed to impart needed
certainty upon judicial decision making.596 The practice of constitutional law
is the practice of making a set of arguments, but it is as much the practice of
arguing about how to choose among those arguments.
Recognizing that originalist argument in the United States is ultimately
ethical should give pause both to originalists and to their detractors. For
some originalists, the recognition is self-defeating. Originalism is valuable
to many originalists precisely because its source of legal authority is not
inherently contested: it relies on ostensibly verifiable historical facts about
the world. Ethical argument is an ideological approach to interpretation, not
in the sense that it is partisan, but in the sense that it is socially constructed;
originalists generally reject ideological approaches in either sense.597 The
narratives originalists rely upon are imagined to emerge from analysis rather
than advocacy.598 But if the choice of a historical modality is culturally
592. Greene, supra note 1, at 674-76.
593. See supra notes 242-48, 402-06 and accompanying text.
594. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
595. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
596. See supra section III(B)(4).
597. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Originalism's Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1295,
1347 (2008) (suggesting that an honest commitment to originalism could guide judges away from
their ideological preferences).
598. See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (book review) (summarizing the originalist
position that originalism arises not from judges' ideological preferences but from their commitment
to safeguarding the distinction between law and politics).
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dependent, conventional legal analysis cannot be authoritative on its own; it
must always be connected to a story about what kind of people we are.
Nonoriginalists have been on the defensive of late. 599 This Article's
observations are reason for optimism and caution alike. Recall, from Part IV,
the framing of originalism's template in terms of three "o's": orientation,
objective, and opportunity. It will be fruitful to discuss them in reverse. The
opportunity for political progressives to construct an alternative program
framed in methodological terms is riper than it has been in some time.
Barack Obama was elected with a larger popular vote share than any
nonincumbent Democrat since Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932,600 and he
began his presidency with large majorities in both houses of Congress.601
The judicial nomination process remains vulnerable to populist appeals, but
in an era of deep economic uncertainty it is far from clear that such appeals
still align comfortably with conservative politics.
The notes of caution relate to the other two "o's": objective and
orientation. The originalism movement is connected to a set of political
commitments. We need not guess at what those commitments are. The
Reagan Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy produced a document in
1988 entitled The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in
Constitutional Interpretation.6 02 The document proclaimed itself designed to
identify the stakes of the "judicial philosophies" of the judges appointed to
603the Supreme Court. The claimed results dictated by an originalist view of
the Constitution aligned nicely with the Republican political program of the
1980s: restrictions on abortion rights, gay rights, immigrant rights, and affir-
mative action, and protections for private discrimination, school prayer, state
autonomy, and property rights.60 4  We can now add gun rights to that
program, although resurrection of the Second Amendment was not a
mainstream view in the 1980s. 60 5 Originalism does not obviously produce
some of those positions-restrictions on affirmative action, for example-but
originalism was a means of casting many of them in putatively neutral terms
and therefore branding the agenda as a whole as consistent with constitu-
606tional fidelity. No similarly coherent political program has emerged from
599. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Liberal Reading, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6,
2007, at 14, 16-17 (arguing that liberals should respond to conservative methodological rhetoric by
making textualist and historicist appeals of their own).
600. JAMES W. CEASER ET AL., EPIC JOURNEY: THE 2008 ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 4 (2009).
601. Alex Spillius, Democrats Gain in House and Senate, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 6, 2008, at
11.
602. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000:
CHOICES AHEAD tN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988).
603. Id. at iii.
604. Id.
605. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
606. See Greene, supra note 1, at 716 (concluding that originalism's appearance of value-
neutrality explains, at least partially, its popularity as an interpretive methodology).
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the left. It will be difficult for progressives to formulate an effective
response to originalism without reaching general consensus on a policy
agenda that the response is designed to promote.
More attention will have to be paid, moreover, to the first "o":
orientation. This Article has sought to demonstrate that originalism is
attractive to many Americans in part because of our orientation toward the
founding generation, toward assimilation and individualized claims of right,
and toward secular approaches to interpretation of sacred texts. These
orientations are slow to evolve, and seem to accommodate originalism better
than some of its more dynamic competitors. As I have emphasized, however,
orientations lie dormant without a corresponding narrative, and the narratives
that connect us to these originalism-friendly orientations are contestable.
Significantly, the American polity may be increasingly susceptible to a
pluralist narrative. If current immigration and demographic patterns hold,
the U.S. Census Bureau projects that the United States will be majority-
minority by the year 2042.607 As the nation diversifies culturally, narratives
of assimilation may become less fecund and the unifying potential of
Founding Era mythology may diminish. The symbolism of that Era may not
resonate equally across a range of communities, and to the extent that it does
resonate, it may do so increasingly as a source of redemption rather than
restoration. Claims that extend beyond equal status to equal respect or even
affirmative appreciation of difference may become more prevalent and
politically powerful.60 8
Technological change, which allows communities of interest to form
across geographic space, also may facilitate a relative shift in favor of plu-
ralist narratives. Immigrant rights; rights for gay, lesbian, and transgendered
individuals; rights for the disabled; and less punitive approaches to criminal
behavior might all benefit from a renewed emphasis on the American orien-
tation towards accommodation of difference.60 9 Jurispathic certitude in law
may become relatively disfavored as a result; the most potent constitutional
metaphor may trend away from the tablets of the covenant and toward, say,
open-source software.
A second possibility is that the financial crisis of 2008 could, with
sufficient emphasis, prompt a revitalization of a welfare-oriented
607. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury
(Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/
population/0 12496.html.
608. Cf. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 184-96
(2006) (advocating a shift in the civil rights paradigm from an equality model allied with
assimilation to a liberty model allied with accommodation).
609. Cf Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862,
1872-75 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), suggests a constitutional right to self-definition).
Texas Law Review
constitutionalism. 610 Comparisons between Obama and Roosevelt should not
be lost on those who seek to shift the focus of originalism away from the
founding generation, for the appropriate era to mine for inspiration may be
the New Deal rather than Reconstruction. 611 Freedom from want remains the
most neglected of Roosevelt's four freedoms; 612 the time may be ripe to
resurrect Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights, which called for a fierce
political commitment to a living wage, freedom from unfair competition,
home ownership, health care, education, and recreation.613 That is a remarka-
bly plausible progressive policy platform for the current time. It is,
moreover, a platform easily accommodated by representation reinforcement,
by the Reconstruction-oriented originalism of Justice Black, or even, in this
Democratic era, by a minimalist or prudentialist approach to constitutional
interpretation. What is needed are storytellers; simply mouthing the words
"living this" or "living that" will not do. Too Canadian.
VI. Conclusion
Originalism, like any other species of legal practice, is environmentally
adaptive. The variations in practices of constitutional interpretation that we
observe across space and time may be explained by variations in the political,
cultural, and historical landscape in which those practices are situated. That
may seem obvious, but it is in tension with the view that originalism follows
inevitably from the act of judicial interpretation of a written constitution. I
hope to have demonstrated not only that that view is unlikely to be true but
also that a long tradition of judicial review, a difficult process of constitu-
tional amendment, a familiarity with common law adjudication, and a desire
to avoid judicial activism do not add up to an affinity for originalism. We
share those conditions with Canada and with Australia, and in both countries
the sorts of interpretive moves that enjoy rhetorical potency are quite differ-
ent from here. That is not for lack of exposure to the originalist argument as
it has been expressed in the United States; rather, it results, I suggest, from a
different historical orientation toward their constitutions, a different place in
domestic political time, a different approach to judicial selection, and a
different set of cultural and religious predicates.
610. See generally Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
203 (2008) (arguing that public dialogue about distributive justice expressed through legislation
must precede any judicial recognition of constitutional welfare rights); cf Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) ("[T]he judicial 'equality' explosion of recent times has
largely been ignited by reawakened sensitivity, not to equality, but to a quite different sort of value
or claim which might better be called 'minimum welfare."').
611. Cf supra note 436 and accompanying text.
612. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 3 (2004) (arguing that some American politicians are
"committed, in principle, to 'freedom from want' but in practice "the public commitment is often
partial and ambivalent, even grudging").
613. Id. at 1.
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In exposing these variations in practice and proposing a set of
explanatory influences, I hope not only to have demystified originalism but
also to have gestured at a different frame of mind in constitutional interpre-
tive discourse. Originalism has been relatively successful in the United
States because its proponents have related it to an account of constitutional
authority that resonates with the American people. It has not been successful
in Canada because no comparable narrative is available. It has taken a dif-
ferent form in Australia because Australians necessarily tell a different set of
stories about their constitutional history and the role of the judiciary in en-
forcing constitutional mandates. Interpretive constitutional arguments, like
substantive ones, are arguments about democratic culture. The effectiveness
of arguments for or against one or another method of interpretation will
depend not on whether the arguments are logically coherent but on whether
they are ours.
